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US COLONISATION OF THE PHILIPPINES: INTERESTS, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISATION (1898-1916)

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ABSTRACT

The Philippines was a former Spanish possession acquired by the United States (US) in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898. Although officials did not originally intend to acquire the islands, unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico, the then President, William McKinley, ultimately decided to do so. Throughout the years the US exercised sovereignty in the Philippines, it gradually introduced political and economic reforms normally associated with liberal democracy. In comparison to other colonisers however, the US introduced such reforms relatively early.

This thesis analyses the motives behind the introduction of selected political and economic reforms in the Philippine Islands from 1898 to 1916. This period was selected as the US had by then reached the zenith of its control over its only formal colony. The thesis examines the circumstances and motivations of US officials and politicians involved. It analyses how prevailing interests, ideas, and institutions (Hall 1997), especially among Washington-based actors, such as Congress, the President and their key appointees involved in the Philippines (i.e. Secretary of War and Governor General), played a role and at times worked together toward the gradual political and economic liberalisation of the islands. Key reform initiatives examined in this thesis include the passage of the 1902 Organic Act (also known as the first constitution of the Islands given by the US), certain tariff acts, inquiries on distributing religious landholdings, and the passage of the 1916 Philippine Bill (also known as the 'Jones Law'). This thesis also revisits and surveys some of the developments the colonial government introduced such as the introduction of education and early efforts at land redistribution as well as the motives behind such initiatives. This thesis demonstrates how political and economic motivations in Washington, alongside external circumstances, shaped the gradual introduction of institutions otherwise associated with a liberal democracy. Overall, this thesis argues that although there were benefits for the Filipinos, the US found the introduction of such reforms necessary given their broader motives.

This thesis makes use of archived newspaper articles, letters shared between US officials, and official Congressional and colonial documents to support the empirical analysis.

Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

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PART I – Setting the stage

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This thesis analyses how the United States (US) was motivated to introduce liberal political and economic institutions in its Asian colony, the Philippines at a relatively early stage (1898-1916) compared to other Western colonisers. The question that concerns this thesis is what the possible drivers of pertinent policies were and whether such drivers could act as standalone explanations that have not been informed by other possible explanations or dynamics. It is an interesting study as this is a fairly unique phenomenon among those who colonisers. It is also essential as Chapter 2 will show that most existing scholarship offers mostly empirical explanations for the American colonisation in the Philippines.

In light of the foregoing, this introductory chapter focuses on establishing how the US was an unusual colonial power. The second section briefly describes of some of the reforms that the subsequent chapters will discuss. The third section will also identify the major features of other major colonies and how their colonisers treated them, and when they featured reforms to liberalise their colonies. The choice of colonial relationships is based on whether the coloniser was a major global power at about the beginning of twentieth century (although some of these powers have actually begun colonising their colonies well before this point). For the most part, the relationships will feature a Western coloniser and a non-Western colony. The exception to this will be the British-Australian colonial relationship. Discussing that demonstrates how a Western coloniser's treatment of a non-Western colony differed from the relationship between a Western and non-Western colony. Hence, it reinforces that the relationship between the Western US coloniser and the non-Western Philippines is unique, given how the former introduced colonial reforms in the latter. As Chapter 7 discusses, education is one of the first reforms introduced in the Philippines. Hence, this chapter will show when it was present in the other colonial relationships. Another thing that will be highlighted is when the reforms that provided opportunities for political participation in these colonies were introduced relative to when colonisation began.

Given what the section contains, the fourth section will discuss the thesis' main focus, significance, and implications. The final section will outline how the rest of the thesis will proceed and in doing so, reiterate that the at various times, the outcomes of introducing more liberal reforms early on were made as a result of the interaction of beliefs or values (ideas); norms, constraints and institutional set-ups (institutions); and material and electoral agendas and motivations (interests). Ideas, institutions, and interests are each referred to in general as the Is.

THE UNITED STATES: A UNIQUE COLONISER

The Philippines was the United States' (US) only colony in the Asia-Pacific region. Officials did not intend to colonise it in their initial plans during the Spanish-American War and it was regarded largely as an afterthought. However, politicians and other officials came up with several justifications to assume sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain. As Chapter 5 will show, officials often articulated the move to acquire Philippines in terms of these officials' interests. These interests would include their ability to establish a naval base in the Western

Pacific and a better footing to access China. What was notable, however, is that US officials introduced various politically liberal reforms relatively early on in the colony and although Filipinos experienced the benefits of such reforms to varying degrees, there are indications that the reforms were not introduced to solely benefit the Philippines. There were interests and other deeply rooted ideas that contributed to this. At the same time, there were institutions both in the Philippines, US, and internationally that the US had to deal with and were constrained to work with.

The US was nonetheless unique in among colonisers in its approach to political liberalisation in the Philippines in that a) the Philippines was a non-Western colony, and b) the US was introducing such reforms relatively early. This was an unprecedented move in comparison to concurrent colonisers. Among the key things the US introduced relatively early in the Philippines include a constitution for the colony that allowed its inhabitants a greater say over a wide range of affairs, a formal education system, land redistribution, and a relatively free trade regime. As will be seen in the next section, one or more similar moves towards liberalisation came relatively late among European colonies.

EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPERIENCES: A BRIEF SUMMARY

The European colonial experiences show here that Western colonisers introduced reforms associated with liberal democracies relatively late to non-'white' colonies. Moreover, in cases where the introduction of such reforms was relatively early, it was not as robust as what the US would introduce in the Philippines.

French in Algeria (1830-1962)

Before 1865, French settlements emerged along the coast and Muslim and Berber areas in the interior part of the territory were under military governance, especially those occupied by Algerian Muslims. The French state seized land what they deemed as unused and as a consequence, indigenous algerians were pushed to the margins (Christelow, 2005: 52-53). Algeria was eventually established as a colony to help decongest Mainland France (*colonie de peuplement*).

Reforms intended to be liberalising were introduced only in the 1860s, though they only applied to the Western population living there rather than the indigenous Arabs.

Muslims had no representation in France's national assembly until the end of World War II. Moreover, the Algerian Assembly did not exist until the 1940s. This assembly was subsequently abolished in the Algerian War as it was seen to hinder the Lacoste administration (Lenze, 2016: 20)[1]. It was replaced subsequently by the division of Algeria into five districts each with their own assembly.

French officials had not paid much attention to education in the Algerian colony. However, when they did, the French colonisers hindered Algerians from building their own identity in this aspect. The focus was instead on assimilating Algerians into French identities (Heggoy, 1973; Heggoy and Zingg, 1976). Genuine

[1] In the midst of the Algerian War of Independence, the National Liberation Front had carried out a series of terrorist attacks and *pied noir* (people who were born in Algeria but had French or European heritage) interests. As a consequence, French colonisers placed the colony under a state of emergency.

educational reforms came when the French strengthened their position in their African possessions from 1881 to 1919. However, such reforms were regarded as "too late" and offered "too little" and the number of schools built was insufficient to meet the needs of the Algerian territory (Heggoy and Zigg, 1976: 573). As part of France's educational legacy in Algeria, less than 5% of Algerian children attended school by 1870 and by 1954 about only 20% of Muslim boys and 6% of Muslim girls received formal education (Horne, 2006).

French in Vietnam (1887-1954)
The French colonisation of Vietnam was obtained as a consequence of France's victory in the Sino-French War. Among the key drivers of this were economic motivations, and rice and rubber were the main products. *Corvee* or forced unpaid labour for males was also introduced in 1901 to help fill the need to construct essential infrastructure in the territory.

Although the governor general exercised a significant amount of authority to interpret the colonial laws as he saw fit, political autonomy to benefit the locals was not considered until after the end of World War II when Ho Chi Minh attempted to negotiate for it only to end up in a French Indochina War until 1954.

Education initiatives were seen in Vietnam relatively early and provided with the help of French missionaries. French officials did not adopt a centralised colonial educational policy for Vietnam until 1918. This centralisation of this educational policy was done because officials felt the teachers acted as troublemakers and rebels who sided with and can mobilise Vietnamese armed resistance against the French (Kelly, 1977: 96-97; Llewellyn et al., 2019). Although the Americans wanted to introduce educational initiatives to Filipinos also as a way to discourage moves towards independence similar to the Vietnamese, a centralised education system was introduced much earlier in America's colonial run.

British Rule in India (1858-1947)
The British ruled India in some form since the eighteenth century (as a fiefdom of the – privately owned - British East Indian Company) though direct rule by the British state (the 'British Raj'), was formally introduced in 1858. In addition, the Indian Councils Act of 1861 was theoretically intended to allow more Indians a greater say in local affairs than in previous iterations of such institutions. However, there was no room for Indians on the Council to discuss financial matters, and they could not take binding votes. It was in the Government of India Act of 1919, which created a bicameral Indian legislature and allowed more participation by Indians (Kashyap, 1994). However, at this point, only males who owned high-valued property were allowed to stand for representation in the said legislature (Ganguly, 2011). The Indian set-up stands in contrast to the Philippines, which was colonised by the Americans for a fewer number of years before Filipino males who achieved a property or literacy requirement would be permitted to stand for colonial elected office[2].

When it came to education, primary education was provided primarily by Christian missionaries in the early days of direct British rule and less so by the British state itself. The middle-class were responsible for financing their own education in the

[2] Please see Chapter 6 for a more extensive explanation.

1860s and the opportunities for women to educate themselves to the same degree as men were limited. By 1900, less than 10 per cent of primary school-aged children in India attended any school (Chaudhary, 2017). Between 1860s and 1912, spending on education in the subcontinent was lowest among British colonies (Davis and Huttenback, 2009).

Belgian Colonisation of Congo

Belgian involvement in Congo took place in the late nineteenth century when Congo became personal property of the monarch at the time, King Leopold II, in an effort to enrich the monarch's commercial interests in palm oil and rubber. It was taken over by the Belgian state in 1908 and the focus was on developing the colony's industrial and agricultural sector. Forced labour became a feature of building the economic infrastructure. When it came to political participation, as at 1951, native Congolese did not hold any positions in the central colonial administration apart from being consultants in consultative bodies (Wigny, 1951). One of the reasons for such exclusion was that the population was not educated to a level desired by colonial officials yet. Education was largely the remit of religious organisations such as the Catholic Church. A total of over seven percent of pupils had underwent formal education in Congo as at 1943 (Harris, 1946).

Dutch Colonisation of Indonesia

Although the presence of Dutch colonisers in Indonesia started in 1602 through the (privately owned) Dutch East India Company, direct rule by the state began in the 1800s. The motivations for colonising was to extract spice and cash crops for profit (Booth et al., 1990). It was initially characterised by a forced labour system known as the cultivation system whereby peasant farmers were required to hand over 20 percent of their harvest to the State. It was abolished in the 1870s during the start of the Liberal Period, which focused on introducing private capitalism into Indonesia (Vickers, 2005). Living standards were, however, still undesirable at the turn of the 20th century (Indonesia-Investments, n.d.).

Education, alongside irrigation and emigration was emphasised as part of The Ethical Policy only starting in 1901. As part of this, Dutch officials tolerated indigenous political movements. However, as these movements became more radical, officials tightened the restrictions again on what it has seen as subversive acts and had led to the establishment of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Indonesia-Investments, n.d.).

British Colonisation of Australia – A "White" Colony

Australia was a special case as it involved "White" subjects that the British would colonise. The motivation for colonising Australia was less about extracting crops as it was more about managing prison populations in Britain as relatively minor offences (e.g. petty theft) were punishable by transportation and exile. Furthermore, as the US declared independence from the British empire in the 1770s, it meant fewer options for the British Empire to send its convicts (Ballyn, 2011). Most of the prisoners deployed there decided not to return to Britain upon completion of their sentences.

When it came to liberal-democratic institutions, English law (including the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights) was applicable into the Australian colony. However, demands for representative and democratic government increased in the middle of the nineteenth century. Limited self-government was granted to New South

Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania in 1855, decades after Britain started settling the territories (ibid).

THESIS' MAIN FOCUS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SIGNIFICANCE

As it can be seen from the cases just reviewed, essential liberal reforms were introduced relatively late by different colonisers relative to the US introducing similar such reforms in the Philippines. For instance, in Vietnam, centralised colonial education was introduced over 20 years after the French exercised sovereignty over it whereas in the Philippines, it was much sooner. India permitted propertied males several decades after direct British rule whereas Filipino counterparts received this less than 10 years after Americans ruled the Philippines.

Therefore, based on the foregoing differences, this thesis seeks to explain why the United States decided to introduce liberal reforms in the Philippines at a relatively early stage. As such, this thesis analyses the motives and environment behind the introduction of selected political and economic reforms in the Philippine Islands from 1898 to 1916. This period is chosen as the US had by then reached the zenith of its control over its only formal colony. The thesis examines the circumstances and motivations of US officials and politicians involved. This is especially among Washington-based actors, such as Congress, the President and their key appointees involved in the Philippines (i.e. Secretary of War and Governor-General), played a role and at times worked together toward the gradual political and economic liberalisation of the islands. The thesis will look at whether the given reasons are enough or how other reasons or factors played into the saliency of the given reasons using Hall's (1997) ideas-institutions-interests framework, also known as the 3Is framework.

Key reform initiatives examined in this thesis include the passage of the 1902 Organic Act (also known as the first constitution of the Islands given by the US), certain tariff acts, inquiries on distributing religious landholdings, and the passage of the 1916 Philippine Bill (also known as the "Jones Law"). These initiatives highlight the gradual political liberalisation among the other things that took place during the said period. This thesis also revisited and surveyed some of the developments the colonial government introduced such as the introduction of education as well as the motives behind such initiatives as well as early efforts towards land redistribution. This thesis demonstrated how political and economic motivations in Washington, alongside external circumstances, shaped the gradual introduction of institutions otherwise associated with liberal democracies.

Once again, the main research question that this thesis wants to answer and analyse is: why did the US implement liberalising reforms in the colonial Philippines between 1898 to 1916? The answer lies primarily in the fact that the reasons were the product of an interaction of prevailing interests, institutions, and ideas. Hall's (1997) 3Is framework, a tool used in public policy, shows that the US did not introduce measures associated with liberal democracy to the Philippines out of a commitment to democracy or liberal reforms *per se*. The thesis argues that there were deep-seated interests and ideas that influenced policymaking which could best be served in the Philippines by instituting elements of a liberal-democratic political and economic system. Among other things, the introduction

of such reforms was underpinned by mostly negative perceptions of Filipinos and a hope that by doing so, the Filipinos would have fewer reasons to want to rebel against US sovereignty. More importantly, the thesis also shows that some ideas-, institutions-, and interest-based reasons interacted with one of the others such that each of them, in and of themselves would not be sufficient explanations for US policy in the Philippines.

Given that the 3Is framework is utilised in the analysis of public policy coupled with the unique features of American colonisation in the Philippines, the thesis would contribute to the existing body of literature by linking the attempts to reform the colony to the different ideas and interests that US-based actors harboured and the prevailing institutions in the US and Philippines. This thesis, thus, represents a rare attempt to trace an articulation of ideas, interests, and institutions to account for colonial practices that involved instituting such reforms.

GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis consists of five main parts.

Part I, which contains Chapters 1 (introduction), 2, and 3, focuses on establishing the foundations for the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 will review previous attempts at explaining the relevant phenomena in the Philippines, what their strong points that may be useful for the thesis and what areas they fall short on to warrant the approach in this thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical and methodological basis for the rest of the thesis. It will outline Hall's (1997) 3Is framework. Specifically, the chapter explains the meaning of ideas, interest, and institutions, how the framework has developed, how it is used in broader public policy analysis, and how it is relevant for use in analysing the period this thesis examines. The 3Is framework will be the primary framework that this thesis will use. The chapter also concludes by providing the thesis' methodological underpinnings to justify the 3Is place in historical sociology.

Part II will contain chapters 4, 5, and 6. In particular, they consider the early socio-political atmosphere in the Philippines. Chapter 4 aims to outline the key institutional set-up that US colonisers inherited as they entered the Philippines. It shows that the institutional features they found in the Philippines were constraints that they needed to deal with as they would discharge their mission in the ensuing decades. Chapter 5 then turns to the decision to take the Philippines. It will outline the ensuing Is that interacted to help the McKinley administration and other officials decide what to do with the Philippines as well as on the very start of the administration. Chapter 6 will then turn to the first major effort to provide the Philippines with a Constitution, i.e. 1902 Philippine Organic Act. It will again look at the ideas-interests-institutions that played a role in helping officials make the critical decisions and why, for instance, the Philippines received the level of governance that it did.

Part III focuses on efforts to improve material conditions in the colony. For each of these sections, Chapter 7 will go into the question of education, given that other scholars have widely posited that it is one of the most important contributions of US rule. Chapter 8 will then look at the question of initial land reform attempts

as some officials have tried to do this and yet, have found out that there were factors that limited its effectiveness. Chapter 9 goes to the question of tariffs. For one, this was controlled largely by Congress. However, this issue remained a source of contention between the relevant interest groups. For these three chapters, the ideas-interests-institutions framework will be used to illustrate the dynamics and motives behind how the Philippines was given such measures. Likewise, the argument here was that these were not a product of giving

Part IV, or Chapter 10 examines the dynamics behind the passing of the Jones Law as well as the ideas, institutions, and interests that involved in doing so. Part V and Chapter 11 will act as the concluding chapter. It will then summarise the key findings of the thesis and reiterate how the framework has explained certain measures the US introduced, and identify the thesis' implications.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW: SITUATING EXISTING STUDIES ABOUT US COLONISATION OF THE PHILIPPINES IN THE FRAMEWORKS

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to use a theoretical framework developed by Hall (1997) to analyse the process by which the United States government introduced political and economic reforms akin to liberalising its Philippine colony from 1898 until 1916. That framework is used widely for public policy analysis and comparative politics but has not yet been applied to US colonial policy. As the US colonial era in the Philippines has been studied in different ways, this chapter aims to review selected works done on the Philippines and colonisation to highlight the strengths that they bring and the areas where they fall short. Out of a critical engagement with this literature, the thesis creates the intellectual space for using a historical-sociological approach to develop an original understanding of the significance and consequences of the US' attempts to introduce partial democratisation into its Filipino colony.

Whereas an appropriate theoretical framework will be introduced in Chapter 3, this chapter focuses on interrogating literature that can be grouped into three categories. The first section looks at approaches to colonial control, which in particular reviews Marxist approaches put forward by Filipino nationalist historians, Teodoro Agoncillo (1956) and Renato Constantino (1975), as well as progressives – a school of thought that critiques the degree to which agents have acted in contrast to their stated values but with less emphasis on class struggle - such as Frank Golay (1998). Marxist arguments about selected land redistribution efforts will be revisited as well here. Their approaches to studying history have been well-known and have some useful points as well as issues that need emphasis. This section will also look at geographical perspectives that explain American rule.

The second section focuses on the approaches of other 'non-western' sources (though ones that have strongly influenced 'western' thinking), particularly regarding the degree to which they offer insight into today's understandings of colonial actions. Edward Said's (1978) *Orientalism* and provides a lens for criticising how accounts that promote narratives of the superiority of western ideals and values are used and what their consequences are. The aim here is to highlight how important the framing Americans had been of Filipinos was in making decisions. This chapter will attempt to use their lenses as a way to highlight the negative portrayals of 'non-western'/'non-white' people found in key pieces such as Kipling's *White Man's Burden*, which effectively justified US colonialism of the Philippines. The articulation of a 'non-western' lens will thus, provide a basis for a more *nuanced appraisal* of how pieces sympathetic of 'western' perspectives thought of Filipinos.

The final section focuses on literature related to education and the degree to which relevant scholars have addressed the debates on the rationale of colonial education. Given that subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 7, will highlight the contribution of colonisers to country's education system, it is useful to flag in this section how previous authors have covered and accounted for the mindsets that came to bear on this. Among the questions that this section hopes to seek

the answer to is the extent to which these works can explore factors other than material interests behind the provisions for colonial education.

As valuable as the contributions of the works discussed in this chapter have proven to be, other important factors do not receive sufficient consideration, and as such get missed out. As such, this chapter will conclude by reiterating some of the strengths of the existing literature that lend themselves to a more theoretical approach that articulates material motives in the context of prevailing institutional set-ups and values, as well as the shortcomings that such a framework hopes to address. The conclusion will also emphasise that the previous works featured here fail to pay adequate attention to the political and economic situation in the US, as well as the desires of officials not just for the Philippines but for the broader geopolitical image of the US as an emerging power. Thus, another aim of this chapter is to show a need to weave into the discussion of a theoretical framework more players than, initially, might have seemed appropriate.

REVIEW OF APPROACHES TO COLONIAL CONTROL

Marxist-Nationalist Approach

The Marxist approach focuses largely on grounding the motivations of would-be colonisers in a desire to control the means of production, such as land, other natural resources and technology. The underlying premise is that societies are structured on the basis of class inequalities whereby a small but powerful property-owning class lives off the "surplus labour" that workers produce (Chakrabati, 2016: 11). Exploitation is also a key element of the Marxist approach, especially as Marx thought it was a system based on the "theft of labour" (ibid). Marxists, thus see colonisation as a means to fulfil a dominant power's material interests and strengthen its position. In here, there is a structural relationship whereby a system of developed (known as the core) and underdeveloped (known as the periphery) economies prevail. As such, some Marxists such as Fanon (1961) note that violence is an essential feature of colonisation as the dominant power does not want to relinquish control. An important theme is that the colonised subjects do not necessarily want decolonisation as the most privileged of them -dependent for their wealth on the colonisers - may lose out (Fanon, 1961). Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism movements are seen more as part of the general struggle against global capitalism. Specifically, anti-colonialists see Marxism as something that could be studied along with other resources such as nationalism and that it has been Marxism's relationship to nationalism that has been essential (Young, 2016: 111-112). Additionally, imperialism has a connotation whereby a state uses its power to try to find economic monopolies for its larger firms (Wolfe, 1997: 388).

One of the more prominent Marxist scholars on the Philippines is Epifanio San Juan. In his book *US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines*, San Juan (2007) has called attention to how the Philippines has been represented in the official government documents and how colonial acts of violence have been downplayed. San Juan is Marxist in that he emphasises motives related to capital accumulation among US officials and allied business interests for acquiring overseas territories. He argues that a desire for capital accumulation had driven what he called "the messianic impulse of genocide", which in the case of the Philippines, was the Filipino-American War (ibid: xv). Moreover, he reiterates that violence against non-whites in the US has been a feature even before that country

industrialised (ibid: 27). As such, San Juan establishes that racism towards non-White races was part of the American psyche before the US colonised the Philippines. San Juan also takes issue with a limited acknowledgement in Western discourse of US imperialism whereby those who would consult such would not think that it had existed and how such imperialism inhibited the development of the native culture. A recurring argument in San Juan's work was demonstrating how the portrayal of the Filipino in Western sources acted to shape the consciousness of US officials. With San Juan raising these issues, he argues that a one-sided accounting of the US role in the Philippines has obscured the underlying motives US politicians and their allies had in the colony.

Nationalist historians like Teodoro Agoncillo (1956; 1960; 1990)[3] and Renato Constantino (1975) have introduced a leftist angle to their telling of the American story in the Philippines. The nationalist historians have attempted to view the Philippine situation as a struggle and that Filipinos, especially the peasantry, are the ones on the struggling side. Specifically, one of Agoncillo other books - *The Revolt of the Masses* (1956), although not dealing directly with US rule, sets up the ordinary Filipino as someone locked in a struggle against the US' colonial predecessors (the Spaniards) shortly before the US' arrival. Agoncillo's (1956) work offers a look into his mindset, which shows the Filipino peasant revolution as "unfinished", and that movements promoting independence were initiated by the petite bourgeoisie and the working class in cities. Agoncillo's narrative is shaped by what he considers the differences between what Philippine officials said shortly after the Philippines became independent from the US and what he observed (Ileto, 2011: 500). Agoncillo's (1956) account of Andres Bonifacio's role[4] in the Philippine revolution attempts to tap into Marx's initial thought of a peasantry that needed to be mobilised to pursue national liberalisation.

Another one of the key tenets of their arguments are their conceptions of "mis-education of the Filipino" by colonisers and their talk in terms of social classes with the Filipino masses being the oppressed and exploited party and the US officials siding with the oppressive capitalists (McFarlane, 2000: 302). To them, colonial powers like the US introduced such measures with a hope of increasing surplus value and thus fulfilling the interests of their major business allies. On the notion of benevolent assimilation, for instance, Agoncillo (1990: 214) argues that business and religious interests pressured President William McKinley[5] into acquiring the Philippines as a base for their operations and missions, respectively. He documented how revolutionaries like General Antonio Luna and Emilio Aguinaldo rebuffed such a proclamation and did their part to reduce tensions[6].

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[3] Two books written by Teodoro Agoncillo are discussed in this section – History of the Filipino People (1960; 1990 is latest edition) and Revolt of the Masses (1956) which focuses on the Philippine Revolution of the late 1890s.

[4] Andres Bonifacio is a filipino national hero. He was credited for being one of the leaders of the Philippine revolution against the Spaniards. He was part of the Katipunan organisation, which advocated full Philippine independence.

[5] William McKinley was President of the United States during the time of the Spanish-American War of 1898. As such, his administration was tasked with deciding the fate of Spanish possessions. Analysis of the process behind is provided more in Chapter 5.

[6] Emilio Aguinaldo was the first president of the Philippines, also known then as the Malolos Republic. Antonio Luna was an army general under Aguinaldo. Both of them resisted American rule.

Agoncillo has also presented evidence of brutality perpetrated by the Americans and senior Filipino officials. (e.g. Agoncillo, 1990: 230).

Agoncillo believes that in interpreting the events of the past, historians should be critical without dismissing evidence that may rebut their own beliefs (May, 1998: 292). Agoncillo (1990) wants those who interpret historical events for readers to challenge established accounts and to be challenged.

As Agoncillo (1990) has focused on the element of struggle by casting the less privileged Filipino classes as the oppressed and the American elites and Filipino office holders as oppressive forces, he failed to account for any benefits that Filipinos may have derived. For instance, when Agoncillo illustrated McKinley's *Benevolent Assimilation,* he has not acknowledged whether any good intentions among colonial officials existed, even derivative ones. Even if self-interested motives prevailed, it does not have to exclude questions of whether genuine desires to improve the Filipino way of living, no matter how misinformed, existed. In this matter, the narrative that Agoncillo sends to audiences is that self-interested motives were the sole driver of policy and action. Based on examining Agoncillo's work, one thing that was lacking was a vigorous attempt to acknowledge that any action by officials that originated in economic or power interests yielded desirable results for Filipinos.

In relation to the previous paragraph, Agoncillo's approach, as written in the relevant sections of his 1990 book, also focuses more on the Filipino perspective. Even though there were some references to American intentions, they were not discussed in the same detail to help account for their mindset as completely as other approaches. Thus, the process and factors towards the key decisions made by relevant officials become obscured. Agoncillo's works have discussed the decisions but less so of *how* and *why* they arrived at such decisions. Discussing them would enrich Agoncillo's - and Constantino's - work as it could show *how* US officials thought about their decision and role in the struggles that such scholars wish to portray (i.e. between Filipinos and the colonisers). Granted that at the heart of nationalist history is an attempt to build an analytic narrative of struggle among non-elite Filipinos against other powerholders, it presumes that the officials on the US side were well-informed about *how* they considered what they wanted to do in the Philippines and *why* at greater length. That is, it would assume that officials there would have to think hard about creating social classes, but evidence presented by such historians has remained relatively limited. The letters invoked by US sources document what happened. However, an interpretation of the reasons for such remains limited on the part of these historians.

However, one of Agoncillo and Constantino's notable strengths is that they did not treat the Filipinos monolithically. For instance, they have shown how wealthy Filipinos have collaborated with the colonial administrators, a phenomenon called *comprador bourgeoisie*. It is valuable in that it illustrates, albeit implicitly, the presence of institutional set-ups that administrators had to deal with and the institutions that as the succeeding chapters will allude to, have shaped the execution of their policies. Their approach is similar to Fanon's (1961) characterisation of local elites' role in facilitating the spread of colonialism. That said, it is also important to note that Agoncillo and Constantino have emphasised that this is a struggle not just between Filipinos and foreign occupiers but a class

struggle. Agoncillo and Constantino can thus be considered both Marxist and nationalist.

In trying to frame US activities involving the Philippines as a struggle between the elite class (US and Filipino officials on one side and less wealthy Filipinos on the other), another significant and related issue is that Agoncillo and Constantino assume that colonisers think in terms of a zero-sum game where one party gains and another one has to lose as a result. That may be true with respect to how the Americans saw themselves vis-à-vis other colonial powers. The Spanish-American War was one such event. There was also a clear desire for the US to exercise its power under the Monroe doctrine and drive European colonisers like Spain away from the Western Hemisphere. However, Agoncillo and Constantino's works seem to imply that such a condition was present between coloniser and colony. The fact remains that for all the possible motives the US had in the Philippines, it does not mean that the Filipinos would not benefit from it. If the US pursued a zero-sum expedition against its colony, one would need to pose some questions regarding its reforms. They would need to be asked to the effect of whether they would be introduced in the first place, albeit slowly. Under a zero-sum game scenario, the Philippine Islands may not be receiving any of the reforms even if such reforms had the sole intention to satisfy the administrators in the islands.

Marxist authors are also useful in trying to ascertain the effectiveness of land redistribution efforts.[7] As will be explained further in Chapter 8, land redistribution is a way to achieve economic progress, something which officials in the US hoped to elicit out of the Philippines but were hindered from doing so. Among the authors who are relevant in this include Saturnino Borras. Borras does not specialise on the causes of US colonisation or their motivations *per se*, but he, together with Jennifer Franco, point out that most of the peasant uprisings that occurred during the Spanish and American eras focused on issues of land, which was something that Agoncillo (1956) and Ileto (2011) concur with. As such, they go on to argue that dealing with land ownership is crucial to solving the plight of the rural poor. Their framework highlighted a sense of struggle between the powerful (colonisers and landed owners) and the peasant classes. Colonial officials in both Spain and the US reacted with repression (Franco and Borras, 2007: 68). Franco and Borras acknowledge the presence of the contentious issue of the Friar Lands and the US' attempts to resolve it. Furthermore, they suggest that resistance and insurrections were not against colonisation itself but rather the inability to address issues of property rights effectively. That is considering that the Philippines, as will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 8, had not had a robust institution of property rights that would include those who were most vulnerable to losing the lands they occupied.

Although connecting land redistribution to insurrections was that one of the significant takeaways of Franco and Borras' (2007) work, their framing of struggle does not account directly for subsequent events such as the distribution of political power towards Filipinos. Moreover, as Chapter 7 alludes to, education would be used as a tool to pacify the insurrections by endearing the hearts and minds of the Filipinos to what life under US influence had to offer. As plausible as Franco

[7] US colonial efforts to address such issues of land redistribution will be discussed more in Chapter 8.

and Borras' arguments are in explaining the shortcomings of officials on land redistribution, their argument of it leading to insurrection and the increased nationalist sentiment is undermined by the fact that officials attempted to address the underlying issues, albeit by introducing weaker legislation. Furthermore, those officials possessed other means to quell the ensuing insurrections.

Figure 2 - Philippine Islands Map as of 1898; source: Shepherd (1911: 199)

Filomeno Aguilar (1998) discusses how the US intervened to prop up the sugar industry in Negros (refer to Figure 1 for its location relative to the rest of the Philippines). He suggests that the US was desperate to pacify insurrections happening around the islands by enlisting the assistance of native elites. Aguilar points out that administrators wanted to incentivise these elites to cooperate in their efforts to quell rebellions by providing them opportunities to participate in governance. Moreover, he compared Filipino elites to their Malayan and Javanese counterparts by saying that that former was integrated into the system more as politicians and less as civil servants, which was the norm in the latter two settings. Aguilar also discusses that the colonial state found it challenging to solve issues brought about by rinderpest and locust plagues and the unprofitable environment plaguing the agriculture especially in Negros where colonial officials discovered that it was "less risky" to invest in the sugar industry (Aguilar 1998: 195).

Aguilar manages to point out that native elites were responsive to colonial incentives. In doing so, they cited the context of pacifying the Philippines, and they allowed local elites, some of which hailed from the line of sugar capitalist class from Negros, to participate in affairs as politicians fairly early (ibid: 189). That is a narrative that most other scholars have accepted. Given that there was a problem with quelling insurrections or preventing more of the sort from happening, officials had to play a gambit even if some of them were hesitant. Aguilar also points out how much power was bestowed to native elites, especially in (trying to stop) gambling, which was something stifled during the Spanish era but re-emerged under the Americans. All of these accounts are valuable in that they imply how institutionalised various practices (e.g. gambling) were. His work points out that if there are interests the colonial administrators wanted to fulfil, they needed to work within the norms the native elites were used to (ones presumably developed under the Spaniards).

Aguilar pays limited attention to considering how local elites thought that such was their motives, as his work has spent more of the time looking at fulfilling economic interests of elites and administrators and to some extent considering the institutional set-up of the islands in accounting for the outcome of introducing policies and incentives. Aguilar also places relatively limited emphasis on how colonial elites conceived how establishing such power structures would serve their material motives. For instance, what would inform the motives of suppressing rebellions? Would that be a key reason? Although accounting for material motives may constitute a compelling narrative, it is not clear how local elites conceived of such as their interests. Such conceptions are pronounced to a relatively limited degree when it came to citing Philippine Commission chair Jacob Schurman's[8] hope for increased governance for the Filipino people. The conceptions for material motives, however, has not been given further elaboration and are merely implied. Also, given that officials based in the mainland had domestic sugar interests to worry about as Aguilar himself has inferred, if material interests alone are considered, it would be reasonable to imply that these officials may not extend assistance to the Negros sugar industry to the degree that it did so.[9]

A strength of the Marxist-based frameworks is that they show that the reasons behind US rule were economic and geo-political rather than largely altruistic. They have reiterated that the US did not hesitate to engage in acts of violence in the Philippines, as was the case during the Philippine-American War. This is especially given that scholars like San Juan (2007) have reiterated that violence has been a tool to subjugate non-white peoples throughout US history.

San Juan, effectively claims that Western scholars have downplayed US transgressions and cast local elites in a more antagonistic light than warranted in explaining perceived backwardness, especially when interrogating notions of *hiya*

[8] Jacob Schurman was chairman of the Philippine Commission set up by William McKinley in 1899 to investigate the conditions in the Philippines and provide recommendations on what appropriate structures are to be implemented.

[9] Although Aguilar (1998) focused especially on the power dynamics of propping up the sugar industry in Negros, this work nonetheless tried to examine it in the context of existing class structures in the Philippines, which he argues were propped up and that a desire to do so was connected to broader American motives of putting the colony under control.

(shame), *utang-na-loob* (internal debt), etc. San Juan has also illuminated how the US officials portrayed Filipinos as pre-modern, less "civilised" than Americans. This thesis does not dispute that Americans used such characterisations of Filipinos and in later chapters, it will consider such characterisations as a key factor in analysing the decisions US officials took. Irrespective of how flawed these recurring characterisations of Filipinos were, the fact was that they influenced some of the policy decisions this thesis will analyse.

In relation to dispelling the notion of altruism among Americans who wanted to do business in the Philippines, the Marxist approaches have highlighted the role of business interests in shaping US policy. Furthermore, these authors uncover that such interests emerge in framing US colonialization of the Philippines as a class struggle. In this, they emphasise what they consider is the exploitative nature of colonisation. For instance, San Juan (2007) has called out what Chomsky terms "politics and ideology" constrained by the "consensus of the business community", which promote ideas related to a so-called "free market". But such accounts, San Juan shows, at times obscure violent action and downplay exploitation. As succeeding chapters document, some officials and politicians wanted to satisfy their business allies. Similarly for Marxists such as Agoncillo, class struggle becomes a basis for introducing other elements associated with it such as regional inequalities and collaboration between Filipino elites and US officials. Agoncillo has, for instance, continued to frame the Americans and Filipino elites as advancing US business interests. For Marxists like himself, such collaboration happens to the detriment of the vast majority of Filipinos who do not own the means of production.

As valuable as those points are in elaborating the extent to which opportunities to exacerbate class struggle and the power imbalances between the US and the Philippines are, the Marxist approach has its limitations. One such limitation is that the assumption that the state, which in this case is the US government (both in Washington and through their representatives in the colony), is always preconfigured to assist a capitalist-owning class when it has other functions or groups that it needs to work with. In other words, that an agent's actions are predetermined by their position in the power dynamic. Although the likes of San Juan, Agoncillo, and Aguilar have pointed out that the state wanted to promote US business interests, there is evidence that that is only one of a number of interests the US pursued. For instance, the state facilitated the fostering of religious interests (Domhoff, 2005). As Chapter 5 argues, the state helped Christian missionaries. Additionally, although one could conceivably connect the threat of warfare against rival powers to opportunities for economic exploitation, given the economic reasons for rivalry between sovereign states, the Marxist scholars have generally been unable to account directly for how rivalries between sovereign states could explain reasons to acquire a colony and/or grant it a certain status.

Moreover, although the Marxist literature introduces the economic interests of agents, other dimensions need to be considered and mobilised to be able to formulate a more adequate explanation for the course of US colonialism in the Philippines: institutions and ideas. This thesis does not intend to contradict Marxist-based accounts but instead, complement them by providing more context to such accounts and examining the process of policy-making. The Marxist focus on class interests needs to be understood alongside other factors. The 3Is

framework, which the next chapter will explain in more detail, is a widely-used framework to analyse public policy but has not yet been deployed to understand US colonial policy. It is able to examine a variety of factors and their impact on the decision-making process involved in colonial policy. Specifically, the 3Is framework incorporates how the ideas, interests, and institutions work together to explain such a phenomena. Thus, the framework provides a more holistic perspective on such processes.

In light of the foregoing, this thesis utilises the 3Is framework to analyse US colonialism in the Philippines and its consequences between 1898 and 1916. As a result, it provides an original explanation for the origins of what would later become Asia's first democratic state.

Progressive Approach

The progressive approach to historical analysis is a school of thought that portrays the dominant powerholders as a hypocritical force. That is, scholars in the approach criticise those who held positions of power for failing to act in according to the values those actors wanted to profess. Scholars in this field tend to express reservations about the actors' motives. Although this may be a characteristic shared with Marxism, the progressive approach places less emphasis on the concept of class struggle. A progressive approach does not have to reject the principles behind what agents claim to profess *per* se but questions whether the agents' motives are consistent with such.

Among the progressive voices in accounting for colonial decisions is Frank Golay (1998). In his work *Face of Empire*, Golay has approached it based on looking at the legislative history of decisions related to developing the US' only colony in Asia.

Golay is particularly useful for his empirical detail. He has also extensively discussed the role of US politicians. For instance, Golay (1998: 34) evaluates the worries of the McKinley administration during the legislative/Congressional process about colonisation and the concerns they had about opposition to their proposals. Golay portrays McKinley as someone concerned with maintaining standing within his party. This detail provides clues to the role of partisan politics in the colonisation decision. He also examines US perceptions of a potential Japan threat to the US and whether keeping The Philippines would help or hurt America's ability to defend itself against possible Japanese aggression.

Golay's focus, however – like those of Agoncillo and Constantino – mainly centres around how US power players stood to gain materially and electorally from in The Philippines, with limited attention to how ideas-based considerations might have determined the policy outcomes. For instance, in the decision to acquire the Philippines, most of the references Golay made had to do with the "commercial advantage" as well as President William McKinley's desire to expand the number of his Congressional allies[10]. (cf. Golay, 1998: 33-4). Although it is clear that

[10] Golay (1998) argues that this "commercial advantage" was touted by Navy Admiral George Dewey, who was well known for his victory in the Spanish-American War under President William McKinley's administration. This "commercial advantage" implies that Dewey and by extension McKinley thought that the Philippines had economic benefits for the US. Also in consideration is that 1898 was a midterm election year and McKinley

commercial interests were an important consideration, the issue that warrants consideration is whether these interests alone played a decisive role in driving decision-making.

Larkin (1999: 926) also criticises Golay's approach as it has a limited view of how colonisation was viewed from an indigenous perspective as there were issues related to the Philippines that may have been accounted for. Larkin, however, has applauded Golay for his argument that colonisation of the Philippines should be seen in the broader context of empire building, the roots of which date as far back as the Mexican War. Also evident in this work is that Golay shows how concerns over these related issues resonated with each politician's constituencies.

The closest allusion to less material-based approaches would be Golay's invocation of Kipling's *White Man's Burden*. Although Kipling's poem will be discussed later, it is sufficing to say at this point that there were implied ideas about what a "White Man" was. Nonetheless, given what other accounts say about how effective Filipinos are, the central role of ideas was not as explicitly pronounced in Golay as elsewhere.

Approaches Highlighting Socio-political and geographical considerations
As the Philippines is an archipelago that consists of seven thousand islands, the logistical difficulties US administrators would face in managing the territory it acquired from Spain would inevitably become an issue. Previous colonisers had experienced challenges integrating the southern parts of the archipelago, the Muslim regions of Mindanao (cf. Abreu, 2008) (Figure 1 presented earlier shows the position of Mindanao relative to the rest of the Philippines and Figure 2 shows the Philippines relative to the rest of the Western Pacific region with Mindanao in the southernmost island group). According to Abreu (2008), Spain for instance, had at most exercised "nominal" control over the said region as Spanish administrators remained mostly confined to their fortifications, and they had to flee north during the outbreak of the Philippine revolution. It was hence another manifestation where the Spaniards struggled to exercise their will.

needed to increase his majority in Congress, especially considering that some members of his own party have voted against some of his desired pieces of legislation.



Figure 2 - The Western Pacific region in 1898. Source: Omniatlas (2017)

Abreu (2008) documents that US administrators attempted to subjugate the southern part of the country. Such attempts met local resistance, and although the sultans had to compromise from time to time, they regarded attempts to introduce US-style practices, especially on education and community tax certificates as an affront to the way of life. Moreover, the Peace Treaty that heralded the end of the military rule across most of the colony did not extend to the Muslim South and as such, hostilities continued between 1901 and 1913 in what became known as the Moro Rebellion (Theodore Roosevelt Center, n.d.). Abreu also points out that communal property rights were widespread in the southern Philippines, given that this region was not touched by Spanish rule as much as northern parts of the colony. Such a practice caused friction as colonial administrators engaged in land grabs, and the parcels of lands involved were transferred to private enterprises.

Based on the foregoing, Abreu (2008) provides an account where early on, the Moro areas of the Philippines warranted a different treatment from the rest of the colony. That was the case when the Moro areas were not included in the peace treaty ending the anti-colonial struggle of 1899 and hostilities continued until the 1910s. From here, one would otherwise infer that resources used to suppress insurrections were diverted from the north. Given that attempts for insurrections were prevalent in the north, one may also guess that the different treatment might imply that the Americans had a different mindset for Moros or that the Moros were more hostile towards anything that they considered to undermine their way of life. That was especially the case when southern locals did not appreciate the efforts to be educated in the American way of life. However, Abreu is unable to account for the connection between efforts to liberalise the more northern parts and pacify the southern region. Given the different colonial experiences each region had undergone as well as the differences in their receptivity to the American measures, Abreu suggests that the varying institutional configurations in the Philippines were

considered by the US when promulgating the next steps the colonial administration wanted for the colony. According to Abreu, the US' approach was not a 'one-size fits all' approach to solving the issue of internal rebellions.

Notwithstanding the differences in treatments, the fact is Spain ceded the entire archipelago to the US, and the Moro region was eventually given independence at the same time as the rest of the colony (in 1946). In retrospect, there was no intention to grant various regions outright independence at different times, even as officials approached each region differently. Furthermore, in the early 1900s, President Roosevelt regarded the Philippine colony as a whole, and not just one or a few regions, as an entity whose locals cannot govern on their own. The inference from this is that officials wanted to achieve the same objectives of security both regions but that the unique circumstances prompted administrators to treat the Moro region differently until the concerns they rectified the concerns there.

The extent of articulating which material motives were relevant to the US-Moro situation was, at best, implicit. Certain sets of beliefs may have been significant to the extent that earlier Moro leaders were assessing how much of a threat Western culture, including education, was to their way of life. Likewise, accounts by Abreu (2008), by invoking that early Moro leaders felt threatened by Western culture, implies a strength of Muslim institutions in the South that may have made it difficult for Western occupiers to make inroads there in the first place. Almost no attention is paid to the institutional issues involved (such as the possible significance of the mosques in helping to mobilise popular opposition to the US colonisers).

Finally, although looking at the differences in how the Moro regions were treated adds perspective and evokes questions on strategies to manage resources, Abreu would be well-served to identify the views from Washington more extensively, especially since the decision to effect long-lasting changes would come from politicians and how they see their prospects, as well as those of the US.

Foreign Policy-Related Approaches

The Contested State by Amy Blitz (2000) provides an overview of the early colonial era from 1899 to 1916. Unlike most other approaches discussed so far, Blitz discusses the Philippines more in terms of domestic politics. She manages to identify the partisan dynamics with most of the president's party supporters in congress favouring acquisition and Democrats mostly in opposition to it. Blitz's approach points out the foreign policy and economic interests that the US officials and politicians possessed such as Taft's stake in trade agreements and his battle with other industry interests. She highlights the importance of transnational relations between politicians in the US and the Philippines, such as when there were moves to devolve even more powers to Filipinos during the Wilson administration and when governors-general like Francis Harrison worked together with Filipino representatives such as Manuel Quezon to promote steps towards independence. These common goals stemmed from various interests from each party (51).

Although it is a compelling account and is useful for this thesis in the sense that alliances between individual politicians on both sides were formed, Blitz's work could have made more explicit reference to how material motives of officials

related to the US's acquisition of the Philippines could have been interpreted and the institutional contexts it operated under. Although there were occasional allusions to America's mission to shape its image with the Philippines and references to form an "appropriate form of government for the islands", (37), this piece of literature would need to make clear references to what administrators and politicians have thought of the Philippines as it was an important discursive tool to convince colleagues about what the intentions were. Furthermore, regarding the motivations to provide the Filipinos with a say, Blitz has not discussed the factors driving both proponents and opponents to it. The exception is when he mentions the development of "goodwill" between the two races (37). It begs the question again of *why* it was such. Blitz does account for Taft's desire to isolate opposition from Emilio Aguinaldo's insurrection-prone forces and Taft's "policy of attraction", though. Nonetheless, the references to what her work says about *ideas* towards Filipinos needs more elaboration. There were more allusions to this when saying Wilson did not want Filipinos to prove themselves "worthy of self-government" (48), which meant there was a clear implication that an idea about Filipinos not being able to govern themselves or that Filipinos were by nature like this or that was a prevailing thought.

In accounting for the passage of the legislation that would bring the Philippines one step closer to independence, Blitz makes almost no substantial reference to other geopolitical events such as the dynamics in the Western Pacific[11]. Other scholars would consider this. Given that a rising empire like the US had finite resources, one would want to consider how strong its defences were against rival forces in the Pacific arena.

Even as Blitz has made occasional references to the long-standing norms such as the strength of the farmers' unions in the US, she does not explain in detail how they have consolidated. Even when it comes to the discussion of material considerations alone, references to the historical glut thesis and previous desires to access the Chinese market were[12]. As Chapter 5 points out, these items are important when analysing relevant factors (whether they have actually followed up on this motivation *once* they were the colonisers is a different story). Blitz also pays limited attention to institutions such as property rights.

Victor Bulmer-Thomas (2018) looks at the Philippines in relation to America's broader rise and fall as an empire. A direct discussion on relevant parts of the Philippines came in a chapter related to American pursuits in the Orient. As Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, most scholars have traced the acquisition of the Philippines to America's desire to expand trade with China. Bulmer-Thomas adds that the US was fascinated by Spain's trading arrangements with China. Moreover, the genesis of trading with the region had its roots in the late 1810s. The work points out the lack of appetite for statehood to be granted to territories

[11] One such geopolitical incident that officials invoked was the threat of an emerging Japanese power. There was a fear that if the Japan were to attack the Philippines, it would undermine US military power. This will be discussed more in Chapter 10.

[12] The *Glut thesis* is a concept which promotes the notion that seeking markets overseas was a solution to domestic production surplus. This was a popular concept scholars used to characterise the economic developments of the late nineteenth century in the US. Among the promoted moves associated with such is increased access to the Chinese market. This will be explored more in Chapter 5.

outside the mainland and it highlights that the Supreme Court declared the Philippines as an unincorporated territory which meant it does not have "civil" and "procedural" rights, just "fundamental" ones under US law (ibid: 97). Bulmer-Thomas had also illustrated the economic challenges of introducing trade for local US industries as well as the immigration issues that Filipinos may be entitled to, which some politicians back in the mainland believed would be detrimental to the labour sector in the US.

Bulmer-Thomas' work is valuable in terms of its accounts of the broader geopolitical context that the US faced not only in the Western Pacific but also the rest of the world. Moreover, as the Philippines was just a subsection of Victor Thomas's (2018) book, this goes to show there was a macro focus on the project of imperial rule. It has also highlighted the domestic economic and political interests at play that wanted to build America's image and ideals as an empire. The section also makes a brief mention to Filipinos "taking advantage" of their so-called "fundamental" rights with the introduction of liberalised trade laws (97). It is in these respects that the thesis could use the chapters in this account.

Given that the title of Bulmer-Thomas' (2018) book is entitled *Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States*, it is notable that the chapter does not pay sufficient attention to the steps and processes concerned with devolving power away from the US colonial administrators to Filipinos. Given that between 1902 and 1916, a significant number of powers were devolved to native politicians and bureaucrats, one would have expected a discussion on the motives for such from works trying to make sense of an empire trying to step back from its colonial obligations.[13] As Chapter 10 of this thesis will explain and analyse, these events should be mentioned given that there were external forces that could make American power vulnerable (e.g. Japan) and that officials considered these even years before they started implementing moves to offer the colony more devolved powers.

CHALLENGES AND QUESTIONS POSED BY 'NON-WESTERN' LITERATURES

Some scholars have criticised approaches that disregard the importance of stereotypes of colonised people. *Orientalism* by Said (1977) focuses on the perceptions of colonisers towards the colonised subjects and more importantly, how these perceptions affect the colonised themselves. Among Said's main arguments is that orientalism is used by the West (or Occident) as a way to characterise what he calls the Orient. Moreover, the Orient was used by Western scholars and power holders in a manner that allowed them to justify their perception of themselves as superior to their colonial subjects.

Said regards the Orient as a projection onto the colonised 'other' of anything the West saw undesirable in itself. It means that for any undesirable trait the Western powers possessed themselves, they would articulate to make it seem that the Orient possessed such a characteristic. Moreover, under the concept of orientalism, anything conceptualised about the Orient was intended for the consumption of powerholders in the West. That was propagated in the 19th and 20th centuries when western countries apprehended in their colonies what they considered to be a pure form of human existence – a sort of 'innocence' -

[13] Please see chapters 5 and 10 for a more detailed analysis of the motives and circumstances behind the devolved powers.

compared to their self-characterisation of their own societies as highly sophisticated, technologically advanced, and complex. Said suggests that as far the West is concerned, given the supposed 'innocence' of their colonial subjects, the 'protection' (and thus the control) by the colonisers was justified.

In the context of US colonisation of the Philippines, one could say that the US took the role of the West, whereas the Philippines was an embodiment of the Orient. As will be mentioned in subsequent chapters, one of the underlying ideas that would be influential in decisions by officials was the ability of Filipinos to govern themselves. In there, several authors would argue that officials thought Filipinos did not possess such abilities yet and needed education. San Juan (2002: 15) emphasises the presence of Orientalist stereotypes in the case of how officials saw Filipinos who fought for self-determination: "wily, devious, incapable of domestication". San Juan argues further that state apparatuses that the US colonisers introduced (e.g. legal system, census, surveillance) replaced anthropological knowledge (ibid). Under Said's characterisation, this implied that the US, by imposing education and other institutions to the degree that it did, was also trying to assert the dominance of Western ideas about the Philippines. On the other hand, US officials had to rely on native officials who were holdovers from the Spanish government to help carry out the former's directives. Nonetheless, and as will be seen in subsequent chapters, Governors-General like William Taft did not prefer such a tactic.

Applying this to Kipling's (1899) *White Man's Burden*, which is about moves to colonise the Philippines, it is noteworthy that he uses the phrase "White Man" at the start of every stanza. Although other pieces of works tend to portray the "White Man" as someone who was benevolent and cavalier, Kipling made it clear in the first stanza how the other party to this was portrayed: "your new-caught sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child". The use of the words "new-caught", "devil", and "child" to refer to the other connotes Western superiority and inferiority for the Orient, which in this case is the subjects that would be caught. The West (based on Said's characterisation) characterised the Orient as "half-devil" and "half-child" to justify the tasks. Moreover, his explicit reference to the phrase "White Man" was a way to remind readers what he thought about; what that character possessed in relation to those who were not. In this case, it was the ability to impose what it thought of as moral on the subjects it would put under its jurisdiction. Kipling also goes on to use phrases like "Fill full the mouth of famine and bid the sickness cease;". The inclusion of such words is a characterisation that the Orient, to the West, was a place stricken with economic backwardness. The Orient is, according to Kipling, also a state of material poverty that the West thinks it needed to eradicate.

To further highlight the features of Kipling's (1899) poem, Roxanne Doty (1996) illustrates the US colonisation of the Philippines. In the study, Doty presumes that identities of "Western people" and "inferior races" did not exist until discursive practices surrounding certain points were brought to the fore (331). Doty argues that colonial relationships follow what she calls a "distinctly social logic by which actors construct themselves and others and the 'reality' that makes…colonialism possible" (333). She focuses on the language used in texts and pays attention to the terms used. She analyses Kipling (1899) and emphasises both the word "white" and "man" in separate sections. Doty invokes how Kipling characterised colonisation as an exercise in manhood and that a failure to colonise would

undermine the emerging power's image. Despite such a desire, Doty argues that the US' acquisition of the Philippines is, unlike Spain's, borne not out of "fear" but "love and sympathy". Doty also characterised how manhood was seen in the other way by opponents; that being a colonial power would undermine the sense of manhood. Nonetheless, Doty also emphasised the word "White" in the title to suggest that being a white man was a mechanism to exercise power over those who were not "White" (336). When decisions to grant Filipinos rights and privileges closer to what "white" Americans enjoyed were considered, Doty argues that Americans found this unthinkable because Filipinos were regarded as "unthinkable".

In addition, Figure 3 shows examples of how the media had portrayed Filipinos during the earlier parts of the colonial era. One of those cartoons also portrayed the US as saviours from oppression (McCutcheon, 1914). The other has highlighted notion that American education would "superstition, ignorance,…etc" and "bring civilisation" (Hamilton, 1899).

Those pieces of literature the emphasise the positioning of the West as superior and the Orient as requiring supervision become useful in the subsequent chapters. As mentioned previously, they would form the basis for the frame scholars would use interpret the belief system they thought the West (i.e. US officials) would subscribe to. Their beliefs had to have originated from somewhere. Said and Doty were framing the West (US officials) as wanting to exercise their superiority. As the subsequent chapters will show, there is some credence to this as politicians and officials were in the process of trying to prove themselves. Elements of these would be manifested in McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation and instructions to the Philippine Commission, even though he was reluctant at first. Officials would be explicit in their intentions. This notion would also bring the question up of why officials would contemplate the decisions they made in the first place – as empirical chapters would argue, is this was their chance to address what they saw as deficiencies in the colony. That was manifested in the introduction of educational programmes – to address the notion that they thought Filipinos could not be left to govern themselves. That was the colonial administration's way to exert their power – by introducing reforms and hope that Filipinos (the Orient) would not want to let go of their ties to the US, something that pro-colonial actors like William Taft would hope to achieve.



Figure 3 - Some Portrayals of Filipinos and Americans in the US Press, McCutcheon (1914), Hamilton (1899)

One attempt to integrate orientalism to the study of the Philippines was conducted by Reynaldo Ileto (2001), who reviews Karnow's (1989) *In Our Image*[14]. Consistent with orientalism's principle of drawing attention to instances of literature that promotes Western superiority by projecting anything undesirable about itself onto the Other, i.e. Orient, Ileto criticises Karnow for casting Filipinos in an adversarial light. Specifically, Ileto says that in Karnow's text, Filipinos were "doomed" all along due to their long-standing practices related to kinship and reciprocity (Ileto, 2001: 5). Furthermore, as a result, Ileto thinks that this Karnow uses these traits he observed as a basis to construct a binary characterisation of Filipinos vs Westerners with the latter portrayed as the more superior party.

Ileto (2001: 6) reviews *Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations: 1898-1946*[15]. Although Ileto lauds what he believes is a "faithful" representation of such thoughts by the book's various authors, he raises the concern that such perceptions are prone to being relied upon, and reproduced by officials. This flaw that Ileto uncovers in Steinberg's has later framed and informed Karnow's (1989) work. In other words, Steinberg believes that Karnow's perceptions of Filipinos are tainted, given by the fact that Karnow believes Filipinos are an inferior race.

[14] In Karnow's (1989) book *In Our Image,* he offers a journalistic account on the events of the Philippine-American War and the focus here was on the successes, failures, and difficulties of the US trying to transmit its ideals into its sole Asian colony both during its colonial era and afterwards.

[15] *Compadre Colonialism*, edited by Owen and Cullilane (1971) highlights the thoughts of colonial officials on Filipinos during the colonial era. Steinberg argues here that officials had at some points needed to de-prioritise the inculcation of US values in favour of securing their territory.

Ileto's work concludes with an inference that the way America has seen itself is coloured by the way it has seen other races, including Filipino colonial subjects. It is significant in highlighting the depiction of the Filipino as the Other.

Another attempt made at critiquing studies of Philippine colonial experiences in terms of orientalism is provided by Azurin (2002), who expressed criticism of Karnow. Azurin has questioned not only Karnow's perspective but also the lack of academic rigour as he compares the quality of Karnow's work to Corpuz (2005) and Bresnahan (1981). Azurin has characterised Karnow's work as "no more than a babe in the woods, whimpering about the lack of will among the stubborn natives to imbibe American democratic ideals" and a "waste of time reading it" and something that merely reflects his perspectives on what he observed (143-144, 149). By extension, he criticised Ileto for even using it as a benchmark for an Orientalist perspective. Notwithstanding the flaws in Karnow's work, Azurin has pointed out a distinguishing characteristic of researchers based outside the Philippines. That is, compared to their Filipino counterparts, foreign-based researchers are likelier to subscribe to a school of thought and a theoretical framework for whose elements they must account for in their chosen research site. Azurin suggests this is because the researchers' mentors have encouraged or trained them to seek out, the failure to do so successfully would have repercussions for their careers moving forward. Azurin has also pointed out practical constraints (e.g. funding) for why there was a need to assign and map relevant elements in the empirical findings.

Despite Azurin's criticisms and concerns about Orientalist literature, he is mindful about Said's limitations. For instance, he mentioned that when a Western researcher would focus on warlords and warlordism, it was not necessarily in and of itself Orientalist. It may be true that one may come to a research site with a framework. However, the absence of a framework does not erase the reality that something that others may consider a warlord existed. In this manner, it is something that cannot be reconciled by merely invoking an Orientalist perspective. Based on Azurin's assertions, he does not necessarily see Orientalist and native literature as contradicting. Notwithstanding Karnow's contribution and Ileto's use of it, Azurin believes that both perspectives can complement each other in the understanding of the research subject. Such perspectives, according to Azurin, also encourage Philippine-based researchers to "compete" and improve their work (150).

Based on the foregoing, orientalism offers a lens by which scholars attempt to make initial sense of how they thought perceptions about the Other, which in this case is the Filipino, were formed. Orientalism is thus, a manifestation of how influential and powerful perceptions could be. Orientalism is, however, not the only way in which perceptions are manifested and that the thesis will consider a range of other similar tools. The concept of this will be discussed more in Chapter 3.

EDUCATION AND COLONIALISM

FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED

While Chapter 7 will discuss educational issues in greater detail, commentary on the relevant literature is warranted here as they provide clues as to how US administrators crafted and executed educational programmes in The Philippines.

When it comes to the role of education, one theoretical framework that comes into mind is Paul Freire's (1968) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. One of his work's central tenets is that the "central" problem of humanity is how its members affirm their human identities and that such quests get disrupted when oppressors try to exercise their power over oppressed people. In addition, he argues that education is useful for oppressed people to find their humanity and become liberated, but only if someone from their ranks leads them. In this case, the oppressors find themselves in a position to consider freedom as "threatening" but that despite this, the oppressed people would find themselves isolated from each other and regard the oppressor as "good" forces.

Freire does not address the Philippine situation directly. He may have a compelling account on what to do to avoid the pitfalls the oppressors used. However, this thesis is not too focused on the outcome of educational initiatives. This thesis is not so concerned as well with the effect that colonisation and the educational policies had on self-esteem.

Freire's work may, nonetheless, exhibit some form of resonance to the Philippine situation. As Freire argues that they see the concept of liberation as something threatening, its resonating point in the Philippine situation is that administrators discussed and put forward the programme they did. As Chapter 7 would show more extensively, there was hesitation by administrators to make academic-based education more widespread for fear that it could spark more insurrections, something that colonial educational initiatives wanted to suppress in the first place. Hence, oppressors, which in this case are the colonial administrators, could be motivated to design programmes that help ensure that the oppressed subjects, in this case, the colonised, stay in line and be discouraged from rebelling against the order.

Freire also refers to his theory of "cultural action" consisting of two kinds: "dialogical" and "anti-dialogical" action. The latter of which involves divide-and-conquer tactics, invasion, and other methods used to reinforce the oppressor's power over the oppressed. On some level in, there were signs of these tactics by administrators, especially in the early colonial era, albeit subtly. Although it was not stated explicitly, Freire's "anti-dialogical" approach may have some resonance in the fact that some educational institutions catered to some prospective future Filipino leaders. Nonetheless, if this framework were to be applied to the Philippines, one would imply that there would be a gulf between the poor Filipinos and affluent ones. Moreover, given the political situation that Filipinos have experience over decades, it could also be tempting to think that Freire's advice to increase the chances of a successful liberation was disregarded and to adverse consequences.

Therefore, Freire's work, if applied to account for the educational policies in the Philippines, can serve as a reminder for one of the commonly cited reasons why administrators wanted to apply the educational policies they did in the first place – to discourage rebellions[16].

Although Freire does not address the Philippines directly, his work provides a reminder that colonial administrators would find it in their material interests or

[16] This is discussed more in Chapter 7.

stand to gain from Filipinos becoming less encouraged to cause rebellions. With Freire's framework in the background, it would imply that by preventing Filipinos from recognising what Freire calls their "humanity" and "critical consciousness", colonial administrators are shoring up the security of the colony, and would thus stand to gain from that. However, this would then imply that administrators have a mindset that Filipinos are by nature, a security risk. At the same time, there needed to be an institutionalised set-up that should have facilitated such perceptions. These could be coming from the coloniser's side or from the colony's (e.g. the norms that colonisers found upon their arrival). Nonetheless, these articulated together would mean that administrators would have a basis to claim security considerations and thus, whilst trying to educate Filipinos, do so in a way that would not encourage Filipino pupils to destabilise what administrators consider as security interests, thus, preventing pupils from experiencing what Freire calls "humanity" and "critical consciousness".

ROLE OF THE THOMASITES

The Thomasites were a group of several hundred educators who sailed on the US Army transport vessel Thomas (hence the term *Thomasites*) from San Francisco to Manila to support the colonial administration's mission of educating Filipinos. They took over from the US military who provided initial education to Filipinos (Anderson, 2018: 47). Given their influence and role as some of the first civilian educators in the colony, attempting to review works centred on them will allow this thesis opportunities to include educational initiatives in an analytical framework.

One such scholar to write about the Thomasites is Steinbock-Pratt (2012). Through Steinbock-Pratt's review of the Thomasites, she tries to fill a gap in the historiography of gender in the Progressive Era[17] as a result of women in the era being portrayed more as being associated with staying at home when in fact women have been involved in gainful employment experiences outdoors. In the process, Steinbock-Pratt acknowledges that women looked forward to the prospect of the establishment of institutions in a setting (i.e. the Philippines) where few Americans occupied at the start. She argues that their arrival in the Philippines marked a transition from a war setting to "suasion". But what is even more notable is an acknowledgement that the teachers presented themselves differently from what administrators intended for in the territory (178).

Given the nature of the approach and gap Steinbock-Pratt wanted to address in her field, it is understandable that the narrative put forward focuses on the experiences of the Thomasites. In trying to situate Steinbock-Pratt's work when it comes to the motivations of colonial officials, Steinbock-Pratt's assertions are a reminder of how such officials wanted to use their soft power. Steinbock-Pratt's assertion that this is a transition from military to civilian power would seem consistent with what officials had in mind. Furthermore, given the motivations of these women, one would infer that they would be a suitable foil for administrators to be able to make ordinary natives less suspicious about their moves since these

[17] The progressive era is an era where views and ideas that promote more rights and privileges towards other demographics who were previously deprived of them. One such example is women's rights to vote and rights in the workplace.

teachers are regarded as the middle person between the administrators and the natives.

Although not related to the Thomasites' professional careers directly, Steinbock-Pratt has documented the incidents in these teachers' private homes and their free time. Whilst at home, the Thomasites had shown their disdain for what they considered as minor native transgressions. During free time, these Thomasites have been portrayed to show a fascination for Filipino bodies, particularly men. The point here is that Steinbock-Pratt portrayed the Thomasites, as humans, had notions and ideas about ordinary native Filipinos that were not different from how other Americans saw Filipinos in the colony. That is especially evident in their treatment of native servants or household helpers, who committed minor mistakes. In some ways, one could argue that these Thomasites would embody how Americans in general saw Filipinos.

Ultimately, Steinbeck-Pratt sought to portray women who felt otherwise constrained by their traditional roles back home, as empowered with authority given that they had to deal with Native Filipinos.

That said, one way where Steinbock-Pratt's work becomes extraneous, vis-à-vis this thesis is when it highlights debates and policies over whether men should have preference over women in upcoming recruitment cycles. Despite their depiction as the middle person to help ease what Filipinos intend to do, there was also rather limited explicit or direct engagement with the question of what role the Thomasites' public demeanour played in the motivations of administrators. Nonetheless, if one considers the role of the beliefs/perceptions, institutional set-ups, and material motivations in the promulgation of educational policies, this puts into doubt the notion that officials wanted to primarily provide independent women with opportunities especially since it was policy for a time to have men as a preference. Though the empowerment of women was a derivative benefit, doing so for its own sake was not a priority of the colonial administration. Therefore, this account helps rule out some of the possible primary motivations for educational initiatives. Nonetheless, these shortcomings in the literature do not take away from the fact that there were other motivations that administrators saw as essential in this process.

CONCLUSION: SITUATIING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS

The thesis' contribution to existing Philippine historical literature lies in connecting the emergence of key aspects of liberal reforms to the material and non-material motivations for the US to do so more systematically. Although the works that this chapter discusses have identified different explanations for why the US would pursue such motivations, they also provide an opportunity to identify how the links between each of them interact.

When it comes to where these may come in, the orientalist mindset's significance becomes useful when the thesis considers the prevailing ideas in the process of American decision-making. Given that ideas are described as beliefs about subjects, the orientalist mindset is one manner by which this concept is manifested. However, the thesis aims partly to find out whether this alone can account for such given the other prevailing factors.

The review of the Marxist/Nationalist historians emphasises the material considerations people who hold authority and their allies. Just as with the orientalist views on the US administration of the Philippines, there is value in highlighting the US' material stake there. Given that resources are finite, it necessitated a need to consider where to best use them and where the gains could be maximised. Nonetheless, such approaches as presented suffer from their zero-sum approach to explaining the US' mission in the Philippines and the former's attempt to introduce liberal reforms when there were clearly some material improvements, even residual, that the Filipinos experienced and benefitted from, compared to when the Spaniards were present. Therefore, focusing on the US' mission in terms of their desires for material exploitation and class struggles obscures other considerations. Even though it was conceivable that the government wanted to possess in the Philippines to get something out for people in the mainland and more particularly for business interests, most accounts would suggest that Filipinos experienced a material improvement. Moreover, despite the finite resources, there were other reasons officials and politicians thought of to pursue the acquisition of the Philippines.

Another one of the opportunities for this thesis to come in is that the works reviewed here have not emphasised directly how the politicians back in the mainland viewed the Philippines and Filipinos, as well as their own broader mission in the Far East. The perspectives and approaches reviewed here add some value in their own right but given the Orientalist perspective prevailing about Filipinos among officials in the mainland, it provides an opportunity to witness such mindsets in action. It also accounts for them when identifying the motivations to delay or introduce measures to liberalise the Philippines. Moreover, as Azurin (2002) argues, these approaches should not be seen as competing but complementing one another.

Given that some of the existing scholarship has discussed what colonial administrators and local elites have discovered, the reality was that most of the officials were partly dependent on the cues from Washington. Decisions about where the Philippines featured in the US agenda, whether materially or in terms of America's image, had to clear the political process and system. As the coming chapters would point out, colonial administrators, as well as the executive branch, depended on their political prospects and the desire of their colleagues to bolster the image of the US abroad. They were also dependent on the perceptions of various politicians and administrators on what the Philippines is. Based on those, such considerations are also why the thesis focuses on the policy processes.

In other words, given that existing scholarship suggests a role for each idea, interest, and institution, and the opportunity such scholarship has provided by not discussing the domestic political situation in the US directly, this thesis' contribution is using a more analytical framework to analyse the political and strategic decisions made to colonise the Philippines. The contribution also includes using that framework to analyse why the US decided to gradually introduce selected political and economic reforms between 1898 and 1916. That period was when the US exercised maximum power over the Philippines. Emphasis will be on the policy-making process, which includes analysing the origins of reasons associated with such decisions. Analysing the origins of such reasons also means considering the *connections* and *articulations* between the kinds of factors that have been ascribed to the phenomena in the Philippines. This thesis wishes to

suggest and emphasise that through the 3Is framework discussed in the next chapter, many of the factors behind the US' actions on the Philippines have not developed in isolation from one another. Thus, 3Is framework introduces an original explanation for the origins of what would later become Asia's first democratic state. It is through this that the other perspectives these scholars have championed are enriched and complemented.

The next chapter will explain the underpinnings of the theoretical model that brings together material motivations, institutional constraints, and perceptions and values, and how the underpinnings will be deployed.

CHAPTER III: INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND IDEAS: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is to map out how and why the United States, as a colonial power, began to introduce liberal political and economic reforms in the Philippines at a relatively early stage compared to other Western colonisers. Given that dynamic, there is a question on what the possible drivers of the pertinent policies were and whether they could act as explanations that have not been informed by other possible explanations or dynamics.

This chapter introduces a framework for analysing such questions and explores its application and significance. The works surveyed about the Philippines in Chapter 2 suggest an opportunity for a less interest-only-based explanation to provide new insights into the Philippine situation in the early twentieth century in a more nuanced way.

Hall's (1997) 3Is framework is a widely used model in analysing how public policy works and variants have emerged to appropriate the 3Is framework to different kinds of policies. This chapter's second section outlines what ideas, institutions, and interests are. It will also explain each of them, discuss their importance and salience in accounting for phenomena and outcomes. It will, however, explain why considering them alone is not always sufficient. The next section will also reiterate some of the authors who have privileged and criticised using just ideas, interests, and institutions as a sole explanation to reinforce the points given in the previous sentence.

Based on what the second section has uncovered about the Is, the third main section will also illustrate how the ideas, interests, and institutions interact together to shape policy. Specifically, examples will be illustrated to demonstrate how scholars have used the 3Is framework to analyse the process and the ensuing outcomes. The chapter will show the framework's relevance to explaining US colonial policies in the Philippines by identifying the different ideas, institutions, and interests and previewing how they potentially interact. From here, there would be a justification for how the 3Is fits within the tradition of historical sociology. In particular, that as historical sociology encourages the creation of a theoretical lens to help make sense of previous phenomena, the 3Is framework can provide an interpretative lens for analysing the key factors involved in the process of decision-making.

INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND IDEAS: USEFUL BUT INSUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES

Bashir and Ungar (2015) describe interests broadly to refer to the agenda that the actors have, institutions as existing structures and policies, and ideas as the knowledge and values that policymakers have toward an issue. The coming subsections will discuss the different Is and how each of them is valuable but also inadequate as explanations.

INTERESTS

Hall (1997: 176) defines interests simply as the "material" agenda of the actors involved in policy-making. The mention of material interests implies that they can refer to anything that would deliver financial gains, access to resources, electoral victories, among others. Similarly, Pomey et al. (2010: 709) defines interests as the "agendas of societal groups, elected officials, researchers, and policy entrepreneurs". Such actors can come in the form of groups or individuals. For Hwang (2006), interests can be thought of as the material benefits an actor believes he or she stands to gain or lose from pursuing a particular decision. Furthermore, interests are thus often associated with principles of rational choice (Blyth, 2003), which assume that an agent will act based on what he thinks will provide him with more material benefits. These can take the form of group interests, class interests, or agents acting on behalf of groups.

Interests may refer to an agent's electoral prospects and the degree of support an agent hopes to obtain by deciding to take a particular action. Interests also refer to the other things that someone may stand to gain or preserve as a result of taking certain actions.

This thesis adopts a position interests refer to a political or economic agenda an actor hopes to gain, defend, or satisfy as a result of making a certain decision. The fact is agents act and decide on what they believe they stand to gain or lose politically and economically/materially. Perceiving something as an interest to be a basis for making a decision does not necessarily mean the agent would ultimately protect it successfully; the agent may be wrong and still lose out. However, it still does not preclude that agent from acting based on it.

There are a few limitations of using material-based or interest-based approaches. One of Blyth's (2002; 2003) key assertions is that interests are social constructions and that agents' decisions do not reflect their interests *per se* but how they *perceive* or *think* their interests are. Blyth also highlighted a flaw of rational choice-based accounts by suggesting that they rested on "statics" more than "dynamics", which means that they did not adequately consider the role of change.

A critical consideration of using material-based approaches is whether an observer could assess if the action an agent takes is actually in that agent's best interest. It implies one must consider the values system involved as well as the information made available to these agents. Blyth (2002; 2003) questions the explanatory value of interests in and of itself. Rational choice approaches provide the basis for interest-based explanations. He has acknowledged that the salience of rational choice theory in political science lied in helping the discipline think about how the achievement of stability was a problem. However, one of rational choice's assumptions that he found faulty was that it was a given that agents knew what their interests were. Under such a premise, there was almost no question about how they thought about what their interests were. Another problem with highlighting interests lies in the circular logic that may arise implicitly. For instance, if an agent decides to do *A* over *B*, there is a tendency to conclude or assume that choosing *A* was a "rational" choice and that it was considered "reasonable" to the said agent. However, by making such assertions, one could

merely equate an agent's interest to what is observable. Second, that what an agent does is due solely by what the agent *believes* is his or her interest. Thereby, a pitfall of relying solely on interest-based explanations is that observers may tend to reduce the analysis to something akin to a "because they wanted to do it, they did it, and because we know they did it…, this shows they wanted to do it"-type of circular reasoning where the underlying reasons for doing something may remain undiscovered (Blyth, 2002: 27-9).

Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) attempts to analyse the repeal of the corn laws in 1846. She looked in particular at why Conservative Prime Minister Robert Peel pushed to repeal corn laws when members of parliament (MPs) from his own party had a financial stake in retaining such corn laws. The author identifies the so-called supply- and demand-side pressures to analyse the decision. Schonhardt-Bailey analysed MPs' speeches for keywords. Such keywords contained the basis for what MPs prioritised. The strength of Schonhardt-Bailey's work is that it impresses that interests alone were not sufficient in accounting for such decisions. If that were the case, then the MPs would vote in favour of retaining and against repealing the Corn Laws. Peel himself would not have pushed for it, given that he would face backlash from his party-mates.

Additionally, Schonhardt-Bailey's account suggests that interests are not static over time. That is, there should have been other forces in play to make agents think differently about their interests. In the case of the passage of the corn laws, as Britain's economy's structure evolved, it prompted key MPs hesitant of free trade to warm up to it, and their electoral coalition influenced them to embrace it. The bottom line here is that interests and how to satisfy them are subject to change. Given the non-static nature of interests, it will mean that external conditions influence them. It will also mean agents will think differently about it as a result of interactions and changes in circumstances.

INSTITUTIONS

North (1995) defines institutions as the "rules of the game". More specifically, these are "formal and informal rules, norms, precedents, and organisational factors that structure political behaviour", or government structures and policy legacies among others (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hall, 1997; Pomey et al., 2010). That goes beyond a traditional definition whereby John (2012: 56) argues that an advantage of introducing institutions is that it acknowledges the unique nature of each polity's rules and emphasises the values that shape state traditions. It implies that in addition to formal structures in place such as the bureaucracy, institutions are also informal traditions that agents need to obey. Examples of such would also include notions of reciprocity, the machinery of key groups.

For Hall, theoretical approaches that emphasise the importance of institutions ascribe factors behind economic policy or performance to the organisational structures of the political economy. It primarily ascribes the nation-state as the main unit of analysis. In turn, the actors in the analysis include organisations in the economy, such as trade unions or firms. This approach also pays attention to institutional differences among nations. In turn, scholars in the discipline argue that such differences would cause different patterns in economic performance and policy.

Using institutions alone to explain how policies are adopted contains limitations. Decision-makers do not necessarily internalise the norms associated with such institutions. An institution-only-based approach does not adequately consider the political and social context that would affect how such institutions would work in the society they are located in (John, 2012: 55). It implies that John further argued that using a standalone institution-based approach is most appropriate for making a comparison between two countries (ibid, 56).

Furthermore, Hwang (2006) criticises the limits of institutional explanations, especially when accounting for how key welfare policies in South Korea have evolved. For instance, he questioned the notion that such policies were products of urbanisation and industrialisation. Hwang points out that such programmes existed before wide-scale industrialisation efforts. Hwang argues that by adopting an institution(-only) approach, such approaches do not address the availability of policy choices within which the pertinent political opportunities arise. Existing institutional approaches do not necessarily indicate what actors consider as important. Although institutions provide the constraints and platform for which agents would have to act, Hwang argues that institutions do not inherently tell the actors involved what their feasible options and desires are. Those would have to be something that actors would need to make sense of within these institutional constraints. Institutions are also not inherent or self-commanding.

When trying to explain change, Hwang argues that institutions *per se* do not necessarily explain policy change since they tend to promote what is called "policy inertia" (2006: 18). That reinforces the notion that institutions are the constraining power that provides agents with a reality check on how far their ideas can be realised. Beland (2009) argues similarly that institutions and historical institutionalism identifies what the actor's goals are or what is important, but more importantly, that there are constraints that surround them. Although they are useful in explaining the failure of policies or options to advance to the next stages, institutions themselves are unable to explain how the policies were even options in the first place.

Although Hall is usually known for emphasising the use of ideas in some of his work, there are occasions in which he flags up the usefulness of institutions. For instance, Hall (1993) provides an application of how institutional analysis is conducted and uses institutions to explain how policies change. He was interested in how the UK government shifted from a Keynesian- to a consumption- and monetary-based economic orientation.

The previous account implies that with too many institutions, it may be difficult to ascertain the importance of each. Furthermore, with the identification of too many institutions, one may devalue the importance of potential institutions. As a result, a broad definition of institutions could erode how well such can explain the decision-making process (John, 2012: 56).

Steinmo (1989) also attempted to use institutions to discuss how the US, UK, and Sweden have diverse tax policies. He argued that political structures (e.g. fragmented institutional structure in the US, centralised state structure in Sweden, first-past-the-post electoral system in the UK) played a major role in how tax

policies differed not just between the three cases but within some of the cases. However, studying institutions alone had its limits, such as its inability to explain the relatively high corporate tax rate in the US as at the time of the studies. Amidst Sweden's institutionalised state-interest group relationships, the intermediation of group remained dependent on the country's social structure and that the electoral system would only cause stability if voting patterns have remained consistent. In this case, interests have played a key explanatory role to distinguish how Sweden and the UK have been apart in tax regimes (in John, 1998: 50-51).

Based on the foregoing, this thesis adopts the position that institutions are structures and constraints that agents have to work with or consider if they are to make certain decisions and carry out what they want to do. Although identifying institutions is not always sufficient in justifying why agents decided in a particular manner, they are nonetheless useful as they provide what North describes as the norms in which decision-makers should consider and operate under. Furthermore, amidst the differences mentioned in this section about how institutions are understood, this thesis plans to adopt the North's (1995) characterisation of an institution as the established norms and practices agents encounter, or the "rules of the game". Agents may have an interest in something, their ability to fulfil it may be limited or constrained by the presence of the institutions or norms in the areas they plan to operate. On the other hand, as Hwang suggests, scholars need to make sense of institutions to identify and appreciate the options available to agents that had to make decisions.

IDEAS

Ideas are socially constructed beliefs that individuals hold (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 3). More specifically, Pomey et al. (2010: 709) describes them as "knowledge or beliefs about what is", or "views about what ought to be (e.g. values)", or a combination of both. Based on these, ideas influence not only an agents' definition (in Gauvin, 2014: 3) but also these agents' perceptions of what is acceptable. Ideas are also associated with the meaning that actors place when deciding certain courses of action.

Among the key questions that analysts consider when analysing ideas is whether a policy option is consistent with prevailing societal values, style of government, and/or values of the most influential professional groups (Gauvin, 2014: 3). Ideas may take the form of political, social, and economic beliefs and this thesis plans to examine both.

Cairney (2012: 242) argues that the concept of an idea may refer to a broad range of concepts and social practices. Cairney's aim with ideas is that one has to identify common themes such as the degree to how such ideas explain political power. That includes one's world views and shared beliefs. It may also comprise traditions passed down through socialisation and understandings of the world that one can use to articulate interests. Hall (1997) argues as well that ideas may also refer to ideologies. Beland (2016: 736) also defines ideas as "changing and historically-constructed 'causal beliefs' that agents harbour". Beland further argues that these would incorporate the values and perceptions that actors possess. Campbell writes that ideas are supposed to be treated as an aspect of

reality that can mould human behaviour and policy decisions directly. Ideas can powerfully affect the policy-making process given that they affect preferences about what goals are deemed desirable and they also give so-called "cognitive maps" for assessing how to reach such goals (Feldmann, 2013: 355).

Hall (1997) argues that compared to the first two approaches discussed, the idea-centric school is relatively underdeveloped but still important to understand the outcomes. Ideas-centric approaches include the significance of culture to economic policies. Furthermore, other scholars (e.g. Hall, 1989; Hirschmann, 1981; Walsh, 2000; Weir and Skocpol, 1985) contend that ideas are important in that they define what policy options are feasible. Some scholars (e.g. Appel, 2000; Goldstein, 1993; Haas, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) also go further to argue that ideas themselves are the main causal factors in why agents would decide in favour of a certain action (in Poteete, 2003: 527).

Some scholars ascribe their preference for interest-based approaches before institutional-based approaches. According to Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6-7), ideas should only be incorporated into analysis after one deems that interest-based approaches do not sufficiently account for the outcome. On the other hand, scholars such as Sikkink (1991) and Haas (1992) prioritise ideas more. Policies would be influenced by ideas that have received consensus among the relevant profession. Hall also argues that allocating causal forces to ideas is done as they provide an opportunity to create newer types of possible social or political groups. A third group posits that ideas which have had broader definitions should have causal primacy as they constitute the most basic meaning systems that make possible individual or collective action (Johnson, 1994). Based on the foregoing, it also tries to imply that interests and institutional factors are not predefined or uninformed. Thus, ideas shape interests and institutions.

For Hall, ideas-based approaches can account for aspects of human interaction that cannot be emphasised in other approaches. Challenges remain, however, as there is difficulty to separate ideas from other approaches. On the other hand, although incorporating ideas enhance analysis, Hall posits that those who emphasise too much of ideas at the expense of material interests are in danger of missing out on other factors that are important to the functioning of the political economy. Thus, Hall analyses the interactions between ideas, interests, and institutions.

Therefore, Hall has put forward some guidelines for those who want to work with ideas. They include a need to put forward sophisticated theories on how ideas could be persuasive in their own right, irrespective of what propels their salience. It necessitates an improved definition of how new ideas interact with existing ones. Hall also argues that ideas are influential if they are part and parcel of social contexts in which they operate. It would then be useful to identify and discuss how such ideas become institutionalised in their society.

Beland (2016: 736) argues that one should rigorously assess *how* ideas matter. In an earlier piece of scholarship, Beland (2009) also extends Blyth's approach to ideas and argues along a similar line. In particular, Beland argues that ideas help

actors make sense of their interests. Among his primary arguments about what ideas do is that they shape assumptions that affect what is in the proposals that agents put forward. Second, they play a useful role in constructing issues that make their way onto the agenda. Finally, given the assumptions that agents work under as well as the problems and issues that were constructed, ideas act as discursive weapons used in the construction of reform measures. Beland concedes however that if ideas are to be the fundamental causal factor, certain institutional and political conditions need to be present. It is through the interaction of ideas with institutions and political actors that institutions become politically influential. Furthermore, for Beland, institutional factors, thus limit the effectivity of ideas. Similarly, cultural factors impact what Beland calls the "framing process". Under the "framing process", if values that movements seek to defend score low in a society's belief system, the task becomes more challenging. However, if the value under discussion runs high in that hierarchy, the framing process becomes more effective.

Hwang (2006) also adds that given that agents have multiple preferences, *how* issues are defined affect their decision. Finally, ideas can be used as discursive tools. Furthermore, Beland makes room for discussing the impact of institutions on the politics and underlying ideas. That was something that Schonhardt-Bailey has argued in accounting for how some members of Peel's party supported his call to repeal certain the Corn Laws.

For John (1998: 123), the issue is whether ideas have an independent influence on policy formulation and implementation. It means that he focuses on whether the existence of ideas *per se* can cause actors to decide in a particular manner or aim for a certain outcome.

Based on these accounts, the two common themes that emerge are that of ideas as values or shared beliefs. In other words, ideas try to answer the question of what is it that the agents who are making the decisions and trying to put forward a series of policies believe in and basing their actions on such beliefs. Although it may be useful to think of ideas as knowledge, the problem with this notion is that knowledge may not be absolute or sincerely applied. As such, this thesis adopts ideas as something that refers to an agent's beliefs or values, especially those that were historically-constructed (e.g. Beland, 2016). Ideas help the agent make sense of the options he or she has for decision-making and can also provide him or her room to manoeuvre his or her interests. Further and in relation to that, the agent's priorities and world views provide a way for agents to shape how they understand their interests.

INTERACTION AMONG THE IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS

The 3Is framework is widely considered by scholars to be the foundations for politics (Bashir and Ungar, 2015). As a starting point, Heclo (1994) broadly posits the relationship of ideas, interests, and institutions: a) "interests tell institutions what to do"; b) "institutions tell ideas how to survive"; c) "ideas tell interests what to mean". These are positions that were briefly posited by some of the scholars discussed earlier in the chapter. They imply several things: interests are not self-explanatory; they need to be rooted in contexts about beliefs and values systems.

Given how widely used the 3Is framework is in public policy, it can act as a tool to help account for how various factors could lead to the outcomes that had transpired when the US colonised the Philippines.

To further illustrating how these Is potentially work together, it may be worth revisiting their strengths and weaknesses briefly in explaining a certain phenomenon. Hwang characterises how interest-, ideas-, and institution-based scholars consider the role of changing target institutions. For those primarily concerned with interests, change happens if the structure of preference experiences changes. Preference experiences, in this case, would then refer to what an agent's options are, based on what that agent values. The question then becomes how to account for such changes. The answer lies in bringing ideas into the discussion. In this light, ideas, which refers to the values that an agent subscribes to, helps to shape the way he or she changes thinking about interests. Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) shares a similar notion of ideas by arguing that reinterpreting the meaning of conservatism within the 1840s British Conservative Party to match the need to repeal the corn laws was a way to persuade wavering MPs from Peel's own party.

Furthermore, consistent with Heclo's (1994: 383) characterisation that "ideas tell interests what to mean", ideas also act as rhetorical devices that could convince agents with decision-making powers that thinking about their interests in a certain way could serve what they *think of* as their interests. For those primarily concerned with ideas, on the other hand, institutional change how which actors define and articulate their policy positions.

Moreover, for institutional-based theorists, change is perceived as the consequences of strategic action in an institutional context that lends itself better to some alternatives over others. Hwang argues that each of these ideas, institutions, and interests considered on their own are particularly problematic in their inabilities to explain policy changes and the form such changes manifest themselves in (Hwang, 2006: 10-11). For one, this strengthens the notion that one of the ideas, interests, and institutions have to be situated in a particular time or contexts and that the timing of when certain events happened may be important.

Ideas telling interests what to mean is something that Blyth (2002) has already raised. As established previously, interests *per se* do not have any inherent meaning and are subject to social construction. More specifically, ideas affect preference and as mentioned earlier, provide a "cognitive map" for how to consider and attain such preferences (Feldmann, 2013: 355). In other words, ideas provide a guide for agents for achieving their interests. In relation to such, Blyth (2003: 702) has argued that ideas can be used along with interest- or rational choice-based explanations as – but not limited to - "power resources". Ultimately, his point here is that one has to make room for *how* or *why* agents behave the way that they do; in other words, why agents consider this or that as interests to begin with. For him, "ideas constitute our interests" (ibid). It means

that interests of being satisfied by opening new trading routes or winning re-election should have originated from somewhere. They imply that these should have been reached partly as a result of what one values.

Based on Beland's (2009) arguments, the relationship between institutions and ideas can be one where institutions limit ideas from or encourage actors to realise their full potential. Given Beland's concern that institutions *per se* do not indicate how options were conceived, it suggests that ideas come in that they would stand for the assumptions that agents have to inform their creation of options. As institutions also refer to social arrangements (e.g. what local officials can do), their presence implies that collaboration has to take place between local (representing the institutional) and transnational actors to ensure ideas are implemented as effectively as possible. It was also previously mentioned that ideas are powerful precisely because of how they interact with institutions and political agents (i.e. and their interests). Therefore, Beland suggests that given the important role of ideas, the study of institutional forces, agents and their interests is warranted. Finally, he argues that as ideas help shape interests, any ideas about how interests are seen may impact the ability to mobilise for support of such assertions.

Similarly, Beland also suggests that although ideas help agents make sense of their interests, agents also decide to promote the ideas that become part of the agenda. Beland argues specifically that certain ideas, to become influential, need to have powerful agents promoting them.

As Heclo (1994) posits that "interests tell institutions what to do", he is suggesting that interests and institutions act together such that the resulting institutions are a reflection of the interests that agents have had in mind. The resulting institutions are there to help agents realise what they think their interests are and that they are not established necessarily for their sake.

Poteete (2003: 531) provided a lens for considering the relationship between ideas and institutions. Ideas, according to her, feed into one's expectations about causal relationships. Furthermore, institutions come in between ideas and interests by deciding who may choose and implement policies. It would make sense given that institutions act as a constraining factor that helps agents make sense of how far an agent's ideas can be taken. Institutions help influence the attentiveness of actors to ideas when it's time for them to make decisions. Institutions also influence the degree of attention-specific sets that policymakers give to ideas from particular sources, and the former determines the degree of influence any given set of ideas need to achieve to effect policy changes. As for the relationship between institutions and interests, the former structures the latter (Poteete, 2003: 528, 531). Furthermore, as a result of the constraining nature of institutions, they will help agents rethink of what their interests are, which in turn will translate to what decisions are made.

The constraining power of institutions on ideas can also be manifested in works such as Lieberman (2002). Lieberman (2002) attempts to account for changes in US policy during the civil rights era. Affirmative action was borne out of conflicts between institutions and ideas. Civil rights were discussed in terms of promoting

the idea of racial equality. Those in authority had to implement relevant legislation within existing institutions. The institutional set-up of the US, such as the power that states had and members of Congress from southern states have forced proponents of civil rights to lower their expectations. The implication is that institutions have constrained the idea of racial equality from reaching its full potential. As a consequence, there was a series of political problems that occurred, which in turn triggered stronger and less incremental civic action. Policymakers came up with better policies whose outcomes exceeded the intentions of the original laws (in John, 1998: 141).

Based on the foregoing, ideas can help agents make sense of what their interests are. It provides them with a set of values for which to decide what interests to keep in mind as they pursue decisions. On the other hand, ideas are also going to reflect the interests that are dominant in society. Institutions limit the effectivity of the ideas that come into mind. At the same time, ideas also help agents make sense of the institutions around them in a similar way that they make sense of interests. Institutions make agents' aware of the interests that agents may pursue, given its constraining power. Likewise, institutions also reflect the interests of the agents that have gone before them.

However, this thesis does not intend to argue that interests, ideas, or institutions, each in and of themselves, will always be the most important determinant in policy outcomes. The thesis would instead focus on their interactions. Ideas, interests, and institutions, when used, would always operate in combination with each other. The extent to which one or two of them will be privileged over the rest is contingent on the phenomenon under examination.

Figure 4 - SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF HOW Is POTENTIALLY INTERACT WITH EACH OTHER



POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO PHILIPPINE CASE

The given framework helps identify and analyse the ideas, interests, and institutions that could have been influential in how the US decided to (a) take the Philippines, (b) grant the Philippines a constitution that contained more civil liberties from within the colony in 1916, and (c) introduce the institutions associated with such liberties between 1898 and 1916. Works by Blyth's (2002), Poteete (2003), Hwang (2006), Beland (2009) and Humpage (2010) help

characterise the nature of the interactions of the ideas, interests, and institutions in the Philippine setting.

Institution-related factors

Based on various accounts on why the US took the Philippines and introduced pertinent reforms when it had control, several common institutional factors were present to the extent that they influenced the nature of the reforms. First of them was the commitment of the US to honour existing directives, laws and treaties. Senior officials believed there would be in trouble if, for instance, they violated the principle of neutrality. Such a line of thinking was also extended to the notion of property rights, which also served to constrain decisions to introduce key reforms. It was related to another institution involved - the Catholic Church. One of the chapters discussing land redistribution shows (Chapter 8), the governors-general had to tread lightly so as not to go anger this group. Furthermore, their influence has limited what governors-general could do to give Filipino a piece of the land. As will be argued, this institution was a limiting factor in how much the executive branch could grant Filipinos ownership of land, given how valuable the Friar Lands were. The influence of the Catholic Church then relates to the electoral interest politics that US officials had to work with.

Another institution is the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Back then, there was a separation of powers between each branch of Congress that politicians and bureaucrats observed. The Presidents and the administrations they led could, hence, not get all of their agenda passed even if their party dominated Congress. The President and the Governor-General failed to get an outright abolition of tariffs as members of Congress have expressed opposition and reasserted the authority of the legislative branch.

As will be seen in the coming chapters, particularly in Chapter 4, a third institution the US government and its representatives had to deal with was the local/provincial elites in the Philippines to be able to achieve their stated political and economic pursuits in the colony. These were mostly holdovers from the Spanish government.

Based on the institutional perspective, a hypothesis emerges. US officials, with their attempts to introduce liberal reforms, had to work with pre-existing institutions. These institutions, in turn, had the potential to limit the effectivity of certain outcomes. These institutions would have actors who have their interests in perpetuating social relations. These had, at times, frustrated efforts to introduce liberal reforms. These institutions in the Philippines and the US had at times frustrated the hopes of officials to introduce progressive reforms.

Interest-related factors

As mentioned in the previous sections, interests refer to the agendas that agents have when pursuing a course of action. Some of the main interests involved in US actions over the Philippines include improving the US' image as an emerging power, securing the Philippines from rebellions, better prospects for the domestic US economy, satisfying key domestic interests groups.

Interests may encompass economic and strategic/geopolitical interests. Dr James Kurth defines geopolitics as the "study of the 'realities and mentalities of the localities'" (Granieri, 2015: 492). The localities in that instance refer to paying attention to the local contexts and cultures of the parties involved in the policy in question. Granieri further argues that geopolitics looks at the "longer-term forces" that shape the actions agents decide. More particularly, geopolitics is about looking at the historical and geographical factors that shape policy-making. The geopolitical sphere provides opportunities to identify interests, including economic and political ones. It should have connections to the economic factors that drive the actors involved. In this case, the actor is the US as a state and the key officials acting on its behalf. One could hypothesise that under the geopolitical level of analysis, the US government had a strategic use for the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Another related interest stemming from geopolitics is the after-effects of economic downturns in the US. The relevant questions that stem from this include a) What else did the US want from the Asia-Pacific region? b) Furthermore, where else in the world could the answers to how strategic retaining the Philippines was lie in? c) Given that the US had other possessions and its adversaries, did such circumstances undermine what would become its commitment to the Philippines?

On the interest level of analysis, a hypothesis that comes into mind is that the Asia-Pacific provided opportunities for the US to explore other places to exert their influence and expand their territories. That is analysed in conjunction with economic or interest-based explanations as well as ideas-based explanations (e.g. glut or overproduction thesis).

Inspired by Hall's interest-based approach, the upcoming chapters would attempt to look at interests that were present in the US and the Philippines that would limit the desired outcomes, their effectiveness as well as encourage certain pieces legislation. Chapter 8, for instance, draws from various sources to see how US government officials and Congressional leaders responded to reactions from key constituents. These responses would then try to account for whether these officials wanted to do something but were unable to do so. Congressional legislation meant to target the Philippines and assist it economically, and more importantly, any hindrance to what could have been a quicker passage is covered by this. In this perspective, a question of land reform would be covered especially on the foundations that the US found themselves grappling. Therefore, this thesis would also hypothesise that interests connected to certain US industries delayed the passage of bills that would have provided the colony with economic assistance sooner.

As mentioned several times, Hall has hinted out that the interests approach, emphasises decisions made from the perspective of gains or loss. In this light, how much were electoral politics a factor in the decisions made to develop the colony? The interests approach makes some mention of the economic and political benefits of holding or liberalising the Philippines at some point or letting it free altogether. In other words, it refers to what actors or agents thought they could stand to gain for operating in the islands. This rational-based approach considers the presence of constituencies or lobbies that delivered key votes and would

otherwise benefit from the Philippines remaining a US territory or not. The rational-based approaches examine the constituencies who would withhold votes if the US government or its representatives in the Philippines were to liberalise certain policies in the colony. In any case, one hypothesis under the interest-based approach is that electoral politics was an important consideration for politicians.

Furthermore, in some cases, there would be a change in management, i.e. including their political affiliation. Additionally, politicians want to get re-elected. Given the difference in political affiliation, there would be a different set of policies and circumstances that they intend to address. The key, however, is that they campaigned to address such circumstances, and they need to be seen as keeping their campaign promises in front of voters. Hence, one of the hypotheses that would be explored, especially in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 is that electoral politics was one of those things that helped ushered in changes in policy.

The other possible interest-based reasons officials acquired the Philippines that they needed a base for the US for its naval activities and easy access to the Chinese market. The Philippines would then serve that interest. Similar reasons would apply for issues of instituting trade policy and education. Thus, this thesis analyses the role of developing the colonial economy as a primary consideration for the establishment of institutions of education and the trading regime.

Ideas

Given that ideas refer to shared beliefs and emerge from values, if one was looking at interests and institutions in isolation, then one might say that liberal reforms in the Philippines were introduced to merely improve Filipinos' lives. The same is true for desires to grow the colonial economy. However, given that such initiatives take effort and entail material costs, one would want to reflect on what they are doing this for. Hence, *ideas* enter the picture, and the link may be deep or indirect. The ideas and discourses involved had to do with those of the "white man's burden", "civilising mission", and the notion that US officials felt Filipinos were not ready to govern themselves. In this light, such measures and reforms are introduced to address ideas US officials harboured about the Philippines.

Analysing US actions using the ideas approach involves looking at the ideas that the US put forward to Filipinos such as "liberty" and "civilising". Moreover, it also considers other ideas that politicians have been floating around, such as the so-called "white man's burden" as a purported justification to take the Philippines under US possession. The "white man's burden" implying that the officials believed those belonging to the "white" race are in the best position to introduce reforms. Another way to see this level of analysis manifested this is to look at the educational programmes the US instituted in the islands. Scholars have posited that one of the obvious contributions to the Philippines was the public education system whereby certain ideals and values the US wanted Filipinos to inculcate were transmitted. Without overstating the ideas approach, by considering ideas and cultural items that were floated by US officials, one could plot out other issues in which the otherwise strictly economic or institutional levels of analysis alone are unable to touch on. From here, one can hypothesise that the US supported

the establishment of formal institutions associated with itself to make its values known even if there are questions as to whether the US actually stood for what it claimed to stand for. Therefore, the ensuing institutions reflect the ideas that officials had about the Philippines.

Some potential interactions between Interests, Institutions, and Ideas

Although each chapter tries considering as many ideas, institutions, and interests as possible, some of them are linked intrinsically to each other. Also, in identifying the ideas, institutions, and interests, the thesis will show that some interests are linked to each other. This is also the case for some ideas and, to some degree, institutions. For instance, one of the points this thesis will highlight is economic and geopolitical levels of analysis cannot be easily separated when accounting for the motivations of US officials to stir the Philippines in a certain direction.

One potential hypothesis stemming from the interactions between ideas and interests is the glut thesis was powerful enough, as evidenced by the fact that key officials wanted to find new markets for US goods. It made officials make sense of their desire to seek ways of becoming profitable, hence their desire to look for new markets. The glut thesis, coupled with the ensuing economic depression in the US, provided a discursive opportunity to frame the ensuing acquisition of the Philippines in such economic terms.

Likewise, just as much as there were ideas that encouraged interests related to free-market capitalism to emerge, the same was true for more protectionist-based economic approaches. The idea of protectionism helped politicians conceive that they could take care of industries that supported them politically by ensuring these industries (especially those dealing in sugar) do not face intense competition from their counterparts in the Philippines.

The ideas surrounding the US' "civilising mission" influenced the interests of officials to want to secure the Philippines from insurrections. One such manifestation which will be discussed continuously in subsequent chapters is a "policy of attraction" put forward by Governor-General William Howard Taft. The key interaction between ideas and interests here is that attracting Filipinos to the incentives that Americans offered them reflected the desire for US officials to secure the colony from rebellions and insurrections in an innovative way.

As institutions have a constraining power over interests, colonial officials felt compelled to work with the institutional set-up in the Philippines. Therefore, amidst the former's desire to pursue its interests, the latter had constrained the possibilities made available to the former. That was especially the case when attempting to rectify issues surrounding land redistribution. The power of the Philippine institutional set-up is manifested by the fact that governors-general such as Taft conceded they had to work with them to put forward their own policies even though their preference was to work with a different kind of group.

The interaction between ideas and institutions is highlighted again when it comes to discussing efforts surrounding land redistribution. The Catholic Church was an institution that US officials and politicians showed deference to. The fact that

politicians worried about the Catholic vote implies that the institutionalised Catholic Church wielded considerable influence.

As a consequence of the institutional set-up, it became more challenging for US officials to introduce ideas of further democratic and autonomous reforms and instead, gave credence to the idea that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs, and thus unworthy of full autonomy and democracy just yet.

Finally, given that this thesis hypothesises that institutions as consequences of ideas and interests, talking about the *resulting* institutions is integral to how authors like Heclo (1994) characterise their interactions, i.e. interests telling institutions what to do. In the case of the Philippines, and as will be illustrated more in subsequent chapters, the interests would interact with institutions in a way that suggests these institutions were established as a way to minimise security risks as well as serve other interests.

Table 1 shows a further list of ideas, interests, and interactions that the subsequent chapters will discuss in more detail.

Table 1: TABLE OF POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONS, INTERESTS, AND IDEAS THAT AFFECTED US DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Institutions	**Interests**	**Ideas**
Property Rights Existing Elites and Social Relationships in the Philippines (e.g. sharecropping) International laws and conventions (e.g. property rights and neutrality) Catholic Church Political system and set-up in the US	Security from Filipino rebels Commercial and military considerations (e.g. Philippines as an access point to China and naval base). Defeating Spain in the Spanish-American War and preventing European powers from further accumulating more power. Developing the colonial economy Interest groups (e.g. industry lobbies, business groups, Catholic voters)	The "policy of attraction" to incentivise Filipinos to want to remain with the US as a result of the features the US would introduce there) "Civilising" mission; Filipinos as uncivilised Notions of readiness of Filipinos to govern themselves Glut thesis Freedom, liberty, democracy and capitalism by Americans

	Keeping Threats in the Pacific under control (e.g. Japan) Improving the US' image as an emerging power Managing economic risks in the US	

METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE

BASIS IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

In a broad sense, this thesis utilises a historical-sociological approach to the research field: the development of political institutions in The Philippines during the American era.

As the thesis aims to find out where the elements of Hall (1997)'s and similar scholars' framework mapped in what is known about the Philippines, this thesis had taken an interpretative approach to previous events. Furthermore, the elements of the Philippine case were unique enough to add valuable insights to the theory.

This thesis is grounded in comparative historical analysis. Comparative historical analysis is an approach to performing historical sociology, which "ask[s] questions about social structures to be concretely situated in time and space". They look at how meaningful actions and structural contexts interact with each other to generate the outcomes scene and highlight specific features within social structures. Thus, groups had chosen or encountered "varying paths in the past" and as a consequence would limit or introduce newer alternatives in the path forward (Skocpol, 1984: 1-2).

More specifically, causal analysis looks at possible outcomes of interest and the plausible causes to be analysed and chosen specifically. It also does not treat the big questions and certain outcomes as static over time as it has to accounts for appropriate changes in circumstances. These mean not ruling cited possibly causes out but at the same time not taking such as the determinative explanations. Another important aspect is to treat the final outcome as a product of a process over time. This includes considering the timing of relevant events. Finally, as comparative historical analysis is about attempting to account for significant historical outcomes that consider key historical contexts, the number of cases is limited, and the approach allows scholars to easily move between theory and history as novel explanations become discoverable (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 10-13).

Skocpol also posits various approaches that unify history and sociology: applying a general model to explain historical instances, using concepts to develop a meaningful historical interpretation, and analysing causal regularities in history. This thesis' work lies between the former two. Such strategies are useful for explaining and demonstrating how the otherwise abstract theory can work in a concrete case (Skocpol, 1984: 365). This is useful when, for instance, attempting to account for and demonstrate what the relevant phenomena are. In line with this approach, Mahoney (2003) offers a more specific strategy in which to manifest these principles. In comparative historical analysis, there is what is called a "within-case strategy" whereby the focus is on examining and comparing processes within particular cases and looks at what Mahoney calls a "disaggregated" case (ibid: 360). In the context of the 3Is framework, a "disaggregated" case involves breaking the process down into the outcome and the possible explanations and aspects and other important parts of the context

surrounding the related decision-making processes. A specific technique in analysing causal relationships is process tracing. Process tracing is an effort to identify causal relationships by looking or identifying possible intervening variables through which the explanatory variable can be used to create a causal effect on the outcome variable (ibid: 363). The possible explanatory variables here will be the different ideas, interests, and institutions that were currently involved. Process tracing is applied by identifying the roots of the possible causal explanations for an outcome and where appropriate, showing how they may not have possibly acted on their own but through their interaction with one or a few other ideas, interests, and institutions. As comparative historical analysis is concerned with causal explanations, one way to achieve this is to show the extent to which ideas, interests, or institutions needed one or the other to be a viable cause.

In view of the foregoing, this thesis' contribution when it comes to accounting for the drivers of policymaking is to explain how or why such possible explanations are insufficient reasons in and of themselves. It is in this way that the thesis could establish the foundations for a more robust causal analysis.

The comparison within the case that is called the Philippines manifested in several ways. One way is manifested by looking at the different processes, the more commonly invoked ideas, interests, or institutions will be analysed to see the extent to which they have informed the phenomena feasibly. A second way is to see whether there were any changes within the reasons invoked within the process. This could be especially useful when trying to account for reasons to acquire the Philippines in the first place and reasons to further grant it liberalisation (as well as oppose it along the way).

Blyth (2002) argues ideas shed light on what interests mean. Based on the meaning of ideas and interests established early on, this gives the thesis room to assign which are ideas, institutions, and interests, and explain such interactions between them. This also gives rise to the fact that this thesis will borrow some elements from the second approach identified by Skocpol: that of providing a meaningful historical interpretation. For this to work, one has to consider carefully what the "culturally-embedded intentions of individual or group actors" in such settings are. The aim is trying to identify contrasts and not generalisability (Skocpol, 1984: 368). The interpretative approach also suggests that it is just one lens to consider when looking at the circumstances that led to the decisions made by US officials.

The 3Is framework also provides a theoretical lens that does not merely rely on narrative history. As Šubrt (2017) has discussed, part of that involves enquiring about the social structures that were prevailing. Based on the explanations given, this involves identifying the institutional settings. Furthermore, there is room for the 3Is in historical-sociological analysis in that actions and contexts' interactions with each other are examined. It means looking at previously published historical works and archives, and identifying the broader geopolitical context that they're operating with. It is through here where one gets a sense of the prevailing ideas that agents were putting forward and were attached to. These materials will also provide a clue or even an explicit mention of what the agents' interests are.

Hwang (2006) has also suggested that those who put ideas forward to explain certain phenomenon are also considering such with a sociological perspective. Thus, it facilitates causal analysis by looking at the possible causes and asking questions such as whether such a possible idea, interest, or institution on its own was the reason and how else it could inform or be informed by another one. Moreover, given that comparative historical analysis emphasises that processes develop over time, there will be explanations that attempt to trace the roots of the possible causal variables (i.e. ideas, interests, and institutions) for the resulting outcome. This would also be an opportunity to identify the context in which they operated and the degree to which they were dependent on other possible explanations.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STRATEGY

For Skocpol, historical sociologists may consult archives using methods that historians do, or use such works to act as evidence, and such may be combined with other ways of analysing evidence about phenomena (Skocpol, 1984:360).

Using what Mahoney (2003) calls a "within case" strategy and in particular process tracing has clear implications for what to look for. Given that this is a test of possible causalities, the thesis will involve a gathering and listing of the commonly stated reasons as well as the contexts therein. Therefore, to identify the possible causes, this thesis has used a wide range of sources such as archives of American newspapers, Philippine Commission Reports, selected letters between officials (especially those who served under Presidents McKinley, Taft and Wilson), and legislative transcripts (especially from the US Congress) were among the main primary materials[18]. Some of the reports were available online such as Hathitrust.org, Theodore Roosevelt Center, and the University of Michigan's the United States and its Territories website. Some presidential letters were made available in volume by EE Morrison (ed) for Theodore Roosevelt (1951-1954) and AS Link (ed) for Woodrow Wilson (1978-1980). These archives provide direct and first-hand information that will help reconstruct the policymaking process and thus provide an empirical basis for the assertions made in the upcoming chapters. This thesis consulted archives from November 2016 to April 2018.[19] In addition, the works of Constantino (1975), a Filipino historian whose works highlight the dynamics and contradictions of development during the colonial era, is a case in point, as is that of Karnow (1989).

Chapter 4 focuses on the institutions that colonial officials needed to work with as they would deal with the Philippines. The other empirical chapters (Chapters 5 to 10) focuses on analysing a set of possible explanatory variables (i.e. ideas, institutions, and interests) associated with the ensuing outcomes. A key part of explanations will be showing what other one variable could not be a sole explanation for the ensuing outcome.

[18] These materials are publicly available in the British Library in London and Library of Congress in Washington DC.
[19] A full listing of the archives used and their location is found in Appendix B.

The thesis focused on gathering and interpreting data about institutional developments at the colonial and federal levels. As such, relevant were pieces of legislation passed by Congress, transcripts, and journals of Congressional and Philippine Commission. These archives contain clues on what the relevant US officials had in mind when promulgating certain policies. It was in here whether one could identify any interests, ideas concerning Filipinos being invoked. These were analysed along with the institutional constraints the agents operated under. These were identified with a view that the granting of such measures of liberalisation was not due to a single reason, and that the reasons were related to one another.

PART II – EARLY SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CHAPTER IV: PRE-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES: A FOUNDATION FOR OTHER INTERESTS, IDEAS, AND INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

As will be seen throughout this thesis, one of the most recurring reasons for the decisions of US officials and politicians toward the Philippines was the idea that Filipinos was incapable of governing themselves and are uncivilised.

Given that the US was the victorious party in the Spanish-American War, one would think that it would want to shape the former Spanish colony in its own image by introducing its own institutions. Whether they would have altruistic intentions is something else Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 would address. However, if the US were to have an altruistic plan to reform the Philippines, what constraints would they inherit? That is the question that this chapter will explore.

Such constraints would not be unique to colonies as the US faced its constraints when trying to expand the reach of its institutions in its territory. But institutional practices in the colony they would inherit have existed for centuries, some of which have foundations even before the previous coloniser colonised the territory.

The US was not the Philippines' first coloniser. It acquired the Philippines from Spain as part of the Treaty of Paris for $20 million (about $605 million at 2018 values). William McKinley, however, admitted limited knowledge about the territory his country would be acquiring. McKinley thus commissioned a study to better understand the environment in which they would be operating in (cf. Morrison, 2009). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the US had ultimately experienced mixed results when it introduced its institutions on the Philippines. Economically, the US also had trouble instituting land reform and opening up other industries.

The main issue that this chapter will be to identify what the institutions are that would await the US as it took over sovereignty over the Philippines. As characterised in the previous chapter, institutions are formal or informal norms usually developed over time, as well as the organisational structures that reproduce those norms. Given the subsequent idea where US officials have of Filipinos as culturally immature and thus "unready" for self-government, this chapter explores the basis for that understanding. That basis partly lies in the underlying institutions that were prevalent before US occupation of the territory. Previous authors would characterise institutions as formal or informal structures that would constrain the decisions and outcomes that arose. Colonial officials would cite such structures in future reports.

The system that the Spaniards established in the Philippines fostered class divisions and government mismanagement, as well as to spread the influence of the Catholic Church far away from Spain. Attempts to develop the local economy were limited. Furthermore, attempts to introduce more modern liberal institutions were an afterthought (Wolff, 1961: 17). Throughout the sixteenth to most of the eighteenth century, representatives of the Catholic Church took charge of internal affairs in the Philippines.

Also, regarding the Catholic Church trying to make inroads in the East, amidst the abuses the Spanish committed in the Philippines, there was a markedly different idea of racial inferiority between Spanish colonisers and American colonisers. For one Spanish and Portuguese colonies primarily permitted slaves and subordinate colonised peoples to listen to the Christian doctrine. That was something that was lacking legally among Anglo-American areas, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, especially as slaves in the British West Indies did not get most privileges associated with Christianity and plantation owners were not allowed to evangelising to their slaves in the hopes of keeping their slaves in line and discouraging open rebellion (Tannenbaum, 2001: 82). In other words, the Spanish colonisers made it a point that Catholic doctrines permeated every aspect of life.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to emphasise that this serves as a background chapter. To establish connections to the broader question of how subsequent decision-making of US officials was informed, there will be brief references to future actions. Those future actions will be discussed in more detail in the coming chapters. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to say is that as this chapter would show, institutions were deeply rooted in something and that ideas Americans would have about inhabitants of their new colony were not completely unfounded. Furthermore, given the ideas and the practices prevalent during Spanish colonialism that this chapter plans to outline, it also aims to provide points of contrast to future ideas US officials would later espouse.

Before the concluding section, this chapter will reflect on how the institutions are relevant to the framework introduced in Chapter 3. It is in here where the chapter will preview how the institutions could interact with a few other important interests and ideas, thus providing a basis for officials' future actions.

PRE-HISPANIC INSTITUTIONS

Important among the pre-existing social arrangements and institutions prior to Spanish colonisation were practices of reciprocity. These relationships involved notions of indebtedness where those with more material resources provided for those who did not have them in exchange for services and indebtedness. Arguably such a sense of indebtedness has characterised, for instance, election campaigns through to the present day.

Regarding indebtedness, the class of people would also be dictated by how much one owes the other. Social mobility between a free man and someone indebted was still possible compared to during the Spanish era. The lowest class, the peons, would have to render services until their debts have been cleared. If they die, their offspring would be responsible for the remainder of the unpaid debt. However, they can, in turn, also have peons who are indebted towards them if the latter has some form of indebtedness towards the former (Constantino, 1975).

POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE

Scholars have characterised pre-colonial institutions that appeared to resemble dependency as mild. Moreover, they have found that abuse of the system was less common. Nonetheless, there were aspects of such institutions that lent themselves to abuse.

Riedinger (1995: 18) was among those who thought that the institution of one's relationship with a pre-colonial *datu* or chieftain was characterised with reciprocity. In addition, the villages in the Philippines were regarded as "clientelist" and less formal (Neher, 1985: 1). Under such a relationship, creditors may request debtors for further favours even after the latter's debt or obligation has been settled because the creditor considers the offer of credit as a form of personal accommodation to the debtor which the debtor must reciprocate at some point (Hollnsteiner, 1964: 40).

As reciprocity and indebtedness prevailed, there were risks for those who were dependent on others. Given the informal nature of this, there were no formal institutions that could regulate or settle disputes. As a result, the effectiveness of these reciprocal institutions depended heavily on the character of the parties involved. Most pieces of literature have not commented on whether the value of services rendered by the debtor was commensurate to what was actually owed to the creditor. Nonetheless, such issues needed to be taken into account to assess the degree to which institutionalised relationships were vulnerable to abuse or the degree to which such abuses could be preventable.

Given that scholars (e.g. John, 2012) have argued that institutions are by their nature also informal, safeguards to minimise abuse become even more imperative if the system is to be trusted. The fact that the network of dependents on a single leader ran deep already raises questions. For one, given the leader's stature, he can tell everyone in his network to do whatever he commands to their detriment. This meant that with an institutionalised deep network of dependents, the leader would think that his power base would be less vulnerable to being undermined. Given the informal nature of the network, it was theoretically possible that the leader could use his leverage to persuade those followers in his network of dependency to disregard long-standing institutions if he wanted to. With this informal nature, there is no guarantee that the leader of the dependent networks would want to follow whatever norms he would place. On this count, there was a potential to end existing institutions that leaders wanted.

EARLY SPANISH INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL SETTINGS

Just like the Americans who conquered the Philippines, the Spaniards initially conquered the Philippines to open a trade route between Mexico and China, although their motives also involved helping the Catholic Church gain a footprint in the Far East.

The Spanish Crown was also in alliance with the Catholic Church as the latter saw the former as an important agent for its missionary activities. There was practically no separation between the Church and the Crown. In light of this partnership, the Spanish King was regarded to be a "patron of God". The King was thus also regarded being indebted to a certain divine power and that to satisfy this debt, the King needed to attend to the needs of the lands he was entrusted with ruling (Rafael, 1988: 147). This meant that the King had to provide the necessary financial and military support to such territories. Roscher and Bourne (1944: 4) also added that if it was necessary to perform exploitation on such colonies, it should be done in a way that considers the well-being of those in such colonies.

As will be seen in this chapter, the desire to acquire land was a key driver of how enterprising political and Church officials dispensed with their duties. Roth (1977: 39) argued that colonisers worked based on the principle that land ownership was "the noblest condition for a gentleman and the highest form of status." For such officials, acquiring land was about increasing their prestige. Although one may argue that this may be connected to exercising stewardship and care, it was a principle that was ripe for abuse. This was given that most natives neither had free status nor possessed sufficient resources to participate in the colony's political life.

Although the Spaniards, led by Portuguese explorer Magellan, initially stepped foot in the Philippines in 1521, they formally assumed sovereignty over the islands in 1565. The Philippines was originally designated as a province of the Viceroy of Mexico from 1565 until 1821 when it was subject to direct Spanish rule.

The existing social structure was crucial to Spanish officials hoping to exercise their rule over society. Although there was a central colonial governance structure, day-to-day governance was in practice left to existing leadership that Spanish officials found prior to colonisation (Roth, 1977:30; Simbulan, 2005: 18). In the process, friars and local officials became more influential and used the situation to amass wealth.

Spanish officials made the *datus* or local village chieftains into the *cabeza de barangay* or *cabeza* (Simbulan, 2005: 18). They were the go-between central Spanish government (Borromeo-Buehler, 1985: 72). They were primarily responsible for tax collection in their jurisdiction (Phelan, 1959: 122). Furthermore, under this system, the *cabeza's* firstborn male child automatically inherited such a position from his father (ibid: 122, 126).

The *cabeza* became part of the upper class or the *principalia*. As such, the *principalia* class enjoyed certain privileges, some of which depended on the province the *cabeza* belonged to. Phelan (1959) for instance, cited the situation in Pampanga, where the *cabeza* was given a title to reiterate to the local population the status of the *cabeza*. To incentivise loyalty to the higher authorities, members of the principals were also not included in the draft for join forced corvee labour (or the *polos y servicios*). They had also gotten exemptions from paying tribute (Simbulan, 2005: 18). According to Nadeau (2002: 80), one consequence was a division formed between natives who paid tribute and those who did not. The latter also merely collected tribute on behalf of the colonial administration. These privileges depended on the provinces in which the *cabezas* served.

Amidst all the laws that the Crown had promulgated on the Philippines, the central government had given leeway to its local officials to interpret the laws as they see appropriate. This meant some of them using the law to maximise their political advantage and placing burdens on their subjects. In other words, that directive opened the possibilities for corruption to become widespread in the colony. It also limited the possibilities for social mobility for most native Filipinos, especially those outside the *principales* class.

On the other hand, not all officials received exemptions or relief from Spanish officials for agreeing to be part of the Spanish operation. Even as other provinces

have permitted exemptions for local native officials to render forced corvee labour, this was not the case in the likes of Cavite, where the leaders faced the risk of imprisonment if they failed to do such (Borromeo-Buehler, 1985: 73). In some cases, they were paid salaries that were low (ibid, 74). Officials based in different provinces were hence not given equal treatment.

According to Phelan (1959: 122) and Aguilar (1998: 58), existing members of the local elite enjoyed greater degrees of social mobility, especially if a local friar wrote a reference letter for them. In the process, such local politicians witnessed first-hand how political machinery beyond the local levels of governance worked. These included family succession and rotating family members among the different positions available (Phelan, 1959: 126-127). However, only members of the local elite with adequate resources were able to avail and that the requirements to avail of these privileges were prohibitive.

Encomienda, Encomendero System and Methods of Servitude
Spanish officials dealt with issues surrounding land ownership when they were in the Philippines. Cushner and Larkin (1978: 103) pointed to commanders of armies who conquered the Philippines and believed that their superiors assured them of land. As a consequence of such, the *encomienda* system was born. This was primarily instituted to reward Spanish officials for the services they rendered to the Crown and as a way to secure such lands that were acquired (Vargas, 2003: 4; Simbulan, 2005: 17). Under this system, a Spanish official (the *encomendero*) was in theory responsible for providing care for the natives. In exchange, the natives were required to render forced corvee labour and pay tributes to the *encomendero* (Constantino, 1975; Vargas, 2003: 4). The *encomienda* system was supposed to be discharged with the view of supporting the colonies and the mission of the Spaniards (Roscher and Bourne, 1944: 4; Constantino, 1975: 44; McLennan, 1973a: 19).

However, such an institution also faced abuse. Some *encomenderos* were greedy and possessed what was called a "capitalist impulse" at the expense of the peasantry (Constantino, 1975: 42, 44). Friars referred incidents of abuse to more senior officials, and such instances of abuse commonly involved the value of agricultural goods produced (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 55). Furthermore, natives did not possess sufficient cash and were forced to barter some goods to satisfy their obligations. As a consequence of such abuses, it also took a long time for less wealthy members of the *encomienda* to pay off their tributes.

Moreover, Roth (1977) also indicated that such a system yielded too much power such that clergymen who acted as landowners had to face onerous bureaucratic conditions to even apply for exemptions for their labourers.

These abuses demonstrated a relaxed implementation of The Laws of the Indies – the law upon which the *encomienda* was based upon. Such a law in practice favoured the *encomenderos* at the expense of the native population. Those who promulgated a flexible interpretation did not take into account the propensity to abuse such a law. Those entrusted to the care of the unscrupulous *encomendero* was deprived of the care they were due.

The theory and the practice of the *encomienda* system was a testament to the fact that although institutions were important, the people behind them also played

a key role. Given that senior Spanish officials had given leeway to colonial and local officials to interpret the laws as they see fit, some enterprising *encomenderos* treated their *encomiendas* in that manner.

In a letter, Henry Kerr, an aid of President William Taft's family, wrote that in practice, the Spanish instituted a system akin to "practical peonage" where common folk were kept indebted by appealing to the latter's weak spots. In this peonage system, the common folk or "tao" as was called, were to render labour until that person's debt has been settled (Henry Kerr, 21/01/1906: 3). This bore some resemblance to the pre-Hispanic system of peonage, but as Kerr pointed out, the officials deliberately exploited the locals' weak spots in order to increase the chances of successfully getting them to render servitude. Kerr concluded that this method was successful.

Introduction of Property Rights

Riedinger (1995) argues that one major institution that Spanish introduced to the Philippines was that of property rights. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, the lands that chieftains used were for "communal use" but that eventually, they became the private property of someone (Krinks, 2002: 25). Moreover, Abinales and Amoroso (2005: 60) said when the Philippines was at the early stages of being colonised by Spain, the real estate that the Crown-owned were no longer communally-owned. The consequence of this was that children no longer enjoyed an automatic right to work in such lands once their parents passed away (ibid). If they wanted to continue doing so, they needed to pay fees the Crown for a relevant title. However, in practice, this meant that less wealthy families were displaced and the wealthier local elites benefitted more of the time (McLennan, 1973a: 19).

Based on this, the institution of property rights did not automatically come with improvements in living conditions, particularly for those who were less wealthy. Borromeo-Buehler (1985: 73) further argues that even institutions associated with pre-colonial Filipino leadership, especially the ones that featured patron-client relationships, were further reinforced by the colonial government. As mentioned previously, a key difference in that iteration was that greed became more of a central feature than in the pre-Hispanic iteration.

Cabazas found ways of retaining parts of the tribute they collected even if they were legally not permitted to do so. For instance, they collected more tribute than was necessary (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 57).

The issue of property rights also brought up issues on concerning sharecropping. In theory, this system was supposed to simultaneously mitigate risks and manage the incentives (Stiglitz, 2003: 21). According to the accounts given, however, the key problem was that the risk the tenant could bear did not have a maximum. As the risk that the tenant would bear was based partly on the value of the produce, it was not up to the tenant to say what this value meant. As a consequence, such tenants had to depend more on their landlords had to say.

Based on all of these, the Spanish regime has heralded a merger of two institutions: pre-hispanic notions of indebtedness and tribute on the one hand, and property rights on the other hand.

When institutions are not established to promote the welfare of actors it touches, there is a risk that "opportunism" could emerge (Toye, 1995). Such was the case when members of the local *principalia* class acquired designated as private property. In this light, the *cabezas* took advantage of this and saw this as a route to wield greater power than they previously had.

Although O'Driscoll and Hoskins (2003: 2) argued that having secure property rights were a necessary part of societal development in the sense that it settled the question of who legally owned certain properties, the reality was more complicated than that. The institution of property rights allowed more members of the *principalia* class than less wealthy individuals to assume control of the land. Moreover, there was a logistical issue in that the Spanish officials tasked with overseeing the implementation of such institutions were unable to do so, partly because of the geographic conditions (e.g. weather/climate) in the communities. As such, there continued to be abuses and manipulations.

Membership in the local elites was a consequence of whether someone took on a leadership role in his local community (Rafael, 1988). There were semblances of this in the Spanish colonial era, such as the differences among social classes being a consequence of a leader's ability to assert control over labour services, which Cushner and Larkin (1978: 109) attributed partly to one's ability in combat. Cushner and Larkin further add, however, that institutions that facilitated greater wealth did not completely consider the credentials of the officials in question.

Although Spanish colonial officials attempted to introduce reforms to the Philippines early on, the abuses that previously characterised the institutionalised behaviour persisted (Phelan, 1959).

THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH

During the early colonial period, the Church, in particular, the friars, played a significant role in how the colony's political and economic landscape was like. (Roth, 1977: 37). For instance, clergymen sat on the board that was responsible for deciding how to divide lands that the Spanish Crown had legal possession of. Given their ability to possess the land they thought that they owned, and they owned a sufficient amount of land to participate in the colony's political and economic affairs, the friar assigned to each subdivision played a critical role (Constantino, 1975: 74).

For more than half of Spain's time in the Philippines, the Philippine territory remained closed to outside trade and representatives of the Church continued to wield more influence over day-to-day matters.

EDUCATION AND CONNECTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

Discussing education provides one with clues as to how officials valued investments in human resources of the future. Kerr (21/01/1906: 4) wrote in his letter that such education consisted of just small bits of teaching pupils the Spanish language and heavier bits of Catechism. Kerr mentioned that the authorities did not permit attempts at improving education levels as they were a potential source of trouble.

On some level, such trouble for the Spaniards would eventually be realised. The *illustrados*, or enlightened affluent Filipinos that were educated in Europe, formed movements that Spanish officials found subversive. Such would imply that Spaniards feared that by extending higher forms of education to the wider population, such troubles could be replicated across more corners of the colony.

As for the implications for the kind of human capital in the colony, the lack of educated Filipinos was manifested in how closed-off the colony's economy was. Kerr (1906) stated that the colonial economy was set up in such a way that did not incentivise capital accumulation of more than what was necessary to survive.

EARLY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRE-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

On the one hand, Spaniards came to Christianise the Philippines. On the other hand, acquiring large parcels of land accompanied the Spaniards. As a consequence, the agents involved were given avenues to act abusively.

The earlier part of the Spanish colonial era had three key economic legacies. The first of them was the introduction of the notion of private property. The second was the high amount of tribute collected from locals. The final legacy was the institution of forced labour (Sobritchea, 1981: 19-20). Given the wider opportunities for upward social mobility during the pre-hispanic era, the economic institutions introduced by Spanish officials made such prospects more challenging. This should not be surprising given that the nature of institutions and incentives within them had been too attractive for local elites to pass out.

The institutions that the early colonial era introduced largely had the effect of consolidating existing pre-hispanic institutions. Furthermore, the practices stemming from the *encomienda* deviated from the legal rationale for its establishment.

The *encomienda system* in the Philippines made opportunism possible. The failure of formal institutions made such manifestations glaring. Another cause of such failures was vagueness or imperfect information. Local elites used the situation to enrich themselves as a consequence. Peasants and commoners faced the risk of being disenfranchised when institutions of property rights were introduced.

EIGHTEENTH- AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY SPANISH COLONY

When Spain started to lose most of its territory in the Western Hemisphere, the government in Madrid would assume direct jurisdiction over the Philippines. It was in this latter period where measures to liberalise the economy were introduced.

Spain realised that it could not continue the economic practices that had characterised its rule over most of the first half of its rule. One of the realities was that Spain had lost much of its influence vis-à-vis other colonising European powers, given that it lost a lot of its colonies in the Americas (Chu, 2010: 78). A brief British invasion of Manila prompted Spain to open up the Philippines economically. Spain's loss to Britain also forced it to politically reconsider its position (Constantino, 1975: 114). One such example was that the Galleon trade where the Philippines played a role as a transhipment port between Spain's Latin American colonies and China became more financially difficult to sustain and

justify continuing. With this in mind, the Spanish crown felt that to help keep the Philippines more competitive, it had to look for new global markets for raw materials. As a consequence, the land would be central to increasing demand (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005).

As Spain executed its new plans for the Philippines, the colony would experience adverse social issues. One such manifestation was share-cropping. It mutated into a much level that widened the gap between owners and tenants.

The Friars were among one of the largest landowners in the colony (Roth, 1977). Governor-General Jose Basco y Vargas designated friar lands for commercial use (Putzel, 1992: 46). Given that the colony was undergoing economic and other social changes, friars agreed to lease some parcels of their land under the *inquilinato* system for a fixed annual cost. (McLennan, 1973a). When the *inquilinato* (lessees) became prosperous enough, they acquired lands and used them as a platform to manage their export-based firms (Putzel, 1992: 47).

In the aftermath of the Anglo-Spanish war of the 1760s, where native Chinese lent support to the British, the Spanish colonisers expelled the native Chinese from the Philippines (Putzel, 1992: 46). The Spanish, however, decided to allow them to re-enter the Philippines and perform a variety of activities there. In fact, Spanish ships were deployed to Canton to acquire more Chinese goods in addition to the supplies the Spaniards previously acquired (Constantino, 1975: 115).

EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE *MESTIZO*

The *mestizo* - a descendant of mixed racial heritage in Spanish colonies - has been around in the Philippines prior to the Spanish promoting policies to liberalise it economically (Constantino, 1975; Simbulan, 2005). The *mestizo* was rooted in the *principales* of the previous centuries as these *principales* members married Chinese or Spaniards. There were, however, more Chinese *mestizo*s and this group had become more influential (Simbulan, 2005: 22). For most of this chapter, it will be the Chinese *mestizo* who married into Filipinas that will be discussed in this context. At some point, some members of the *mestizo* class overtook the *principales* and became the dominant group among the elite (Constantino, 1975: 121). During their early years, *mestizos* made a name for themselves in the field of merchandising (ibid, 121).

When Spain decided to open up the Philippines in the nineteenth century to trade from other countries, the Chinese *mestizo* played a more prominent role in economic affairs (Tan, 1986: 141) and became more economically powerful in this era (Anderson, 1988: 4). The *mestizo's* prominence was credited to the dilemma Spanish officials faced when they decided to expel pure Chinese businessmen from the Philippines during the eighteenth century as a consequence of the Anglo-Spanish War, in particular, whether Chinese people contributed to or damaged the colonial economy (Roth, 1977: 117; Tan, 1986: 143; Chu, 2010: 56). Ultimately, officials decided to convert Chinese people into Catholics and introduce them to Spanish culture (Wickberg, 1964: 68).

To express what officials thought of as the value of Chinese mestizos were to the economy, they were entitled to pay a tribute of only ₱3.00, which was at the time half of what a pure Chinese needed to pay (Tan, 1986: 144).

As Kerr (1906: 9) pointed out in his letter, the Mestizos have a "singleness of purpose for personal gain rising almost to the height of virtue". This means that any prospects of Mestizos acting for a national interest were too optimistic. Kerr also adds that these Mestizos know that they would eventually become the "real rulers". This would imply that they needed to be moved towards supporting causes that involve more than their interests.

Chinese *mestizos* also became infamous for their landholdings. Initially, they leased land owned by friars (Simbulan, 2005: 25). Although Chinese *mestizos* also engaged in the arenas of wholesale and merchandising, competition from pure Chinese in such endeavours made them consider landholdings to be a more profitable endeavour, thus engaging in the latter (Constantino, 1975: 123).

Putzel (1992: 48) describes that Chinese *mestizos* also became known for their business activities in sugar *haciendas* or plantations, found primarily in Panay and Negros. Lands that the Chinese *mestizos* legally owned were utilised primarily to facilitate the export market, and thus, sharecroppers were left with a more limited supply of produce for themselves (Constantino, 1975: 119).

ISSUES WITH SHARECROPPERS

In the latter parts of the Spanish era, the sharecropping system was the main source for generating an agricultural surplus. The farmers provided the labour, whereas landlords provided the capital and other resources (Aguilar, 1994; Roth, 1977: 119).

David Barrows, one of the first US officials to be based in the Philippines, was among those who reported that peasants did not enjoy the gains that stemmed from export growth. Instead, it was members of the landholding elite that kept the largest part of the gains (Simbulan, 2005: 27).

Although the Philippines was a net loss for Spain fiscally during the earlier part, plantation-based agriculture helped revive the colony's economic viability. As a consequence, the practices associated with the plantation culture were consolidated (Anderson, 1988: 5). Given the characteristics of the earlier part of the Spanish era, landowners did not have as much of an appetite to exploit agricultural labourers (ibid). However, with the opening up of the colony and the rise of plantation-based agriculture, the appetite for exploitation only increased.

The institution of *pacto-de-retroventa* became front and centre of the sharecropping class' struggles. The difficult financial conditions of low-income people necessitated such a practice. It also became pronounced when the colony faced problems as it modernised. Peasants saw the *pacto-de-retroventa* as a mean to relieve themselves of financial burdens when they were not doing well economically (Simbulan, 2005: 26). Under this scheme, peasants may borrow money from someone else, which was often a Chinese *mestizo*. The interest rate charge, however, was excessive and that the creditor had the right to acquire a peasant's land if that peasant defaulted on his payment (Putzel, 1992: 47). Constantino, (1975: 122-123) and Simbulan (2005) posits this scheme as a way for Chinese *mestizos* to consolidate their landholdings. Given the usurious interest rates involved, this institution worked more to favour the creditor, who could seize the land, and at the expense of the debtor-peasant. In the end, peasants and

other low-income people found themselves deeper in debt than they could afford to pay back.

For McLennan (1973b: 20), the said scheme as a "legal fiction" especially given that the land in question and what was produced from it were not appraised appropriately. In other words, such lands received a low appraisal value. Under such a scheme, the creditor was aware of these pitfalls and operated under the premise that the chances of a debtor repaying his debt were not promising (ibid). The defaulting debtor, who just lost ownership of the property, was usually allowed to stay in the house as a sharecropper (ibid; Abinales and Amoroso: 2005). However, he was vulnerable to being evicted and to minimise the chances at meeting such a fate, the debtor-turned-sharecropper needed to surrender parts of his produce to the new landowners to cover part of the rent.

There were other similar schemes whereby sharecroppers had to surrender parts of what they produced to their *mestizo* landlord, often at an undervalued price. This *mestizo* would, in turn, lease the land but gain a profit from it (McLennan, 1973b; Roth, 1977: 120; Simbulan, 2005: 25-26). Based on these accounts, the peasants who lived in lands they owned initially but lost to *mestizos* faced significant degrees of uncertainties, given the former's financial position.

Although Spanish officials expressed some concern (Simbulan, 2005: 26), some of them also took advantage of the weaknesses of the peasantry. Although the Spaniards saw the Chinese as a threat, yet the Spaniards decided to integrate them using mixed marriages. To begin with, these *mestizo*s initially won the favour of the Spanish government for their loyalty to the latter (ibid, 28). Furthermore, given the dysfunctionality of the state, it was not surprising that the Spaniards were ineffective. Based on this, one can guess that the Spaniards had a limited understanding of how different Chinese *mestizos* were from the pure Chinese they sought to expel, or the Spaniards had no intent in protecting the Filipinos.

More consequentially for political fortunes, a status of sharecropper limited one's ability to avail oneself of political privileges. As alluded to by Borromeo-Bueler (1985: 95), for one to be eligible to stand as an elected official, the amount of land one could legally possess was important. Based on that, participation was limited as not many people even had parcels of land of sufficient value, to begin with. Consequently, their concerns were not heard properly. Furthermore, as private property rights was a relatively recent institution introduced by Spaniards to local officials, others considered such property to be too valuable to be relinquished, especially as it was through property holdings that one could assert one's political influence (Cushner, 1973: 39; Borromeo-Buehler, 1985).

For Libecap (1986), property rights did not always guarantee equity. That was the case seen with the *pacto-de-retroventa* system whereby the *mestizo*s found a way to gradually, eventually, and systematically remove legal possession of lands from the debtors-later turned-sharecroppers given that these *mestizos* were aware that the latter did not always possess a high ability to settle their outstanding debts. Thus, the sharecroppers were once again at a disadvantage since enterprising creditors who had an idea of sharecroppers' financial capabilities were set the terms.

Once again, sharecroppers were the losers in this endeavour. Enterprising parties such as the *mestizo* exploited the situation and made gains often at the former's expense. It had some consequences for the exercise of political power moving forward as some of them felt that their legal ownership of property was the key to exercising such.

OTHER SOURCES OF PROBLEMS IN THE COLONY

The latter part of the Spanish era continued to be characterised by problems associated with institutions introduced during the earlier part. The problem of corruption was particularly acute in the collection of tribute and forced labour (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 89).

The tribute lists were a problem in their own right. Scholars characterise them to not be accurate enough to account for everyone who was required to pay tribute and also may have missed out on those who had an exemption from it. There were issues as well of lower amounts of tribute collected from the population (ibid). Robles (1969) also suggests that the lower amounts of tribute were compounded by the fact that the central colonial government in Manila did not offer adequate financial assistance to the local levels.

Friars continued to wield influence even as the amount of land they held was reduced. Their power was seen for instance in when it came to keeping tribute lists up to date, which they were against since an updated list meant fewer people on it, which translated to lower expected revenues (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 91).

Given the Friars' stake and power when it came to the tribute lists, it meant that in practice, residents who moved to a new community that was outside a particular Friar's jurisdiction was still subject to the tribute requirements of what would be their former jurisdiction. Additionally, if someone passes away, his or her surviving relatives or family members would be tasked with paying the tribute due to him or her. As a consequence, as more money would continue to flow to the coffers translated to less for the people who left the community or the families/relatives of the deceased.

Overall, the situation in the colony mirrored the political turmoil that Spain faced domestically in the nineteenth century. This volatile situation was manifested in the appointment of up to twenty-four governors-general, most of whom differed in terms of ideological leaning. Such ideological differences had the consequence of instituting policy changes that did not account for the political context in which the policies these changes would supersede operated in (ibid: 85-86).

Given that constant changing of policies and the unstable political atmosphere back in the mainland that Spanish officials carried over to the Philippines, the colonial government lacked credibility. With Spanish officials' credibility impaired, they were unable to govern effectively in the eyes of the colony. With this, there was an implication that the government could not be trusted to secure property rights, settle disputes, or control the level of corruption of institutions internally within the colony (cf. Spoor, 2012: 190-191).

As the sharecroppers lacked security of tenure, they suffered political consequences. A person's electoral fortunes depended on whether one was able to own land or other forms of property (Constantino, 1975; Putzel, 1992). As such, they had no real property under their name to qualify them to participate in the colony's political exercises in a manner that affects significant changes they wanted.

INSURGENCIES AND REVOLUTION

Such abuses by Spanish officials eventually resulted in uprisings which only hit their climax in the closing years of Spanish rule. Even if Spanish officials suppressed insurgencies throughout their exercise of authority over the islands, their power had weakened over time.

Two kinds of resistance to Spanish rule have emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. One of them has been by the *ilustrados* – a class of European-educated Filipinos who came back and merely clamoured for reforms to the way in which Spain would exercise its rule. In terms of background, they are as close to Moore (1967) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) characterisation of the middle-class. They were more prolific in their writings and did not call for violent resistance. Despite not advocating for outright violent rebellion, *illustrados,* most notably the Philippines' national hero, Jose Rizal, were ultimately sentenced to death.

Revolutionaries such as Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo also proliferated. They wanted to take up arms to end Spanish rule altogether. Later, some of them would collaborate the Americans during the Spanish-American War only to be arrested when the Americans would take over.

Such a lack of highly-educated Filipinos would also concern Americans who were in the territory when it was acquired from Spain. Officials would peg their concerns about rebellions in part due to low educational attainment. Such a perceived low level of educational attainment would cause American businesses to worry about leaving the operation of government in the hands of Filipinos, and it implies why they would prioritise enhancing law-and-order.

PRE-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND POTENTIAL CONNECTION WITH OTHER IDEAS AND INTERESTS: A REVIEW

Indebtedness, class relations, and landholding systems were all considered institutions in the sense that they governed the relationships among agencies during the period in which they prevailed. They became among the constraints which officials have tried to break through and/or deal with as they made decisions. However, they bear important connections with the other ideas and interests that Hall has been putting forward.

Furthermore, whilst they are a major part of the decision-making process in the sense that they provide a backdrop and context for subsequent decisions, looking at pre-American institutions alone may not suffice to account for decision-making. These institutions would be enriched in light of other ideas and interests around the time that there were decisions to be made by Americans.

The notion of indebtedness highlighted the personal relationships that were present. In practice, this institution meant that over centuries, people dependent on someone with more resources would experience difficulty and shame going against that particular someone. They would therefore not be in a position to have political and economic freedom apart from their benefactors – something integral to the idea of democracy Americans wanted to implant on Filipinos. Americans would gradually introduce democratic institutions, and to the extent that enfranchisement was prevalent, the drive to use electoral politics to repay favours and retain power structures was highlighted. However, as this practice has existed for centuries, it would have proven tricky to officials who wanted to introduce genuine reforms in the system. However, as will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, if an institution-only analysis would be utilised, then one can argue that the US would not even introduce democratic institutions knowing that the institutional make-up of the colony they inherited had some hostilities to democratic practices they have claimed to preach. It would also imply that there was more in play rather than these institutions but interests as well, although the latter would not be necessarily related to democratisation itself but to interests in maintaining peace and order during a time when rebellions were a worry.

Moreover, such an institution of indebtedness also formed part of the ideas Americans would have of Filipinos of being a backward kind of race. As far as Americans are concerned, they believed that Filipinos were not in the position of being entrusted to manage national affairs, given that indebtedness and kinship ties were a priority among most political entities in the colony.

In connection with the framework set out in Chapter 3, institutions constrain or facilitate the effectivity of ideas. The pre-American institutions found in the Philippines provided credence to the ensuing ideas. Specifically, given the situation that the Kerr and his colleagues witnessed, it became apparent to American officials that the Filipinos could not be trusted to govern themselves and rectify the atrocities the Spaniards did to them with without any assistance. That idea had been built up steadily. It was also apparent that officials who wanted to rule the Philippines had a stronger case to do so and portray the Filipino subjects lacking the abilities to operate a government. Based on these, Kerr (21/01/1906: 13) thought that introducing reforms associated with liberal democracies to Filipinos more gradually was something more feasible and that full autonomy for Filipinos would take a long time.

The framework also suggests that institutions would constrain or make salient the kinds of interests that agents would want to pursue. The fact that friars were one of the largest parcels of land in the country highlights a major institutional constraint that future Governors-General had to deal with – the influence of the Catholic Church. The institutional barriers toward land reform illustrated in this chapter will once again be highlighted in succeeding chapters when Americans attempt to engage in some form of land reform, especially in lands formerly owned by Friars. Filipino elites who were financially capable of owning huge tracts of land would be the ones most able to participate in the purchase lands to be auctioned off. Some of these elites would keep the lands they would acquire as unproductive. However, merely characterising the friars as institutionalised in the colony is a sufficient ground for inaction. Although it was true that the influence of the Church in the US would prove to be a constraining factor, one needs to ask themselves what the consequences are of breaching such an institution. It implies

acknowledging the connection and role of interests. US politicians which these Governors-General served would acknowledge this and become weary of their political interests that would be undermined if they were to breach the said institution. As such, future attempts would necessitate substantial negotiations. In other words, the institution of the friars was deeply rooted and would have the necessary connections to the interests that US politicians needed to satisfy. Additionally, there was also the idea of whether the US government would be reliable enough to keep its word; that itself formed another idea.

Furthermore, the institutionalised state of the Philippines at the point of acquisition and a few years afterwards would alert officials to security concerns. It would also make salient the fact that Filipinos are prone to committing insurrections and hence make them aware that the territory needs to be secured.

Based on the statement mentioned above, there is a connection between ideas, interests, and institutions. The prevalence of the pre-American institutions, for instance, illustrates such.

CONCLUSION, REFLECTIONS, AND FURTHER CONNECTIONS

Once again, this chapter has highlighted the role of the entrenched elite, the prevailing social relationships, economic set-up, the role of the Church, and problems related to land redistribution.

The main thing that this chapter demonstrates is that the Philippine institutions that the US had to work were constraints as it tried to introduce the reforms in the colony. On some level, it was difficult to reconcile the compatibility of institutions found in the former Spanish colony with the reforms the US hoped to establish. The Spaniards had left the US officials with a colony that was politically and economically backwards. For instance, debt peonage and sharecropping continued to proliferate. If it was ever in the US' plan to establish more liberal and democratic norms and develop its economy in a span of only a few decades, it would need to undo more than three centuries of pre-Hispanic and Spanish colonial influence. The fact that these arcane practices and institutions were pervasive for a long time was itself challenging for Americans to work with. As American officials had pointed out, they did not know what to do with the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. One may also argue that it would justify why liberal institutions could not be introduced all in one go. As already mentioned, laws would be constructed in such a way to limit democratic participation. But there are questions on whether these would alleviate the problems they hoped to sort out; there would also be questions on whether these laws would further strengthen the hand of those who became part of the problem in the first place. The voting franchise was not open to most Filipinos until 1916. Until then, only existing Filipino men who effectively benefitted from Spanish rule could vote and stand for office.

Furthermore, the prospects of the Philippines being a valuable contributor itself to the American long century was not apparent given the problems the US had inherited. US businessmen would have immense difficulties doing commerce under such conditions. However, in the early years, a lot of them begged administrations not to let the Philippines govern itself. It would also imply the ideas they had of it based on the institutions already seen.

In consideration of this, the coming chapters will show that colonial officials would be resigned to working with local elites that benefitted from Spanish institutions even though most of their compatriots were left behind by the same. These would be manifested when the likes of Governor-General William Howard Taft would have to choose Filipinos who previously worked for the Spanish colonial government for the day-to-day running of the colony's affairs. Burns (2010) reveals that those kinds of officials were not Taft's first choice of point people to deal with.

Land redistribution issues that this chapter discussed are also evident when officials tried to rectify it. Chapter 8 will discuss more of such efforts.

The presence of agitators or rebels that originated from the Spanish era and campaigned for Philippine Independence (cf. Kerr) was also a major concern. According to Kerr, it also justified the calls to educate the population for concern that rebellions would break out too intensely. Officials conceded that that would take some time.

When it comes to the larger question of what the Philippines could do for American *interests* such as setting up a Naval base and being a station to facilitate trade with China, it is clear that the colonial master would need to do a lot of work to make the colony a manifestation of its hegemonic power. It was also no surprise why some officials did not think of the Philippines as itself a valuable commercial station. The situation reaffirmed the need to introduce more advanced educational institutions and more advanced industries. In this way, it would create more opportunity for revenues for the American state. However, one interesting thing that writers like Putzel (1992) found lacking is a lack of more serious attempts at land reform in the American Era. This chapter demonstrated the same during the preceding Spanish era. It would also evoke a question of why this was even left out if the US was supposedly keen at imprinting its image on the Philippines. More of this will be discussed in the coming chapters, but it is sufficing to say that the issue of land reform was something the US could have sorted given the problems that persisted before it entered the Philippines. With the failure of land reform, one of the key power centres of the local elite remained intact.

Given the institutional set-up that was outlined in this chapter, one of the things the next chapter does is reiterate how officials had expressed a commitment to modernising the Philippines based on the problems they encountered. Such an idea of modernisation was based on institutions the Philippines had experienced before Americans entered.

CHAPTER V: ACQUIRING AND KEEPING THE PHILIPPINES

INTRODUCTION

As this thesis aims to use the 3Is to shed light on why the US liberal reforms for the Philippines relatively early on, it will involve trying to shed light on why the US decided to take the Philippines as a colony, to begin with. The purpose of introducing this chapter is thus to analyse the role of interests, institutions, and ideas in the decision of US President William McKinley to acquire the Philippines from Spain, retain possession of it after the Spanish-American War, as well as those involved in the advice by other high-ranking US officials and political allies of McKinley. In here, the domestic (US), as well as broader geopolitical factors, provide an important backdrop to the opinions and decision-makers regarding whether to acquire the Philippines. By doing this, the thesis sets up some reference points for the subsequent chapters that examine the Is involved in further liberal reforms.

In the process, one of the main points that this chapter demonstrates that strategic security considerations around the Spanish-American War, ideas about Filipino capabilities and what US officials thought the US' role was, as well as perceived economic considerations on access to China were among the key drivers of the decisions to take the Philippines and retain it. Furthermore, the chapter also shows that even as there was no firm plan to take on the Philippines until the last minute, there was a hope that doing so would fulfil some of the motives (e.g. interests and some ideas) that had their roots in the dynamics of previous decades, and that one cannot pin the acquisition of the Philippines down to one single cause. However, in introducing ideas, interests and institutions, this chapter will pose questions about whether particular ideas, interests, and institutions, in and of themselves, helped explain the US decision to acquire the Philippines.

Before proceeding with outlining the ideas, institutions, and interests in detail, the next section will briefly argue that the Philippines started as an afterthought in the US' plans. It shows that at the beginning, the federal government had no plans to acquire the Philippines and that it would be a last-minute decision. It is this backdrop for the ideas, institutions, and interests that are subsequently discussed. Given that officials decided to acquire the Philippines at the last minute, officials rationalised acquiring the Philippines in terms of other existing objectives.

The backdrop from the second section introduces the third section, which is the ideas, institutions, and interests involved in the Spanish-American War. Here, security and strategic interests (i.e. developing America's reputation as a global power, need for bases in the Far East, keeping Spain at arm's length) were at stake. It was also here that the idea of Filipinos not being reliable enough to manage their affairs emerged as well as the related idea that officials thought the US needed to exercise its power to "civilise" others. This chapter establishes how some of these ideas, institutions, and interests worked interdependently to have more explanatory weight based on the framework outlined in Chapter 3.

The fourth section then focuses on the broader economic-related factors in acquiring the Philippines. These especially included the interests in the China trade (i.e. facilitating the China trade, keeping European powers at arm's length), something that was deeply rooted. This section does not argue whether the Philippines was a helpful force for the China trade but that officials believed it was. In relation, this chapter also discusses the idea of the glut thesis (the concept where seeking markets overseas was a solution to domestic production surplus) and its possible manifestation in economic interests of key US officials.

The fifth section will then enumerate other factors under consideration as the US was in the process of acquiring the Philippines. These included religious interests and the institution of property rights.

THE PHILIPPINES: AN INITIAL AFTERTHOUGHT

William McKinley was the US President at the time of the Spanish-American War. Amidst the war, the US government was initially preoccupied with the matter of liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish colonial rule. To McKinley's administration, dealing with these two entities, which already became known in the mainland, was a larger priority than the Philippines. At that point, any motivation related to the said matter was less about acquiring the Philippines *per se* as it was an issue of neutralising Spanish forces and keeping the Asia-Pacific within American reach and protecting cities on the west coast of the US from Spanish incursions (Olcott, 1916). Moreover, there was also an existing US policy to not intervene in troubles in Spanish territories unless such troubles would undermine US interests. As such, such troubles were not given notice by officials to warrant action (Olcott, 1916: 141). Furthermore, McKinley thought that acquiring the Philippines would be tantamount to "criminal aggression".

In an interview with General James Ruisling (1903) five years after the acquisition of the Philippines, McKinley revealed he was originally not in favour of acquiring it. He further argued that he did not even know what to do with them once he found out the islands were involved in the Spanish-American War. McKinley struggled with what to do with the Islands. He had several options: a) return the islands to Spain; b) let another colonial power take over; c) grant outright independence to the islands; d) make the islands a protectorate of the US, and; e) acquire the entire territory (ibid).

On balance, information such as those revealed in the Greene papers has further given credence to the image that other scholars had about McKinley being a "reluctant expansionist" (Smith, 1993: 237). Once again, this means that any semblance of expansionism into the Philippines was something brought about by circumstances that the administration faced.

Is STEMMING FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Scholars have considered the Spanish-American War to be the highlight of McKinley's presidency. The events associated with the war here also consolidated the US' footprint in the world as an empire and rising colonial power (Calabresi and Yoo, 2008: 236). In the process, opportunities to develop America's reputation in the world arose. It was in consideration of these interests that the Philippines entered consideration.

INTEREST in Developing America's Global Reputation and Restraining European Powers

As the US was a young rising power, the major European powers were still looking to further expand their territories, especially in Africa and Asia. On top of that, US officials unsure of how to assert the US' authority in the world (Zelikow, 2017: 45-46). Zelikow further goes on to say that as it is a rising power, it also had the fortune of a growing economy at the turn of the century. Some officers and politicians were keen on improving the US' standing overseas to take advantage of these trends. In the minds of these actors, it was thus imperative for the US to improve its reputation.

Having said that, there was also an appetite to slow further European conquest among officials. Some of it was manifested in one of the options later considered for what would happen if Spain were to be defeated. This option was to turn over the islands to a third power like Japan or Germany. Germany was assessed as best in position to take over the reins in the Philippines, given that it was establishing naval ports of its own in Asia (Zelikow, 2017). Given that the US was trying to build up its reputation on the world stage, brigadier general Francis Vinton Greene, someone enlisted by McKinley to help draft recommendations for the Philippines, spoke out against such a prospect. Greene indicated that turning the Philippines over to Japan, Germany or another power, it would be "an act of cowardice of which we are incapable" (in ibid: 57). Furthermore, McKinley himself thought doing so would provide an advantage to what he called were the rivals of the US and that such would constitute "bad business" and was something "discreditable". That was a similar line used to rule out a return of the Philippines to Spain (Ruisling, 1903: 17). In other words, when officials had the option to turn the Philippines over to European powers (e.g. Germany), it was rejected with a view that doing so would reignite European dominance, something that they tried to avoid.

A question that stems from these interests, however, is whether they could be in and of themselves sufficient reasons, or one needs to understand them vis-a-vis the prevailing ideas and institutions at the time. Officials would have needed to think about the values associated with such interests. These would include thoughts about what promoting America's image and reputation entailed. Furthermore, the fact that officials were keen to advance the US' reputation implied that, (a) they had thoughts about how to do it, and (b) there were institutionalised practices that may have encouraged such thoughts to proliferate among decision-makers.

INTEREST - Need for Naval and Commercial Bases in the Far East

As alluded to previously, McKinley was not keenly interested in the Philippines *per se* early on during the Spanish-American war. However, the considerations involving the Philippines during the early stages of that war were partly rooted in the need to manage resources of the Asia-Pacific Squadron and make the latter's missions in the region more efficient. The Asia-Pacific Squadron was a fleet of US naval vessels that aimed to protect US merchants doing business in the Far East from succumbing to pirates. It usually used ports in China, Japan, and Korea to dock its ships when it went ashore. As part of its the initial plans for the said squadron, the US Navy wanted it to go after Spanish ships in Manila Bay. Given the war, the Spanish ships assigned there were considered a threat by the US. Furthermore, given the capacity of ships and the practicality of carrying the coal

that would power such vessels, officers felt the need for new bases to be built (Zelikow, 2017: 42-43).

However, the British and Japanese hosts were concerned about the use of their bases to launch wars, especially against Spain. On top of this, the manner of transporting coal did not lend itself well to existing plans of the US (ibid, 43).

Though McKinley was reluctant to conquer the Philippines at first, he was nonetheless in favour of building US naval bases overseas. McKinley also had a record on annexation as his administration oversaw the annexation of Hawaii (Gould, 1980). As such, this implies that McKinley's ultimate stance to annexe the Philippines was not completely surprising as far as the desire to build bases was concerned.

Additionally, some government and military officials under McKinley had plans of their own. Imperialists such as William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt found commercial value in acquiring and governing the Philippines. They felt that the Philippines would ultimately serve their broader trading needs. Officials did not necessarily value the Philippines *per se* as a final destination for trade. However, the Philippines, together with Hawaii, Wake, and Guam, would comprise a network of naval and coal stations that would form a trade route for the US to China (e.g. McCormick, 1963; Beveridge, 1900; Gould, 1980) and access to Korea, French Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula (Vanderbilt in US Congress, Senate, 1899: 561). Since the beginning of the Spanish-American War, senior officials of the McKinley administration (though not necessarily McKinley himself) wanted to make the Philippines the "American Hong Kong" both commercially and militarily. Hong Kong served these purposes for its British colonial masters: an entrepot and a military base from which to transport goods through (McCormick, 1963). In other words, part of the appeal of the Philippines for colonialists was some major business figures saw it as a base to reach half the world's population easily (Soberano, 1974: 42).

As for possible interactions, the fact that new bases were needed implies two things. First, officials were almost certainly aware that the new bases were essential to the US's expression of power across the North-Western Pacific. More importantly, there is a question of what the ideational basis was to go to the North-Western Pacific to pursue these interests. For instance, given that the Philippines was seen as the "American Hong Kong" in a commercial sense, it is highly likely that their interests were associated with ideas about free trade and economic competition. US officials needed a free port from which to transport goods to and from.

INTEREST OF Keeping Spain From Advancing

Related to the interest of keeping European powers from gaining an advantage in the Pacific, as US officials found that the Philippines was under Spanish jurisdiction, they were considering the prospect of it using what the consequences of letting it advance were. McKinley was fearful that if the American side lost in its war against Spain, there would be no place for them to "refit" in the Orient. Furthermore, McKinley implied that a victory for the Spaniards would also mean that the latter would become unconstrained in attempting to seize parts of the western United States (Rusling, 1903). Given that officials at the turn of the century were wary of further European expansion, it made sense to the US to

contain Spain, the other main party in the Spanish-American War, and prevent it from resurging as a colonial power.

However, this interest to contain Spanish power could not have existed in a vacuum. As ideas help make sense of agents' interests, this would mean that officials must have developed the idea that Spain undermined American prospects as the latter tried to expand its footprint. On the other hand, as ideas reflect agents' interests, the account above portraying Spain as a threat suggests that officials in the US had other interests that it had to protect, such as the tracts of land that it had in the western part of the country.

INSTITUTION of Neutrality
Once again, North (1995) defines institutions as "rules of the game". Other authors broadly characterise institutions as structures and constraints the actors operate within. Hence, institutions include existing laws and practices. Moreover, the institutions also necessitate some of the officials' interests. For instance, during the earlier parts of the Spanish-American war, there was the institution of the neutrality the US tried to honour. The previous subsection already explained the backdrop that the Spanish-American War complicated the Asia-Pacific Squadron's mission. The situation became complicated in the sense that in the eyes of the host ports, the squadron would violate neutrality provisions of the law. In other words, Britain and Japan, the hosts that controlled the ports in question did not want to get involved in the US' war against Spain. Under the principle of neutrality, US vessels and crewmen US risked being impounded by the hosts for violating such. Officials were mindful of this. Moreover, other parties have been reiterating how the US was nagging them to adhere the principle of neutrality, and it would leave an adverse impression if the US did not follow suit when it was them who needed to do so (Zelikow, 2017).

As institutions constrain or facilitate the saliency of interests, the institutional norm of neutrality's relationship with interests lies partly with the fact that the US wanted a foothold in the Western Pacific. However, its path to pursuing such interests became complicated by officials committed to respecting neutrality.

Likewise, as institutions may result from the construction of interests, it suggests that this constraint of neutrality resulted from officials' desire to defend their interests. Specifically, the thinking here is that neutrality was supposed to help officials defend and advance their interests, not least of which was the protection of US troops when pursuing sensitive mission as well as preventing unnecessary warfare. Moreover, ideas make sense of institutions. In this case, the fact that officials observe the institution of neutrality also implies that officials had an idea of what neutrality entails and what benefits it had. Once again, the fact that there was an institution of neutrality suggests that it did not have an inherent meaning. Therefore, the benefits behind neutrality help explain why officials decided to observe it.

IDEA - Filipinos unable to govern their affairs
The Spanish-American war has been one of the first glimpses of what Americans thought of Filipino leadership. One of the proposals McKinley considered was to give Filipino elites their territory once Spain ceded it. But this was opposed to the notion that they would not manage their affairs in a way that would satisfy US

officials. Therefore, McKinley found it imperative to annexe the Philippines as part of the US (Rusling, 1903; Zelikow, 2017).

Given that McKinley himself believed in the idea that upon acquisition of the Philippines, the Filipinos were not yet ready to govern themselves, it would also imply that they were not ready to exercise democratic governance in the way exercised back in the mainland. For the time being, the US pictured the Filipinos as having fairly inferior abilities to manage their internal affairs. Imperialists in Congress such as Beveridge, who considered Filipino calls for self-rule "aspiring for the impossible", also shared this opinion. Nonetheless, McKinley did not necessarily think it would take centuries for Filipinos to develop their abilities to govern themselves (Soberano, 1974: 45).

Although the evidence of McKinley's racism was "not good" (ibid), there were officials who openly admitted what they thought of Filipinos' abilities, including McKinley himself.

In conferring what would come next for the Philippines, the Treaty of Paris also demonstrates how some of its proponents conjured up the idea that Filipinos could not be trusted just yet to manage themselves. The language that was put forward and passed is suggestive as far as Hall's ideas, institutions, and interests are concerned. Assuming the case that those who worded the Treaty did so to give the US maximum leverage, it implied that they were operating with the idea that the Philippines was not in a position (incapable) to determine what was "suitable". This idea worked hand-in-hand with the interests of the US as pressing them to develop the islands to their satisfaction would mean they are facilitating the order they would need to do business there more smoothly.

More specifically, on 6 February 1899, Sen Samuel McEnery put forward a joint resolution. In it, it would be made clear that native inhabitants of the Philippine would not be entitled to US citizenship nor permanently make Philippine territories an "integral" part of the US. However, the resolution also stated that a government that is "suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants" that would facilitate the way for the possibility of self-governance, which in due course would allow them to promote both US interests, as well as that of the native inhabitants (United States Congress. Senate., 1899b: p.13). Further amendments to the resolution to clarify and reiterate the potential relationship and motivations of the US in the Philippines were put forward by Senators Nelson Aldrich and George Frisbee Hoar.

The language of the resolution suggests broad room for manoeuvring, especially with terms like "suitable" and wording such as "islands as it will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of the said islands" (ibid). In it, the US government would decide what passes for 'suitable' and 'best promote the interests of the citizens…' and when Filipinos achieved that threshold. One could imply that at the time, it could leave room for the US and provide officials with territorial ambitions an excuse to keep the Philippines indefinitely without the native inhabitants of the acquired territory necessarily able to enjoy full rights that US citizens in the mainland enjoyed. On the other hand, such a resolution would also bring the hope of keeping the US on its feet because promoting the interest of US citizens would eventually mean restoring order and doing what it takes to satisfactorily and adequately develop the Philippines.

The 3Is framework suggests that prevailing US institutions at the time bolstered the idea of Filipinos being unable to govern themselves. For instance, there was some long history of institutional racism against Asians, in general, that should be considered (cf. Hong, 2019; de Leon, 2020).[20]

IDEA - American "Moral" Obligations

Related to the idea that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs, there was a notion among some politicians and officials of a "moral" obligation the US had to countries whom they considered to be "uncivilised" (cf. Love, 2004, Sebring, 2015). McKinley also relied on his political allies for guidance. Invoking such brings up the idea of the US as exercising responsibility for moulding the territories that it would eventually acquire and that the US felt it needed to be the one to discharge it.

These so-called "moral" obligations, however, are not to be read automatically as something to be done for their own sake. One such recurring "moral"-related idea was the "White Man's Burden". McKinley and his allies believed that whites were capable of engaging in a civilising mission to other parts of the world, hence the so-called "white man's burden". Under that, there is a civiliser who appears reluctant but takes up arms to "relieve grievous wrongs". It also involves "dictates of humanity". The idea originated in the nineteenth century when the federal government attempted expansion further westward and invaded native American lands. In it, officials sold it as a "Christianising" and "civilising" mission. However, such language also meant that the other side was not "civilised" to the standards the occupiers wanted (in Sebring, 2015). Ultimately, racial factors did not stop other officials and politicians from harbouring racial motives and subtly incorporating them into policies concerning the Philippines, even indirectly (Love, 2004).

Also important to this was the hopes of imperialists to assert the federal government's authority as a rising power. By doing that, officials felt the need to view colonial inhabitants and institutions as not at the same level as the US. Thus, officials needed to treat the colony as such. The idea of the Filipinos being unable to govern themselves was also related to the idea that Americans had a "moral" obligation. For one, the latter presupposes that the former is to the mind of the Americans, lacks a satisfactory "moral" standard. For instance, Sen Albert Beveridge (33 Cong Rec 704-712: 1900), an ally of McKinley, was adamant with keeping the Philippines. He insisted that the territory belonged to the US perpetually. In addition to the economic grounds, Beveridge also saw the US' mission in the Philippines on moral and religious grounds. Beveridge was adamant that the American race had a "moral" stake and that a divine power sent them to the Philippines and that abandoning or withdrawing from the territory would be irreversibly catastrophic. In this context, "abandoning or withdrawing" may mean letting the Filipinos manage themselves. Given that officials characterised the

[20] For instance, de Leon (2020) suggests that in the nineteenth century, white nativists had released propaganda against how Chinese 'unclealiness' in San Francisco, which played a critical role in the Chinese Exclusion Act. At this point it was the first law that restricted migration to the US based on one's race. Additionally, de Leon also shows US officials would also look negatively at Filipinos based on what they thought of as "unclean and uncivilised bodies".

consequences as catastrophic, the idea was lurking that was would be catastrophic was the result of Filipinos trying to manage themselves without guidance which US officials thought Filipinos needed. Although Beveridge invoked economic grounds for conquering the Philippines, even if that was not the case, he still believed in the "moral" imperatives he invoked.

The "moral" ideas also influenced the kind of relationship advisers thought the Philippines would As the Spanish-American War was underway, one of the options was to turn the Philippines into a US protectorate. Officials widely regarded that status as inadequate. There was a wide belief that given the US' eventual right of sovereignty, only the Americans were in a position to re-establish order in the Philippines and provide guidance to them. The hope was by exercising sovereignty over the Philippines, both Filipinos and Americans can receive protections from dangerous complications arising from the prospect of the former being the latter's protectorate (Olcott, 1916).

US Senators invoked these "moral" obligations when they ratified the Treaty of Paris. As ratification needed more than a simple majority, there were critical voices that weighed in. In the process, supporters of President McKinley continued to defend what the Treaty accorded the US. For instance, Sen Knute Nelson cited the US' duty of spreading "Christian civilisation" and reiterated that the US did not enter to act as despots, rather as "ministering angels" (Bowden, 2009: 227). The "moral" undertones were used by opponents of the Treaty as well to at least express initial reservations. For instance, George Hoar, a member of the McKinley's party, was initially opposed to the Treaty as he feared it would turn the US into a "vulgar, commonplace empire" that exercises control over "subject races and vassal states, in which one class must forever rule and other classes must forever obey" (ibid). Hoar further clarified his position by tabling an amendment to the Treaty that would suggest protecting the rights of Filipinos. His amendments were given an affirmative vote by 45 Senators and a negative vote by 34 of his colleagues. Based on this, Hoar did not want the US, even under the administration of his party, to act hypocritically vis-à-vis what it stood for in principle. For all the advances that the Treaty has given the Philippines, intended or not, some of Hoar's fears, especially those concerning class developments, would have some foundation.

Amidst the ideas of "moral obligations" and "Christianising mission" involved, one needs to consider what interests US officials had in relation to them. Given that there was opposition to it even from McKinley's party, such would suggest that there are questions about whether "moral obligations" and "Christianising mission" were ends in and of themselves. For instance, if officials acted based on "moral obligations" and "Christianising mission", what would they satisfy or achieve? One should consider the interest of officials to improve America's image as a rising power. As mentioned previously, officials wondered how to achieve this. These two ideas, which for officials connoted American power, reflected the desire of such officials to demonstrate emerging American power.

Is INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC EXPANSION

Officials often cited economic considerations for why they would recommend acquiring the Philippines. Some of the ideas and interests were consequences of decades of US activity in which the Philippines was eventually used to pursue such interests.

IDEA OF "Glut" thesis

The "glut" thesis is an idea advocated by some scholars and adopted by some officials that tried to deal with the production surpluses the US was experiencing. The idea behind this was that as domestic markets reached a point of saturation, producers needed to find a new market to sell their goods (Osgood and Etheridge, 2010).

Business and political elites recognised that the domestic market was at the time, reaching its limit in terms of potentials for profitability. The consumer market back home was thus insufficient for the needs of domestic industries. Furthermore, the fact that the US emerged from the economic depression that lasted from the 1870s to 1880s exacerbated the need for new markets. In this era, American political and business elites thought that one of the causes of the country's economic stagnation and social instability during this time was industrial overproduction. Hence, there was a need for US firms to look elsewhere to sell their goods (McCormick, 1963; Gould, 1980).

This glut thesis gave rise to expansionist ideals before McKinley even assumed office. For instance, it became one of the bases for some Secretaries of State such as Henry Seward to envision an American commercial empire that covered the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific (Osgood and Etheridge, 2010). McKinley eventually subscribed to the idea of overproduction.

Based on all of this, given that the domestic markets were not in good shape but that there was some produce of goods that remained unconsumed, elites needed to sell them elsewhere.

The Philippines fits into the glut thesis as it suggested that Latin America was among the regions the US thought of finding markets in. Cuba was a direct target, but as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, officials also acquired the Philippines and thought of it as a gateway to China (Paterson, 1996: 351).

Ideas help agents make sense of their interests. Specifically, Poteete (2003) argues that ideas help agents interpret interests. Given that scholars consider ideas to be widely held beliefs, the glut thesis was thus seen as a guide and starting point for officials to help interpret how to achieve their interests. In this case, one of the interests that officials had was to help the domestic economy overcome its surplus problem. They also had business allies with existing ventures abroad. Moreover, their subscription to the notion that the domestic market was saturated convinced them that they needed to recover the losses they made by going somewhere else. The glut thesis thus acted as a way for US firms to justify their search for activities abroad.

Moreover, as institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas, a prevailing institution that facilitated the saliency of these ideas was the prevalence and encouragement of profit-seeking behaviours prevalent in the US.

INTEREST OF Growing and Retaining Access to China

There are debates about whether possessing the Philippines gave the US an actual or tangible advantage. Some like Zelikow (2017) have argued that it did not. The

later chapters would show that in decisions to liberalise institutions in the Philippines, the China trade was not a direct factor nor was it invoked in such. However, the fact that officials used the potential of accessing China to rationalise their possession of the Philippines pointed to their belief in what the Philippines would potentially offer irrespective of what actually turned out. Even if it was not the case, officials welcomed anything that would facilitate their trading position.

North Atlantic maritime powers have long sought access to Asian trade routes. For the part of the US, formal commercial contact between the US and China began in the 1780s. The need for bases to China increased in the late nineteenth century owing to increases in production capacity, higher support for the Panama canal and development in the mainland's West Coast (Schoonover, 2003: 35, 52). The China market was valuable at the time. As of 1897, officials estimated the value of Chinese foreign commerce at $286 million (Beveridge, 1900).

However, although US merchants were doing business for some time, their position was threatened. They were looking to maintain their influence. Under China's "Open Door policy'" American businessmen had been able to enter China relatively easily since the middle of the nineteenth century. But later in the nineteenth century, more established European and Japanese powers vied for exclusive rights to develop and control certain ports. The Chinese Empire has withdrawn from free trade as different powers had exerted their influence over various parts of China to the point of closing off Americans and nearly splitting China into multiple colonies. For instance, France secured a promise of preferential rights in exploiting mines in three southern Yunnan provinces. Russia, in turn, was given first preference in constructing railways north and northeast of Beijing, as well as the granting of the status of a sphere of influence in Mongolia and Manchuria. Third, Britain received preference to remain head of the customs service as it secured a non-alienation agreement in the Yangtze area. Japan received a preferential agreement in Fukien province that would result in the exclusion of other partners. Finally, Germany was given preference rights for capital (investment?) in Shantung and allowed to lease Kiaochow, a naval base south of Port Arthur (Dennett, 1941). The advance of European powers (especially Spain, Britain, The Netherlands and Portugal), which threatened the independence of Chinese territory, had also forced the Chinese government to abandon its liberal "Open Door" policy and restricted trading practices to areas that were furthest away from Beijing. The Opium War (1841) also led the European powers operating in the region to annexe parts of China for themselves (Pumpelly, 1868: 608).

Further complicating and undermining the future of the "open door" threat was a change in regime in China. In 1898, a coup occurred where more conservative-leaning Chinese forces toppled the ruling pro-Western government. It implied more inward-looking trade policies within China (McCormick, 1963: 167).

Russian involvement was also a potential concern as half of the textile exports of the US to China passed through areas under Russian control. The US also charged Russia of unfavourable policies in Manchuria. Officials regarded such a development as an urgent reason to retain the Philippines as a base in case aggressive action would become necessary. A majority of peace commissioners agreed with this view (ibid).

McKinley himself was also candid about what he believed was the economic or commercial value the Philippines had for the US, particularly as the US tried to maintain the prized "Open Door" policy towards China. Such a policy could be preserved if the US could prevent other powers from colonising China, and this was considered to be the core objective of American expansionism in the Far East region (McCormick, 1963). Thus, McCormick also characterised American imperialism as a paradox. It was also revealed that McKinley was encouraged and prodded to annexe the Philippines by American businessmen already based in China. One of the strongest advocates for expansion was the American Asiatic Association, where they emphasised that they should pursue such annexation to protect and enhance American commercial interests in the region (Soberano, 1974).

These values were brought up by McKinley's allies in Congress who supported expansionism. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was also a staunch supporter of American expansion in the Far East and agreed with the notion that at least the capital city of Manila would provide the US with a foothold in trading in the Far East (ibid). Other than finding avenues to sell the surplus from domestic production to, US officials feared that trade and investment barriers would be erected by many countries especially as other colonising powers would feel encouraged to acquire more colonial territories. Moreover, some officials opined that Britain had reached the climax of its hegemonic power and that internationally, powers such the US had to take over the reins of global governance at the turn of the century (Miller, 1982).

Thus, to maintain access, the thought that was going through the minds of officials was that of constructing a new port to continue facilitating businesses. Manila was one such prospective spot. In particular, officials considered Manila to be one of the "best harbours". Consequently, Manila was a target for those in favour of expansion in the 1890s (Schoonover, 2003: 35, 52).

The interests of expanding into China were based on ideas such as the glut thesis. The glut thesis states that by seeking overseas markets, US firms would help relieve the domestic problem of surplus production plaguing the country during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Thus, given this idea, they found a further rationalisation to strengthen their existing links to the Chinese market. Given the challenging political conditions, officials and firms needed a rationalisation to continue. This "glut thesis" idea was thus a way to help shore up and remind them of their interests in continued access in the Chinese market. Thus, officials did not suddenly develop interests of Chinese expansion. Instead, the idea of the glut thesis provided a basis for officials to pursue this interest in China.

IDEA: "Moral" obligations revisited

Officials also used the notion of the US' "moral" obligations (e.g. "white man's burden") discussed in the previous section to rationalise American overseas economic policies. In particular, the notion of the US' moral obligations included the spreading of economic capitalism (to the standards of those who expanded) of those territories that the federal government touched. In particular, McKinley believed that spreading the country's economic influence, in particular, US-style capitalism overseas would ultimately serve the country's broader interests and

that spreading such an ideology allowed the country to attain "morally defensible" objectives.

However, ideas may reflect interests. The reality was that the economic health of the US was a constraining thing. McKinley was mindful of this even as he characterised trade and foreign commerce as desirable objectives (Gould, 1980). The idea of "moral obligations" reflects interests to the degree that it included a reference to improving economic prospects in the colony, which officials in turn hope would translate into more lucrative opportunities for American businessmen.

As institutions also constrain or propel certain ideas, the "moral" obligations, particularly the economic portions of it, was given support by the institutionalisation of promoting capitalism.

OTHER Is INVOLVED

Religious Interests and Institutions

Institutions limit or strengthen ideas. In the context of religion, that would suggest a strong interplay between "Christian" [21] ideas and the institution of a Church. As mentioned in an earlier section, there was a "Christianising" mission involved. This idea of Catholic values needing to stay supreme also suggests that the institution of the Catholic Church in the US was also keeping its presence intact. Furthermore, institutions also facilitate or constrain the saliency of interests. This one drives the notion that the institution's interests may face somewhat of a threat if the US were to come in because it would mean them losing influence at the expense of non-Catholics, to which McKinley was a part of. Domestically, however, the Catholic and Protestant sects looked the prospect of colonising the Philippines differently. Given that the Philippines was a colony of Spain, the Catholic Church was keen to protect its legacy in the colony. Hence, Catholics in the US were primarily opposed to the federal government annexing the outgoing Spanish territory. They were primarily afraid of non-Catholic Christians spreading their influence in the predominantly Catholic colony. In other words, the Christian basis for McKinley's acquisition of the Philippines had support from the institutionalised Christian churches.

Support among Protestants was rather mixed, however. On the one hand, they did not think annexation was something that would uphold American values. On the other hand, the Protestants were open to anything to try to counter the established Catholic influence in the colony (Soberano, 1974).

The Institution of Property Rights Laws and Treaties

Related to the interest that the US had to preserve its reputation as a rising power, it needed to show that was capable of and serious in respecting property rights. It was manifested during the Treaty of Paris negotiations, as well as in McKinley's instructions to acquire the Philippines.

On 19 May 1898, Major-General Wesley Merit was instructed by McKinley to publish a proclamation which says that Americans were not in the Philippines to wage war against the Filipinos or a part of them and that Filipinos who aide US

[21] *Christianity*, as used here, refers to the Christian churches in general (Catholicism plus the various Protestant sects).

forces would receive rewards. The proclamation would also state that all personal and religious rights would be protected (in McKinley, 08/09/1900: 16). An apparent reaffirmation of commitment to property rights was indicated in a letter to the Commander of Philippine Armed Forces on 21 December 1898. It specifically indicated to exert US authority within the islands to secure people, property and the former's ability to exercise their rights over the latter (in ibid).

McKinley also wanted to protect existing property rights, which is one of the characteristics associated with early would-be democracies. On the one hand, the likes of William Taft, initially appointed by McKinley to become Governor-General of the Philippine colony, may have wanted a small form of self-rule. However, most of the businessmen who operated in the territory wanted the administration to prioritise the restoration of law-and-order. In the process, this preference ultimately led to the subjugation of civil liberties, and lives were lost as the American forces battled to defeat insurgents who opposed US sovereignty over the colony. For the first few years, the Philippines was under US military rule. Such measures also highlighted the opinions of senior officials that the colony was not yet ready to enjoy the rights that McKinley talked about.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, institutions help constrain and/or facilitate the salience of ideas and interests. Respecting the institution of property rights should be considered in light of the interest that US officials tried to improve the global reputation of the US. As respecting property rights was a norm the US adhered to, it necessitated the thought that by violating this institution, the US would risk becoming discredited. Granted McKinley's instructions to seize the Philippines, the fact that there were issues of property rights meant they could not just do what they pleased just yet. Although the US was the victor in the Spanish-American War, the fact that property rights were at stake meant that they had to tread carefully in this regard or risk losing face. It meant that between seizing the Philippines and preserving its image, it implied that the incentives to pursue the former needed to be tempered even as the US would go on to pursue on.

The point here is that the rules or institutions such as property rights limited the ability of the US to project itself as a rising power.

There are, however, questions about whether the notion of property rights was a free-standing institution. As institutions are constructed to help protect an agent's interests, one may need to look at property rights as being a necessary tool to protect the rightful claims of owners and minimise chaos in the free market system. Also, the fact that this institution existed suggests that there was an idea behind it of property rights.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Philippines started out as an afterthought. There were no firm plans to acquire it. However, the underlying reasons that officials seized on to rationalise the taking of the Philippines had their roots in the US' broader economic goals which were decades in the making as well as a desire to ward off European powers. Another key element in this was the notion of how officials thought of exerting their power and demonstrating subtly the idea that they "moral" obligation to colonise parts of the world. Furthermore, amidst McKinley's initial reluctance on the Philippines, he considered the acquisition of the said territory the crown jewel of his victory over Spain during the war, nonetheless.

Ultimately, given McKinley's reluctance, his advisers were influential, and the circumstances that aides presented him with made inaction futile. The McKinley administration's approach also reflected, to a significant degree, the realities the US faced at the time. It also encapsulated the mindset and ideas McKinley himself exhibited through the early days of his presidency. Support for the annexation of the Philippines came from businessmen, military officials, and clergymen, all of whom looked for opportunities that may or may not be found inside that territory. The interests that these players had in taking the Philippines appeared significant enough for the US government to consider it. It was evident from the preceding accounts in this chapter that interests played a key part in why the Philippines was acquired, albeit reluctantly. It was also evident that colonising the Philippines was not itself the main end but the means towards other things, most notably to facilitate the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War and the prevention of them trying to infiltrate the US' West Coast and the prevention of European rises to power.

Amidst the end of the Spanish-American war, US officials emphasised the need to undercut European colonial powers, and not stepping in to take over from Spain in the Philippines would cause instability to undermine the US' attempt to build its influence. The attempts to redevelop the Philippines economically and politically could be a way for the US to not only facilitate its own economic prospects (e.g. through trade) but also bolster its geopolitical credentials.

In this process, some of the Is invoked in the acquisition of the Philippines were complementary. For instance, the idea of the "glut thesis" was something that provided opportunities to pursue the interests of some of the business and political elites to adopt a more expansive policy. To be sure, their interests of making money had predated the financial crisis of the late nineteenth century but the idea of "glut thesis" had given these elites another opportunity to pursue their economic interests by venturing overseas. In other words, they needed to make money, but they were at the same time wound up by the mindset that their failure to make enough was a consequence of not appealing to markets outside their domestic domains. That is important when it comes to why the US would go to the Philippines because given that officials invoked what the Philippines could do for the China or Asian Pacific trade, it begs the question of why the US wanted to do business and go to such regions in the first place.

Moreover, the idea of the Filipinos being unable to manage their affairs was also related to the idea that Americans had a "moral" obligation. For one, the latter connotes that the former is to the mind of the Americans, based on inferior moral underpinnings.

However, the idea-, interest-, and institution-based reasons are, in and of themselves, not always sufficient to explain the US' decision to acquire the Philippines. For instance, one can identify the relationship among them when the US had to do something that involved respecting laws and treaties such as neutrality. As norms encapsulate institutions, the norm of neutrality interacted with the interest of finding a base. The decision to enter and eventually take the Philippines was partly a product of the fact that Americans needed a base to consolidate their position against the Spaniards. However, the fact that they have respected neutrality for quite some time necessitated the interest of them wanting

a base to operate. One can say that this is related to the US' interest in trying to build its reputation. This norm also provided the constraints that the US had to observe and work with as it developed its image. If the US did not feel constrained by the institution of neutrality, some questions would emerge about whether the Philippines would be considered for a base at that point, given that officials and McKinley himself did not consider acquiring the Philippines until the last minute. It would not necessarily hold off the US from acquiring the Philippines, but if the US did not observe the said norm, there would be one less strategic military reason for doing so, given what was just described.

As will be seen throughout later chapters, developing the islands was a trial-and-error endeavour which the US had limited prior experience engaging in. Regardless of their ulterior interests, they would manage to develop the Philippines to some degree, and partially achieve what the joint resolution discussed earlier hoped it would accomplish. But given the trial-and-error nature of how they governed the Philippines along with other interests that the US would have to fulfil, one of its consequences would also be to empower natives whose hearts did not lie in promoting democratic values the US claimed to espouse at the time.

CHAPTER VI: PHILIPPINE ORGANIC ACT: POLITICAL ASPECTS AND 3Is IN ITS ESTABLISHMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sheds light on the process of establishing a new government in the colony. It examines the factors that led to the establishment of the political and governmental features of the 1902 Organic Act, the act to provide the Philippines with a constitution. The chapter connects the wider external context surrounding the law's passage with the passage itself, as well as the features that it mandated. For instance, the Organic Act contained provisions to establish the lower house of the Philippine legislature or the Philippine Assembly, but it was not established until five years after the law's approval. The Organic Act was also monumental because it codified a Bill of Rights for the Islands' inhabitants (Piedad-Pugay, 2012).

This chapter uses Hall's 3I framework to understand why including an Assembly in the Organic Act was contentious well as explain why senior US officials acted the way they did when they proposed and established the Insular government that prevailed in the Islands. As will be demonstrated later, the addition of an assembly was not an overwhelmingly popular proposal among senior politicians at first. At the same time, there was also evidence of restraint as to the powers they thought should be granted to the assembly.

The core findings that this chapter will develop are that the developing reforms such as the Organic Act and the assembly emerged from the idea that Filipinos could still not be trusted to manage their affairs as well as the "policy of attraction" that Taft would put forward. However, one should also analyse this idea by considering the interests of officials who want to secure the islands and improve the local economy.

In order to do that, the chapter will first identify and summarise the ideas, institutions, and interests involved. These ideas, institutions, and interests will then be seen and used in a historical context when this chapter will then trace the steps in how the Philippine Organic Act was established and the legislative process. It is here where one can find the prospects for the opposition and the purported reasons, which will get examined later. Just as in the previous chapter, this chapter will also assess whether the ideas, interests, and institutions identified in the course of this analysis are sufficient reasons and the degree to which they were products of interactions with each other. Thus, the chapter aims to suggest that although each of the ideas, interests, and institutions warrant valid considerations, one should not consider each of them as sufficient reasons. Instead, one should realise that they have roots in other ideas, interests, and institutions. The chapter will revisit the ideas, interests, and institutions towards the end to attempt to assess their relationship to each other.

IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO THE ORGANIC ACT PASSAGE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

This section provides a brief overview of the relevant ideas, institutions, and interests. They will be elaborated and analysed in the subsequent sections but

stated here to help provide to the prevailing factors when the narrative of the Philippine Organic Act and the Philippine Assembly are set.

IDEA 1: Filipinos unable to govern themselves
The Filipino's inability (in so far as colonial officials are concerned) is a recurring theme not just in this chapter but throughout the other chapters in this thesis. US officials felt convinced that the Filipinos they found could not be trusted to manage their affairs. It was something President McKinley, a reluctant coloniser, even agreed to. War Secretary Elihu Root used words like "but little advanced from pure savagery", "childlike in their lack of reflection, disregard of consequences, the fearlessness of death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable dependence on a superior" to describe Filipinos. Based on this characterisation, Root felt that the Islands were not ready for a government based on popular consent (Stanley, 1974: 60-61).

IDEA 2: "Policy of attraction"
Governor-General Taft's policies toward Filipino governance make up the "policy of attraction". The overarching principle was that by introducing institutions *associated* with liberal democracy (even if they did not constitute liberal democracy itself), there would be fewer incentives for Filipinos to lobby for further independence (Burns, 2010; Burns, 2013a).

INTEREST 1: Security and Business-Friendly credentials
The security interest has to do with preventing insurrections. The insurrections were particularly keen on calling for outright independence. Officials in the colony had fresh memories of the insurrections that led to the Philippine-American War. In this way, the colony would be secure not just for colonial officials to operate in but businesses as well. US-based firms also pleaded to colonial officials to prioritise law-and-order to be able to operate. Officials would invoke security concerns to provide incentives to colonial elites to participate in government affairs.

INTEREST 2: Establishing a Naval Base
One of the reasons for acquiring the Philippines was to establish a Naval Base in the Far East. President Roosevelt especially emphasised that. He wrote that if a naval base was not established, he would rather surrender the islands altogether (Roosevelt to Taft, 31/5/1905, in Morison V4, 1951: 1198).

INTEREST 3: Electoral Politics
As will be shown in more detail later in the chapter, the ruling party's manifesto tried to tout its accomplishments in the Philippines to varying degrees. Politicians stressed these accomplishments partly to show the electorate it was determined to secure its accomplishments and show its foreign policy and national security credentials. More importantly, officials such as Roosevelt read that the political mood was not completely in favour of maintaining the islands permanently. Officials believed such a political mood might undermine their purpose in the islands.

INSTITUTIONS
US officials tried to be conscious enough to observe the bill of rights to the extent they could be applicable in the colony (cf Stanley, 1974; Hutchcroft, 2000). Moreover, as the US was also in the midst of broader institutional changes

domestically, officials concerned with the Philippines were not up to breast with such institutional changes and operated under the mindset the older institutions promoted (Skowronek, 1982).

Finally, another institution that warrants attention is the elites spawned from the pre-American social structures. Although Taft publicly pronounced that he had problems with how the local elites conducted themselves, he was constrained to work with them. He had no choice but to trust them. These local elites were a product of the social relations detailed in Chapter 4, and the choice to work with them was made to address broader security concerns. These local elites were then the subjects of the administrators' incentives.

EXECUTIVE VISIONS FOR INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Since the US assumed sovereignty over the Philippines, administrations had envisioned governance structures for the newly-found possession. President McKinley instructed the Taft Commission to help the Filipinos establish a government "designed not for our [American] satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands". At first, this sounds like McKinley trying to wash the US' hands of what negative effects would happen. It was also clear that others thought of imposing the American worldview on its newly-acquired archipelago in the Far East (United States. President, 1900).

Before the Organic Act's passage, governance of the Philippines was subject to a provision in the 1901 Army Appropriations Act or the Spooner Amendment (1901). In particular, the presidency was responsible for directing "all military, civil, and judicial powers" needed to govern the Islands (31 Stat. 895, 1901: 910). It meant that the Islands were under the direct jurisdiction and control of the executive branch of the Federal government. Filipinos only had representation on a local but not a colonial level until the 1900s. Even then, local representation lacked organisation as late as 1893. During the short period of US military rule between 1898 and 1901, the administration expanded the franchise only to gradually restrict it again (Hutchcroft, 2000).

In a letter to fellow party member Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Taft envisioned that relevant legislation that would replace the Spooner Amendment. Such legislation called for an insular government consisting of a Civil Governor, an Executive Council consisting of eight members – four department heads and four others with the Civil governor as presiding officer, and a popular assembly made completely made out of Filipinos (Taft, 22/10/1901: 1-2).

The exercise of sovereignty over the Islands came as the mainland was also undergoing institutional changes to the state structure. Institutions were born independent of the old or prevailing party system, direct/centralised court supervision, and "localistic orientations" (Skowronek, 1982: 15). However, as this newer version of the American state was taking shape, colonisers developed the Islands to have institutions that resembled more the older version of the state (Hutchcroft, 2000: 285).

As mentioned previously, President William McKinley wanted the US military administration based in the Philippines to "win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines, by assuring them in every possible

way that full measure of individual rights and liberties…, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice for military rule." (McKinley, 21/12/1898). Executing such instructions meant establishing a form of government and bureaucracy that would ensure the fulfilment of those objectives. Nonetheless, a civilian administration would eventually replace the military government.

As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, institutional problems awaited Americans upon arrival in the Islands. To summarise them, the Philippine Commission (1900: 81-2) found what it called "prominent defects" in the Philippine system of governance left by the Spaniards. They included the following:

a) Governor-General's "boundless and autocratic powers'"
b) Powers concentrated in the capital Manila
c) A lack of a parliament or a representative body that provided locals with a forum for their views
d) Onerous taxation regime
e) Officials who lived in the rural areas whereby with their sheer numbers, managed to obstruct public business
f) Division of minor responsibilities done through the establishment of rival bureaus
g) High costs of the institutions and corruption associated with it
h) Confusion between the role of Church and State

Given that the Commission found and considered these as problems, this implied that Congress had the challenge to rectify them through the organic laws they passed. The Commission prioritised enumerating the problems of the governance structures. Even as power remained concentrated in Manila, Chapter 3 also highlighted that a personalistic social structure was prevailing among insular politicians.

In the second set of instructions to the Philippine Commission, McKinley (1900), similar to his first instructions, requested the commissioners to ensure whatever government they establish should not be for their satisfaction but for that of the Islands' inhabitants and that the moves adopted should also conform to local customs. In this instance, McKinley further reminded the Commission to impress upon the inhabitants that in forming a government, certain 'great principles' are applicable and essential to preserve an atmosphere of the rule of law and individual freedoms.

When Roosevelt became president, his first War Secretary Elihu Root described most of the Islands' inhabitants as "but little advanced from pure savagery", "childlike in their 'lack of reflection, disregard of consequences, fearlessness of death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable dependence of a superior". He felt that based on this characterisation, the Islands were not ready for a government based on popular consent (in Stanley, 1974: 60-61). It meant Root believed Filipinos should not experience democracy straight away. However, Root still acknowledged that despite the US exercising sovereignty over the Islands, the Bill of Rights limited what the US government was permitted to do while in the Islands and that "moral restraints" found in the nature of US governance's dealings with other people regardless of their legal status existed (Stanley, 1974: 60; Hutchcroft, 2000: 285).

As for the judiciary, the Philippine Commission, in a letter to Secretary Root (14/07/1900: 13), thought that the islands' system of justice needed "complete reformation". The Commission also suggested that US judges should preside over the courts.

Before assuming the presidency, Roosevelt was strongly in favour of establishing a presence in the Islands. During the early days of his administration, Roosevelt sounded passionate about retaining the islands unconditionally for as long as possible. He criticised politicians who put promoted independence to the islands in their manifesto, saying this promise cannot be made (Roosevelt, 1954: 938-939).

Roosevelt thought early on, US officials were doing the islands' inhabitants a favour by the former exercising its sovereignty over the latter and that if the US were to withdraw, it would hamper the progress already made and the Filipinos would lose out. Based on Roosevelt's letter to politician JG Cannon (12/9/1904: 341-343), the former claimed that the US has governed the islands in the "interests of their own [Filipino] people" and that Filipinos have benefitted most by the American presence. At the same time, Roosevelt also admitted the islands was a "very great advantage" to the US and claimed that the US has been spreading knowledge about so-called "free popular government" through its actions there. Roosevelt continued to be adamant that he viewed what they were doing in the islands as a "solemn obligation" utilised in the "interest of mankind". In this light, he expressed his preference not to change course over the prevailing national policy toward the islands at that moment.

Roosevelt did not see the Philippines become independent during his presidency. It would take nearly four decades for the Philippines to receive full independence. However, Roosevelt's presidency, with the help of Taft (then Secretary of War), oversaw the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. Roosevelt initially dubbed this as an "experiment" rather than as a "step" towards full self-rule, and he had qualms about granting it as much power as a traditional national legislature (in Morrison 1954: 941). Roosevelt continued to write to Cannon (in Morrison 1954: 340) that promising the Filipinos a definite date for independence would be tantamount to deceiving the islands' inhabitants.

Despite Roosevelt's attitude toward the Islands, he did not write or personally lobby legislators to favour of the Organic Act directly. Scholars have given more credit to Taft for this issue, who was at the time the Islands' Governor-General (Alfonso, 1970: 92-93).

CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, HEARING AND DELIBERATIONS

President McKinley's party mate, Senator George Hoar, was among the strongest critics of US involvement in the Islands. In a floor speech, Hoar criticised the administration for turning the Monroe doctrine from something characterised by "eternal righteousness and justice" to something characterised by "brutal selfishness" and that the country was looking for its own interests. Hoar also accused the US then of "crush[ing] the only Republic in Asia" (35 Cong. Rec. 5796, 1902).

In the process, the then-opposition Democrats proposed bills of their own. The highlight of the bill was that within a year of the cessation of hostilities, a Constitutional convention would take place. Moreover, under their plan, the US would continue to govern until the Philippines was in a position to establish its own government and that amnesty be granted to inhabitants who committed political crimes against the US. At issue for them was whether under the guise of having a civilian government if a policy they saw as "unjust and cruel" to the Philippines' inhabitants be instituted indefinitely. They opined that it would violate the treaty the US entered into with Spain (New York Times, 1902a: 13). The majority party rejected this minority's proposals and amendments on the floor (Hamilton County Ledger, 1902: 6).

Among the highlights of the government party's bill, The Bill of Rights of the US Constitution was to be made applicable to the Islands. Exceptions included the rights to bear arms and a jury trial. In Taft's testimony to the House of Representatives' Committee on Insular Affairs on 26 February 1902, he cited the fact that inhabitants who were otherwise eligible in terms of literacy have lacked the elements necessary to soundly execute a jury-style trial. Taft also mentioned that the inhabitants simply did not have any experience in jury trials. He was also wary that prevailing corruption in the system made it impractical to discharge it (in Compton: 1903, 95).

The Philippine Assembly, on the other hand, was not an original feature of the Senate's version of the Organic bill. Senators such as Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge, and William Allison were under the impression that Filipinos could not govern themselves enough to warrant their own insular parliament (May, 1980: 58). Taft took note of their opposition, but he was still adamant that an Assembly was needed at some point.

In 1901, Taft confided to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a staunch supporter of the Philippine conquest, regarding the form of government the Philippines should look like. First, Taft wanted Congress to vest in the Commission the same powers the then President McKinley provided in his instructions. He was aiming that by 1904, to have a government that would consist of a Civil Governor, an Executive Council, and a popularly-elected Assembly with "full legislative power" which would be comprised of Filipinos. Taft further said that it was necessary to have an assembly to make it easier for US authorities to pacify the locals (Taft, 22/10/1901: 1-2). For Taft, the assembly's ability to legislate would be shared with the US-appointed Philippine Commission whereby the assembly acts as the lower house, just as the House of Representatives does in the US Congress (Wertheim, 2009: 506). Although Taft argued that the assembly would open up opportunities for locals to join the Insular leadership, he was clear about what he thought was its other function: to facilitate pacification of locals. It would be an indication that colonial officials placed their trust in locals for certain goals. Most of these proposals by Taft would be realised in the passage of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

MOVES TO INCLUDE FILIPINOS FOR GOVERNANCE

In order to discourage rebellions, colonial officials offered members of the local wealthy class positions in the new colonial government. Whilst Taft had reservations about enlisting their help given that he said they were "difficult persons out of whom to make an honest government", he felt it was necessary to do so to facilitate the pacification of the Islands (Stanley, 1974: 66-7).

Under the Organic Act, prior to the establishment of the Assembly, Filipinos already had some representation in the colonial government. For instance, three out of the eight members of the Philippine Commission were Filipino. One-half of superior judges and all of the magistrates sitting on lower courts were also Filipino (LeRoy, 1908: 847). The Organic Bill, however, proposed that Filipinos have with two resident (Filipino) commissioners, who would serve as delegates to the House of Representatives in Washington to air what they thought were the needs of Filipinos. However, the resident commissioners would not have any voting rights.

As Taft pushed for an assembly, Roosevelt also saw it initially as an "experiment" whose results officials had to wait for before deciding whether to grant the islands further levels of autonomy (in Wertheim, 2009: 506). Similar to Roosevelt, Taft saw the assembly as a component of political education of the inhabitants (May, 1980: 58). While Taft talked about the state of civil service institutions, he reiterated to Root that people should realise that he "shall not relax our hold on the Philippines". He would rather make that position of his clear than yield to the opposition party making false promises about giving the islands' inhabitants more control over their affairs. Roosevelt feared that a consequence of such false promises would include violence and plunge the islands into further turmoil. He instead wanted Root to emphasise the highest standards of good government and thought that they had "the very highest grade of public service that we can get out there" which Roosevelt did not want to upset (Roosevelt, 7/6/1904). He reiterated that the US was there to civilise Filipinos, not necessarily grant them outright independence. If anything, Root considered establishing such institutions to be more of a means to the US' "civilising" mission in the islands, and not an end goal. That was the case until at least 1907 when Root told Taft said that the US needed to prepare for the eventuality of giving the Philippines independence of a "more or less complete type", but Taft's position continued to favour the US holding on to the islands for as long as they could (ibid: 506-7).

Taft made a proclamation "the Philippines for the Filipinos". But in it, he made it clear that he did not necessarily mean giving Filipinos more autonomy or independence to manage their affairs. Instead, he thought of this slogan as giving something that was "best" for the Filipino people and their "welfare" as US officials saw them (Taft, 1904: 3-4). It implied and meant that for him, it was not for Filipinos to decide what constituted what he would consider 'best' for them.

Roosevelt ultimately said in his correspondences that although he would have preferred to keep the islands under US sovereignty, one had to consider the differences between the US and a monarchy of any sort. Politically, given the nature of the party system and public opinion, occupying the islands for altruistic motives was "chimerical in the long run". Roosevelt also later privately confided to Taft that the American people were not "prepared permanently, in a duty-loving spirit…to assume control of the Philippine Islands for the good of the Filipinos". Geopolitically, this change also coincided with changes in Japanese-US relations as well as Taft's initial failure to get tariffs from Filipino goods reduced in Congress (in Wertheim, 2009: 508-509). In other words, Roosevelt was later not sure that keeping the islands was the palatable politics for him or his party that he initially thought.

Roosevelt also wrote to Charles Eliot on 20 June 1904 that he was hesitant to give Filipinos a national government of their own "at the earliest possible moment" was "for the sake of the Filipinos themselves". Furthermore, Roosevelt thought that priority has lain in discouraging any feeling that Filipinos had that would make them subordinate the duty of 'trying to become self-supporting, self-respecting orderly people' to the "cultivation of anything else" (Roosevelt, 20/6/1904: 2).

ESTABLISHMENT OF PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY

The establishment of the assembly, however, happened three years after Taft intended establishment date. Officials conducted a census, which would form the basis of apportioning districts or constituencies, in 1902 and published its results in 1904. Furthermore, pacification appeared to be a major concern among US officials. According to Governor-General Luke's proclamation, one of the things that needed to happen before Washington-based officials could grant authorisation for the assembly's establishment was peace-and-order to be widespread for two years from the commissioning of the census (LeRoy, 1908: 847; National Historical Commission of the Philippines, 2012).

As had been mentioned, the electorate to the assembly consisted of a relatively small group of people. The law stated that to be able to vote, 23-year-old or older males had to possess at least one of the following qualifications (Conroy Franco, 2001: 45):

(a) those who held municipal office under the Spanish regime
(b) those who owned at P500 in real property or P30 in annual taxes
(c) those who could read and write in either English or Spanish

One could classify the restrictions as either (a) incumbency, (b) property ownership or income, and (c) literacy. Officials would not ease these restrictions until the recommendation of future War Secretary Garrison and the passage of the 1916 Jones Law and women remained unable to vote until 1937.

Conroy Franco (2001: 45-46) further cites that across 390 municipalities with a total population of almost 2.7 million people, less than 50 thousand were able to qualify as electors to municipal elections. Moreover, less than 105 thousand people or only 1.15 per cent of the islands' total population qualified as electors to the 1907 Philippine Assembly elections. There were fewer restrictions than during the military administration of the Islands.

When the Philippine Assembly was first elected, anxiety poured through the US and newspapers in the country have commented on the "ignorance of the Filipinos" which they thought was reflected by choice of the electorate's legislators. Taft, who became Secretary of War during the time of the first election, was disappointed that he would have to work with those who were elected. Some of Taft's friends even described that he "deplore[d]" the winners (South China Morning Post, 1907: 4).

IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS REVISITED: AN ANALYSIS

Hall's 3Is provides a framework for explaining the passage of the Organic Act and the establishment ensuing governing arrangements.

Ideas

One cannot exclude ideas to explain the Organic Act's passage. For one, officials made it clear that their early priority was to pacify the Philippines' inhabitants. They had a prevailing idea that Filipinos could not behave themselves and had a tendency to rebel.

Roosevelt was initially driven by the notion that the Philippines was colonised in the first place to be "civilised" and not necessarily be granted independence. Roosevelt also had the ideas that Filipinos would not even be ready for such moves in the next "half dozen or dozen years" (Wertheim, 2009: 506). This implies here was that Roosevelt was bent on driving home inculcating ideas associated with what he thought was "civilising" them. In other words, the Roosevelt administration, through its representatives in the Philippines, had an idea through the "civilised" image it wanted the islands to uphold and the administration was not willing to cede sovereignty to the islands until at least it was confident the Philippines would live up to the "civilised" image. The Roosevelt administration believed that by moulding the inhabitants of the islands to live up to this 'civilised' image, it would be serving their interests as much as it would be serving their own.

The ideas aspect of why American officials like Root and Taft instituted the form of government they did also seemed obvious. Per Stanley (1974), Root had so-called racist ideas about what Filipinos behaved. Root's *ideas* of them being "but little advanced from pure savagery", "childlike in their' lack of reflection, disregard of consequences, fearlessness of death, thoughtless cruelty, and unquestionable dependence of a superior" were, for him, justifications for why a completely democratic government within the Islands could be ruled out. Similarly, this was also why Taft felt that they could exempt Filipinos from a right to a jury trial: he had ideas of Filipinos whereby most of them were not trustworthy enough even if enough of them were deemed sufficiently educated to sit in a jury. Key Senators who were allies of Roosevelt also made their ideas clear when they did not include as part of the original Senate version of the Organic bill the elected legislature. Especially in further moves to devolve the Islands, ideas like this prevailed.

The voting franchise during the time, which represents who is able to participate and have a say in governance, also seems to be rooted in ideas. Would-be voters could qualify through incumbency, income/wealth, or literacy requirements. Given that the franchise was tightened between the military and civilian era of governance, one of the cited reasons to do so was that there were too many illiterate voters, something that coincides with the idea that Filipinos were not yet ready to govern their own affairs. Root also maintained the idea that as at the time of the conquest, Filipinos were not ready to govern by what he called "popular consent". That meant Root was not keen on immediately granting the right to vote to all Filipinos just yet. More fundamentally, restrictions of voting franchises on the basis of property or literacy and the reasons behind them were not new during the time. During the civil war era, there was a belief among Americans that limiting the voting franchise was essential to the founding fathers' concept of safe government. Although property requirements for voting were gradually relaxed, more states restricted voting on the basis of race and gender, citing that African Americans and women were considered "unsafe" voters (Free, 2016: 10). Even if property requirements were less present in the mainland and more prevalent in the Islands at the turn of the twentieth century, what was common

under both settings was the *idea* that an expanded voting franchise would invite what officials thought of as undesirable voters in each setting to dictate the agenda, thus undermining the agenda the government had set out.

Free (2016: 31) also cited instances of how white males back in the nineteenth century believed 'whiteness' was under attack whenever there were opportunities to mingle among different races and genders. Free also wrote how ideas of a white male-dominated social circle crystallised. This is instructive when it comes to the construction of *ideas* of whether Filipinos were ready for governance in the eyes of the colonial government. Based on Free's logic, whenever there was a notion that "whiteness" was under attack, it is implied that the white men in government felt that their entitlement to spread what they considered civilised values was under attack. Officials even had to discharge their duties in the Islands under the guise of a "white man's burden", further suggesting that their notion of governing and living was the way to go. Therefore, it then justified their notion of tolerating the exclusion of groups who in their judgement were not worthy of participating in the political process, especially by invoking whatever suggested the white male's superiority. This was on display in the Islands as well, especially as manifested in Root's and Taft's thinking.

However, Root and Taft recognised that the Bill of Rights needed to apply in some form lest they lend credence to criticism from the opposition. Given as well that they needed to enlist the cooperation of *illustrado* classes to keep insurgents under control, the voting franchise being extended to the likes of them may have not just been an expression that they were qualified, but it also acted as an incentive for supporting the administration's aims.

The ideas that portray Filipinos in an adversarial light may have been partly rooted in the ideas against Asians, in general, living in the mainland (though not necessarily specifically directed at Filipinos). Sentiments against Asians ran raw in the US and were a consequence of the experience of US citizens with Chinese working on the west coast. A majority of members of Congress rewrote the constitutional amendments concerning slavery and birthright citizenship in such a way to exclude Asians and single them out in subsequent laws on immigration and naturalisation (Daniels, 2002: 20). Although Filipinos were not directly targeted, the fact remained that US citizenship was back then only extended to people of European and African descent. This naturally gave a licence for Americans to look at Filipinos with contempt whenever instituting policies that would grant them further liberties. This could be implied in Roosevelt's and Taft's statements, on Filipinos for the Filipino people. In this context, Taft said there that he would do what he believed was "best" for Filipino people but that it did not necessarily constitute democratic forms of government straight away, let alone outright independence.

The thing depicted by officials' reactions to the establishment of the assembly is they wanted Filipinos to be "civilised" to the former's own standards. It was the criteria set by US officials that the islands' inhabitants would be judged against as to whether they ought to be taken a further step toward self-government. Clearly, the preference was to make inhabitants "civilised" rather than ready to govern themselves and that any attempts at the latter would be just as an incidental consequence of the former. McKinley's instructions to commissioners forming a government that satisfied Filipino cultures should also be juxtaposed with ideas

such as the "rule of law". Taft also made it clear that restoring colonial security, especially in light of the request of business interests, was also a priority.

Taft was also known to put forward a so-called "policy of attraction". The idea here is that by introducing institutions *associated* with liberal democracy (even if they did not constitute liberal democracy itself in its entirety), there would be fewer incentives for Filipinos to lobby for further independence (Burns, 2010; Burns, 2013a). Taft was advocating for an elected assembly even as his fellow party-mates in Congress (e.g. Lodge, Beveridge) were against its initial inclusion. This institution was borne out of Taft's idea whereby promoting similar institutions were there to paradoxically discourage campaigns for outright independence (ibid). Juxtaposing this with the idea of the likes of Taft that Americans were in the colony to civilise its inhabitants, the officials were also trying to promote the idea that by introducing quasi-democratic institutions, they would give the impression that Filipinos would live miserably outside US sovereignty.

Ideas also shaped the opposition to the law. Senator Hoar, a member of the president's party, had opposed the annexation of the Philippines from the beginning of American involvement in the islands. By citing incidents such as the murder of "hundreds of hundreds of Filipinos" without trial, he was clearly calling out the hypocrisy of promoting American ideals (35 Cong Rec. 5788, 1902). He also said that the Monroe doctrine, which called for spreading American ideals, evolved to a doctrine characterised by "brutal selfishness" and went as far as saying officials "vulgarised the American flag", "put children to death", and "baffled the aspirations of a people for liberty" (ibid: 5796). Based on this, even some party-mates believed that the US would display its hypocrisy and undermine its own credibility in the process. Although there were instructions by McKinley to promote the idea of liberty and the rule of law, in practice, those on the ground were clearly more keen on the latter as the opposition pointed out problems with the former.

Based on the foregoing, although Filipinos were perceived to be unable to manage their affairs, it is questionable whether this idea alone was a basis. From this, one would suggest that the idea of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs is not enough of a reason for the Organic Act's passage. Instead, institutions in the US and Philippines like the social structures and prevailing practices operated together with such ideas. Furthermore, as other societies are were in a similar state, one could ask why the US did not involve themselves in such. Hence, it makes the prospect of ideas acting alone insufficient.

Interests

One of the reasons for acquiring the Philippines was to establish a Naval Base in the Far East. Even as Roosevelt had continuously indicated publicly that the US to continue exercising sovereignty over the islands, he was mindful of one of the rationales for the islands' acquisition. Scholars have characterised Roosevelt as an imperialist. Given all of these, Roosevelt wrote to Taft on 31 May 1905 that if the US was not ready to establish a strong and appropriate Naval Base in Subic Bay, he would much rather give up the islands altogether (in Morrison, 1954: 1198). That also indicated a critical value that Taft thought the Philippines should be to the US and implied that at that point, Roosevelt perceived the Islands as a cost and that there were other powers in the wings waiting for developments out of the Western Pacific to take shape. Roosevelt thought that economically, the

Islands was not adding value and the US instead continued to find itself in a position where it needed to bail out the Islands. Thus, Roosevelt thought the economic justification for the US possessing the Philippines would not be worth it. In this light, there was some concession that sometime in the future, the US would need to relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines.

In addition to geopolitics, domestic electoral considerations were also weighing heavily in the mind of Roosevelt. In politics, interests refer to whether agents are able to make electoral gains amongst others. It was unclear what role the Philippine question played in the electoral success, though, in the 1904 Republican Party manifesto, there was only a brief mention of the Philippines. However, they touted their accomplishment by saying they had "suppressed insurrection, established order, and given to life and property a security never known there before". They had also touted their achievement in giving the inhabitants "the largest civil liberty they [had] ever enjoyed". They also claimed a geopolitical victory whereby with the capture of the Philippines, they thought to have successfully relieved diplomatic personnel in Beijing and "played a decisive part in preventing the partition and preserving the integrity of China" (Republican Party, 1904). Meanwhile, in 1908, the manifesto mentioned of the Philippine focused on economic liberty, but they have already suppressed insurrection (Republican Party, 1908). Further moves for self-governance were not mentioned.

After 1900, the opposition party's manifesto only mentioned the Philippines briefly, especially in light of what the party claims would be consequences of continued occupation. More specifically, what the party characterised as "speculative exploitation" would lead to "lead to entanglements from which it will be difficult to escape" (see 1904). The 1908 manifesto made independence for the Islands a more explicit position.

Roosevelt was aware that under the American party system, the opposition party had a reasonable chance of replacing his party. He was also aware that that reality and public opinion made it difficult to execute acts with "altruistic" motives in the colony (Wertheim, 2009: 508-9). Ultimately, Roosevelt confided to Taft in a letter that Americans were not ready to take responsibility for the Philippines "permanently, in a duty-loving spirit". He admitted that the Americans were "unlikely" to treat the Filipinos benevolently, which would "undermine" their so-called "civilising mission" (Roosevelt, 21/8/1907: 392).

McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft's party retained control of the lower house for 16 years, only to end in 1911. This meant that whatever Roosevelt proposed at that point would need to consider that the opposition party controlled the said legislative chamber.

Interests also take the form of economics and geopolitical realities. At the time of the passage of the organic act, the governing Republican party was widely regarded as the more pro-business party. Instituting a form of government the provided for in the Organic Act helped the governing party boost their credentials in front of their business-oriented base. During the acquisition of the Islands, businessmen called on the likes of Taft to prioritise the restoration of law-and-order to be able to facilitate the course of business. Without formal and fixed laws, there would be chaos and confusion as to what the rules of participating in the colonial economy were.

Still In the realm of interests, Hoar cited the Philippine-American war that had so far cost taxpayers $600 million and thousands of lives of US soldiers. He also alleged that the government "sold out the right, … to speak out the sympathy which is in our hearts" (35 Cong Rec 5788. On this count, Hoar did not think that any further moves for the US to be involved in the Islands were not financially viable, given that he thought the US was not keen on eventually letting the Islands become independent as seen in the text of associated legislation. Thus, Senators like Hoar thought that it was no longer in the financial interests of the federal government to enshrine into law commitments to hold the Philippines and be help it form a government.

Given that Roosevelt changed his opinion on the Philippines, it implies that his idea of the Philippines' viability for the US must have changed. Therefore, Roosevelt's idea of how viable the Philippines was for the US became the basis for Roosevelt's interest in the Philippines. Furthermore, there seemed to be constraints such as financial and economic considerations that weighed on Roosevelt's mind to have a change in tone.

As this subsection had just mentioned, the idea of the "benevolent assimilation" was invoked again in assessing whether it was in the Roosevelt administration's interests to keep the Philippines. In that case, one should consider the interests of Roosevelt in the context of benevolent assimilation to make sense. Based on that, interests alone are insufficient explanations.

Institutions

Meanwhile, the powers that US officials exercised in the islands highlights the role of institutions. For one, such roles were manifested in the officials' observance of the Bill of Rights (per US Constitution) in the Islands (albeit to a limited degree) and their attitudes towards the same (per Stanley, 1974 and Hutchcroft, 2000). Amidst the criticism from Hoar and his allies from the opposition party, institutions like the Bill of Rights restrained officials like Root and Taft, who believed in US sovereignty over the Philippines. Given as well that there was a belief in the principles and institution of limited government, particularly among members of the then president's party, it provides room to argue that the same was sincere about instituting rights and liberties of the islands' inhabitants, subject to how ready officials thought they were. However, they figured out how to uphold these institutional upbringings without necessarily committing to further devolution or liberalisation of governance beyond the minimum stipulated in the US Bill of Rights.

In addition, amidst Taft's wish to work with insular elites who had a less shady background, he was also driven by and resigned to prevailing institutions in the Islands such as working with those whom he characterised as "difficult". This meant giving some of the old cacique class key positions in the Commission, and when the assembly was in place, these politicians apparently carried their previously nurtured habits into their new positions. These elites whose assistance Taft enlisted belonged to the *illustrado* class, which (as described in Chapter 4) is a group of educated middle-class men alienated from governance during the Spaniards' colonisation. The *illustrados* were largely sceptical of outright independence. They had ambivalent stands especially toward the Philippine Revolution and instead insisted on reforms to Spain's governance which would

include recognition for their role in shaping society and greater freedoms. Their politics was characterised as often "erratic or opportunistic" (Stanley, 1974: 52). Thus, the institutions in the Philippines spawned into a life of its own. As far as Taft was concerned, he had no choice but to work with the institutionalised behaviours these elites had brought with them from the previous colonial era to get the job done.

Furthermore, McKinley instructed the Philippine Commissioners to form a Philippine government that is compatible with such institutionalised behaviour in the Islands. He issued a challenge that, on the one hand, promoted the ideals that American governance was purportedly famous for (e.g. the rule of law, freedom and liberty), and on the other hand, something that would be well-suited to the institutions prevailing in the islands, which some American officials, including former War Secretary Elihu Root, had denounced as corrupt. It meant the *illustrados* would experience the benefits of these so-called American values ahead of everyone else if only to enlist their cooperation. At any rate, amidst the instructions to supposedly serve the Filipinos' desires, the fact remained that Taft and others wanted first and foremost their enlistment as a means to discharge what the US planned to do in the Islands. US officials also took advantage of the fact that at least some of these *illustrados* were not pushing for outright independence so as not to upset their (elites') place among prevailing Filipino institutions. Based on this, one can surmise that Americans could justify holding off giving further self-governance to Filipinos because the *illustrados* felt they could achieve their interests under a system short of outright further devolution.

Despite McKinley's instructions to establish a government that supposedly satisfies the islands' inhabitants, what however sparks curiosity is Skowronek's (1982) observation that the US was in the midst of institutional changes since he found that officials transplanted the older institutions into the colony. One can argue that the older institutional arrangements informed the outlook of colonial officials towards the Philippines. It also implied that the institutional arrangements before the said changes back home were not hospitable to the democracy and liberty that critics said were lacking from the federal government's proposal for the Islands. As previously mentioned, amidst the instructions to form an insular government that is compatible with existing institutions, the fact that a clause related to upholding the "rule of law" and "freedom and liberty" were added means that it was the US and not the Filipino officials who would be the judge of the developments in the Philippines.

Institutions and ideas also drove opposition to the form of governance that the US awarded. Just like the government believing it tried to spread American ideals in the Philippines, the opposition also invoked the hypocrisy against those who wanted to keep the Philippines. In particular, the opposition believed the cruelty and unjustness they saw the government perpetuated. Given that there was an idea of Americans as a promoter of liberty, one can imply that the opposition would have grounds to say the government was not promoting this when they are outside the mainland.

Additionally, the opposition, largely based in the southern part of the US, also had a constituency that was wary of the Islands' inhabitants being part of the US. It would then imply that a sincere commitment to bestowing liberties among the

Islanders was not the primary motive of some of the opposition. The opposition party's history of approaching race relations at that point, as evidenced by their opposition to the passage of the 14th and 15th US constitutional amendments, which both extend rights to non-white slaves further rights (Steed et al., 1980; Kerns, 2017). Their idea of how they see people who do not resemble them may have helped influenced why they do not want to have anything to do with the bill or with the US being in the Philippines; it just so happened that if this was indeed the case, the opposition members found an excuse in calling out the hypocrisy of the measure's proponents. Moreover, their ideas about Filipinos may not have been different from the proponents'. However, the opposition's approach to express their position and the way forward was different from the government's.

Interaction among some key Is

As compelling as the each of ideas, institutions, and interests discussed in this chapter are, each of them is not always sufficient in understanding why officials gave the Philippines an Organic Act and Philippine Assembly. As mentioned earlier, institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas. For instance, on the notion of the "civilising mission", it should be questioned about whether this mission was done for its own sake given the other institutions or norms that were prevalent in US society such as prevalent racist views. It does not necessarily point out to malice on the side of officials. Instead, it means this idea of a "civilising mission" may have had underlying roots in institutions.

Furthermore, ideas may also reflect the interests of agents. Considering that it would take massive resources to undertake a "civilising" mission, particularly when there are other regions, and that the US acquired the Philippines at the last minute, it is difficult to separate the interests that would be at stake from such. Such examples, which were discussed extensively in more detail in Chapter 5, included the interest of helping the US build its image as an emerging empire. At this point, it is not to say that this was indeed the direct cause of why the "civilising" ideas emerged, but that an attempt to look at the "civilising" mission in context of the agenda of other officials means that there is reason to think that considering the idea of "civilising" the Philippines as a sole cause for introducing such measures is insufficient.

In relation to that, there is the recurring idea that Filipinos are unable to govern themselves. When accounting for the decisions to hold back initial attempts to liberalise the Philippines, such as restricting the voting franchise, the idea sounds compelling. However, one should ask about the consequences for officials if Filipinos are unable to manage themselves. For one, they had an agenda in the Philippines, such as improving colonial security. This security could help serve two other interests: credibility with business allies, who were using the Philippines for business interests, and the reputation of the US to be a responsible emerging power. Hence, this idea that officials harboured of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs reflected the security, economic, and diplomatic interests.

Taft's “policy of attraction” was a case that manifested how ideas help agents make sense of the meaning of their interests. At its core was the belief that in order to pacify Filipinos, Americans needed to offer Filipinos institutions that gave the impression that there were desirable perks with staying under US rule. It meant that the Taft administration and its successors introduced some institutions or reforms otherwise associated with liberal democracy (to the extent that it was

allowed) with the hope of securing the Philippines. However, it must be stressed that although Taft introduced such institutions or reforms, he was not willing to grant full independence at that point. Taft, in other words, had an idea of the limits of the incentives he was seeking from Filipinos. Furthermore, to secure the Filipinos from rebellion meant occasionally and strategically scattering them with institutions resembling a liberal democracy to the extent possible. Therefore, the idea of Taft's "policy of attraction" was essential to helping colonial officials realise how else to secure the colony from insurrections.

Institutions also facilitate and/or constrain interests and ideas to thrive in. As mentioned previously, the US was going through broader institutional changes back home, but officials concerned with the Philippines were not up to speed with them. It meant that officials were not practising these new practices, and thus operated under the belief that the Philippines and other territories under their jurisdiction should not fully be subject to the liberties these reforms would otherwise encourage. It does not necessarily contradict the reforms that officials introduced. As for Taft, he knew his limits and was doing it as a means to secure the islands.

Another manifestation of institutions acting to constrain or facilitate the effectivity of ideas is evident in the social structure Americans uncovered in the Philippines. For these officials, such a social structure helped provide a basis for the notion that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs. In addition to this, there is also a question where interests need to come in. The security interests would reflect such a notion of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs. US officials made no secret of the fact that they had geopolitical interests for acquiring the Philippines. At the same time, they also felt they needed to secure the territory. Given such a recurring notion, that idea seemed to be reflected in security interests. As such, it was considered as part of the security factors behind introducing reforms in the Philippines, and the degree officials could do so.

The Bill of Rights was a norm US officials and politicians observed and invoked in the process of forming the Organic Act. It also provided a platform for officials and politicians to express their views and beliefs about what their colonial colleagues have done. That was the case when Hoar laid out his case for opposing the Philippine Organic Act: he claimed he received guidance from the norm of observing the Bill of Rights and based on it, believed that the US was there to exploit the Philippines. Root also believed his observance of the Bill of Rights constrained other things he would have otherwise thought of doing to the Philippines. Although there is nothing that directly says his mindset was a consequence of observing the institution of the Bill of Rights, one can imply that given that the decisions were made based on their belief that it was in compliance with such as institution.

The social set-up in the Philippines that Taft and his team found there constrained Taft's ability to pursue his security interests there. Given that Taft has regarded the Filipino elites with some contempt, he still needed to work with them and incentivise them accordingly to ensure he fulfils the US' security interests. Moreover, Taft's ability to secure the colony also depended on how well he could entice and incentivise members of the pre-existing elite to cooperate with him.

The institution of racism was also a norm invoked implicitly by some members of Congress, especially from the southern part of the US, in opposing the Philippine Organic Act. The ideas harboured by southern lawmakers about non-white people helped reinforce the institutional racism that was underway. Thus, as mentioned earlier, such a norm helped facilitate the belief that Filipinos should be isolated from the US and that the US should have nothing to do with the Philippines. Consequently, it also led to the belief that the passage of the Organic Act would undermine such a desire.

CONCLUSION

Hall's 3Is framework contributes to a better understanding of the reasons why politicians agreed to introduce the Organic Act and Philippine Assembly in that it highlights the relationship between the most commonly given reasons for such. It shows how such reasons are always not sufficient to account for what politicians and officials stood to gain. Furthermore, it shows how their thoughts and the institutional set-up have influenced what they stood to gain and vice versa. For instance, Taft's "policy of attraction" reflected a desire of officials to secure the colony by introducing policies to de-incentivising rebellions without repelling Filipinos. When it came to the reasons on whether to introduce reforms, the institutional set-up in the Philippines formed part of the basis for officials to think that the Philippines are not ready for reforms that granted them more autonomy than what the Organic Act and Philippine Assembly provided.

The senior leaders involved in Philippine affairs, particularly Root and Taft, may have displayed some ambivalence about what they wanted to achieve from the construction of the Organic Act. However, their ideas of what typical Filipinos were capable of were on display through their statements: that although they desired an elected parliament in the Philippines, they were adamant that Filipinos were not at the point where they should all be given rights. It governed the mechanics of when and how to establish the colonial legislature.

Colonial officials and the executive branch also differed with Congress as to when such institutions should be established.

The main theme of this chapter is in establishing a constitutional framework for the political system in the Islands, Washington-based officials navigated a balance between the ideas of the US upholding liberties for all people, and of their prevailing ideas about Filipinos being ill-equipped to appreciate what these American values stood for. Likewise, it was a balance between those same ideas about Filipinos and the institutions Americans wanted to uphold both in them and in Filipinos. There was interplay among ideas, institutions, and interests. Based on this, it was no surprise for why some think that the US was ambivalent and sometimes bordering on hypocritical about their plan.

The next chapter examines the educational reforms in the Philippines during the early colonial era. It shows how the 3Is framework makes sense of it.

PART III – MOTIVES FOR MATERIAL IMPROVEMENTS

CHAPTER VII: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) I: USING IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS TO TRACE THE MOTIVATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

INTRODUCTION

One of the longest-lasting legacies of US rule in the Philippines was public education. Although the primary level of education was theoretically made compulsory during the Spanish era, it was in practice only implemented loosely and to varying degrees (Lande, 1965). US education ultimately became much more extensive compared to what the Spaniards offered the Philippines. One of its most salient features included the use of English as a medium of instruction across the entire colony (Karnow, 1989: 200).

Although some scholars argue that education is associated with enlightenment and liberal ideals (e.g. Lande, 1965), it may seem counterintuitive and paradoxical for colonial administrators to introduce such reforms to colonial subjects. Moreover, it is also paradoxical that once enough colonial subjects underwent the programme and complete it successfully, officials would not firmly commit to giving them more control over internal governance. That is especially stark given that the US was not keen on giving the Philippines outright independence or even limited autonomy anytime soon.

Hence, given this thesis' focus on the 3Is, the overarching question this chapter discusses is "What are the interests, ideas, and institutions that helped explain why officials instituted education programmes during the 1898-1916 era?" As a result, this chapter argues that the initiatives to introduce mass-based educational programmes did not emerge from a mere desire to improve the material conditions in the colony. This chapter shows that security, ideational, and economic motivations were important drivers.

This chapter plans to proceed as follows. First, it will begin by briefly explaining how education is connected to the broader project to develop the colony in general. Second, the chapter will discuss the security interest, in particular, the context of trying to pacify the population and how officials thought that introducing education would be a way to secure the islands more effectively. Third, the chapter would go on to discuss three related ideas of what officials thought their profile of a typical Filipino was and what the basis of their educational programmes should be: a) unable to govern themselves; b) "policy of attraction"; and c) Filipino as a blue-collar worker. That section will highlight the links to the interest of securing the islands, given that officials have an interest in instilling such American ideas on locals. That section will also briefly illustrate the elements of the educational curriculum and changes back and forth that reflected ideas of what US officials thought Filipinos should be. The fourth section then discusses the economic interests that administrators considered. It also contains some key refinements to the education system with an emphasis on identifying the course offerings that would serve the colony's economic interests. The fifth section will illustrate and remind readers of the institutional legacy that the Spaniards have left that in particular deal with educational aspects. That is important as it also

identifies some of the important factors that constrained officials. It also identifies an aspect that sparked differences of opinion among officials. The conclusion will summarise the arguments made here and highlight in general some of the successes the educational programme has in store. In the process, the chapter poses questions about whether such ideas, interests, and institutions, in and of themselves, could explain the outcomes. It thus helps integrate this chapter's empirical findings with the thesis' framework.

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

In retrospect, officials had touted education as the "best safeguard for a democracy" (United States Information Service, 1999: 3). This view is shared by Lande (1965: 344), who argues that among the most dramatic changes that took place during the Spanish and American rule were the introduction of tools that helped prepare Filipinos to become "intelligent voters". In particular, regardless of US intentions to introduce democracy in the colony, education had the consequence of enlightening the democratic citizenry.

SECURITY INTERESTS AND CONTEXT

The initial motivation of colonial officials to educate the locals was grounded on the early realities in the colony that officials felt threatened by. Educating the Filipinos could be traced its origins to US military rule (1898-1901). The first education superintendent back then was Captain Albert Todd. As the era of military rule in the colony came preceded formal civilian rule, the priority was for the US to secure its newly-acquired possession. Todd was among the first to admit publicly that the main priority of these original educational initiatives was to pacify natives. Objectives which put material improvement of the natives at the forefront were introduced during the civilian era instead (May, 1980: 79). Thus, anything that administrators did to advance material conditions was secondary at that point.

US officials were grappling with the issue of how to prevent insurrections against their forces from getting out of control and how to win over the locals who would otherwise become prone to following local leaders that did not welcome US sovereignty over the islands (e.g. Aguinaldo). Such insurrections ran deep and long. Aguinaldo had just declared independence a few months before the islands were formally ceded to Spain and assumed the role of the first president of the Philippines. Moreover, after talks with US officials such as Colonel Spencer Pratt, Aguinaldo was under the impression that the US would respect the Philippines's right to effectively govern itself as indicated by a telegram from George Dewey, then the commander of the Asiatic Squadron of the US Navy (Aguinaldo, 1899: 10). However, Aguinaldo discovered that US officials had other plans and his camp denounced such moves. Aguinaldo then made a counter-declaration where he stood "most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty" of the Philippines. Officials such as General Elwell Otis equated it to a declaration of war (Agoncillo, 1990: 214-216). Guerilla fighting continued as a result for a few years, and although Americans had eventually contained large parts of these insurrections, it faced massive challenges to secure such an outcome. In fact, it was only in 1902 when the last major Aguinaldo-supporting general, Miguel Malvar was captured. When the US assumed control over the colony, amidst the motivation of "pacifying" the islands from those who opposed to their rule, US military officials put up public schools in key areas

(Constantino, 1975: 309). One official noted that education makes Filipinos "less liable to be led by political leaders into insurrectionary schemes" (Faulve-Montojo, 2018: 43). Taft made promoting primary education a central tenet to his so-called "policy of attraction", which is his policy used to win the hearts and minds of Filipinos (Burns, 2010: 57). In Taft's (26/7/1900: 463) letter to Root, Taft also cited that the impact of a first impression would be long-lasting.

The bottom line of the preceding paragraph is that the motivations for insurrections that officials needed to pacify were deep and took some time (i.e. up to three years) to control. Moreover, given such deep roots of the insurrection, it is conceivable that officials thought that it would take more than physical disarmament to disarm and discourage locals from clamouring for outright freedom. The effectiveness of arresting and killing guerrilla leaders would only go so far. Given how Filipino leaders had awakened the national consciousness of their compatriots (cf. Constantino (1975) and Agoncillo (1990)), it would have to imply US officials needed to alter the mentality of natives in the islands if it wanted the desired outcomes, including of that of security. This notion was supported by Taft aide Daniel Williams, who indicated that the hope was that if Filipinos increased their knowledge, they would become aware of their limits. Thus, they would have second thoughts before demanding freedom from US sovereignty (in Karnow, 1989: 200-201).

Based on all of this, when it comes to the 3Is framework, there is a question of whether such factors will be enough to explain the introduction of education reforms. Interests, including security-related ones, may constitute an agents' ideas as the next section.

IDEAS OF WHAT THE FILIPINO PEOPLE WERE AND NEEDED TO BE

As plausible as the security concerns in the previous section were, they were not the sole explanations for introducing education in the Philippines. It is worth reiterating that these interests may form the basis for ideas as ideas reflect what the agents' (i.e. colonial officials) interests are.

The drive to secure the Philippines from future insurrections, and consequently, the motive of educating the colony had a connection to the idea of what Americans thought of Filipinos and what ideas Americans wanted Filipinos to possess.

In relation to the question of educating Filipinos, this chapter considers three related ideas. The first is the notion that Filipinos – in the mind of Americans – were not capable of managing their affairs. The second one is the "policy of attraction", whereby by promoting elements of American ideals to the extent possible, there would be fewer reasons for Filipinos to want to rebel against US rule even if Filipinos were ready for governance. The third is that typical Filipinos were fit primarily for blue collar-based education.

LACKING CAPABILITIES TO MANAGE THEIR AFFAIRS

Americans had an idea of Filipinos as lacking in the skills officials thought the locals needed and had limited potential to develop skills that would be as good as how they saw whites. Thus, War Secretary Root prioritised developing a primary education system that aimed to prepare the colony's inhabitants for the "duties of citizenship and "for the ordinary activities of a civilised community" (in Worcester,

1914: 986-987). These appear to be consistent with the ideas that were presented previously. Given that Root's idea of education had to do with the preparing the inhabitants to do activities for a "civilised community", such a pronouncement presupposed that Root and others like him thought that a typical Filipino was not civilised, to begin with.

As far as most US officials were concerned, Filipinos were not yet ready to manage their affairs. Governor-General Taft's conception of education was in line with making people ready to be able to govern themselves even though he had shown no intention of granting them this sense of autonomy anytime in the foreseeable future. That was the case as he also said that the Filipino people must be capable of self-governing before the government he was responsible with leading could be turned over to them (Brands, 1992: 68). Thus, colonial administrators utilised education policy to instil in locals patriotism and unity, as well as a preparation for democratic "self-government" (Sobritchea, 1990: 74-75), even if Taft and other officials had no foreseeable plans to grant such. In 1902, Taft initially described the Filipino's fitness for leadership positions in government as "uneducated 90 per cent". He further added that in terms of capacity for getting educated, the Filipino is "equal to that of any race, perhaps excepting the white" (in United States Congress. House. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 96). From this testimony, Taft was clear in his view that the Filipino race was not yet ready and had a somewhat limited potential relative to their white counterparts to get educated enough to manage their affairs.

Given the fact that officials did not see Filipinos as fit to enjoy more colonial liberal reforms just yet, there was a worry in some circles about the education programmes that colonial administrators instituted. It is also appropriate to entertain such scepticism about whether the curriculum's contents would inadvertently encourage Filipinos to promote values which officials thought they were not yet mature enough to handle. For instance, when it came to the issue of what language to use, there was a risk that by using English, it would be easier for Filipinos to operate on the premise that they were entitled to freedom and liberty. Previous colonisers' experience had exemplified that exposure to the colonisers' vernacular made increased such risks. However, amidst the avoidance of *ideas* which colonisers thought were anathema, the decision to introduce English as the main language of instruction was due to more practical considerations and given the reality that many dialects the colony has faced (Karnow, 1989: 201). Moreover, the passage of pertinent laws by legislators alleviated worries about Filipinos harbouring thoughts against the US (ibid). Specifically, officials had established laws such as the Sedition Law in 1901 and Flag Law of 1907; the former made it illegal to promote Philippine independence, while the latter prevented the Philippine and revolutionary flags and other symbols from being displayed (Francisco, 2015).

This chapter will discuss the rationale of blue-collar work in later. To address the point of rebellions, however, one has to stress that some administrators worried that giving Filipinos education *en masse* was also a recipe for insurrections to occur. Although one cannot say for certain yet that discouraging academic subjects was due to security reasons, the fact remained that in the early 1900s, officials still viewed Filipinos as savages when it came to demanding outright freedom. Even if Filipinos were equipped with the basic skills of reading, writing, and counting, by shifting to more academic subjects, it was conceivable that

Filipinos would think sufficiently to call for outright independence. That was something other colonisers feared (cf. Coloma, 2009). Later on, officials would realise such fears as Coleman (1965) argues that because of teachings by the educational system that would be in place, local political elites would use it to demand that the colonial government transfer political power to them. Coleman described this initial purpose of pacifying the locals as one of the "greatest ironies" between the Western colonisers and their colonies. Feelings of Filipino nationalism continued to grow. On paper, these may seem as if they do not contradict the instructions of the original colonisers. The Philippine Commission's objectives for their educational policy included being able to engage in the art of self-government. However, the objectives also contained elements of that taught locals patriotism towards the US.

Policy of attraction

Another key *idea* is what Taft's "policy of attraction" was supposed to represent. For Taft, it was about "winning the hearts and minds of Filipinos" which Taft himself acknowledged could take "many, many years" but would be successful. It entailed promoting policies which Filipinos would come to value (Burns, 2011). The rationale for this policy was that if Filipinos were enjoying certain privileges associated with becoming part of the US realm, they would hope to stay to get more. It meant introducing elements of American life to the islands that had the potential to be looked upon favourably by Filipinos to the extent that they would not need to demand independence. As mentioned previously, a key element of this policy to achieve its aims involved the education of Filipinos. The hope here was that the educational system would be one of the main avenues for American elements to be passed on to Filipinos. The elements officials hoped to pass on were even found in the education process itself. For instance, the English language in itself was a subliminal manifestation of the Americanisation officials hoped to impart on Filipinos (Karnow, 1989: 201). However, as shown, this was slightly paradoxical since central to American ideals were ideas of freedom and liberty, the two things Taft hoped Filipinos would not demand from the US straight away. Concerning the previous statement, education, became an area which the US took pride in when it promulgated colonial policy and a spirit of "American exceptionalism" was brewing among colonisers to make a mark that was different from what its European counterparts did in their respective colonies (Francisco, 2015: 14).

Karnow (1989) was critical of the education mission. He went on to say that the mission was not for Filipinos to "Filipinise themselves" but for them to be grounded in the American way of life. Given the statements and the ideas stated so far, this view is not surprising. For one, officials have seen that American values were the way to go. Amidst the security experiences, "Filipinising" Filipinos for US officials meant returning to experiences the latter would worry about. Thus, in this light, education was used as an avenue for the US to implant in the minds of Filipinos the superiority of US values in the hopes that the risks of Filipinos asking independence would be kept minimal enough to manage.

As discussed in Chapter 6, the idea of the "policy of attraction", although instrumental, was not a free-standing idea. It, however, reflected the interests pertaining to security and economic gains for the colonisers. Ergo, the notion of securing the Philippines by disincentivising moves associated with independence

was a motivation for the "policy of attraction". As "winning the hearts and minds of Filipinos" as Taft put it by introducing measures such as education, there was the hope that this would prevent an outbreak of insurrections.

FILIPINOS, MANUAL LABOUR, AND DIGNITY

Given the image that US officials harboured about Filipinos being incapable of managing their affairs, as well as the officials' experiences with Filipinos during the war, they concluded that Filipinos needed to undergo education that encouraged the development of skills needed for performing manual labour efficiently. This assessment was also based on the idea that education based on manual labour had a restorative function. Atkinson (1905: 240), who also happened to be the first educational superintendent during the civilian era, based his description of Filipinos in general on the Filipino Negrito race, which he considered to be a race of a "very low type". Moreover, Atkinson continues to characterise Filipinos as "true savages" (ibid: 241). The description of savages goes on solidify the idea officials had in Filipinos that they were a threat and could not be trusted to live a civilised life the way Americans hoped they would. As a result, officials concluded Filipinos needed to undergo a programme to redirect the skills and energies they exercised.

The association between Filipinos and a blue-collar-centric curriculum was also based on what policymakers did for African Americans after the Reconstruction era. Atkinson was worried about overdoing liberal education (Atkinson, 1902: 414). In here, officials suggested a comparison between Filipinos and African Americans. The fact that Atkinson had to use the US' post-reconstruction African American experience implied a policy that involved stereotyping Filipinos. That was, however, based on the pretence administrators had that Filipinos were to their mind reckless and untrustworthy with such affairs to the point that officials felt US interests in the colony faced a threat of being undermined.

There was also an idea among US colonial circles that manual labour contained dignity in it. That was not an idea that was in practice shared during the Spanish colonial era. Americans saw Filipinos as "indolent" since the latter possessed a disdain for blue-collar work. Although a blue-collar-centred education had some undertones of "inferior" people, those in the US considered such a curriculum as having a rehabilitative function. Specifically, officials thought the curriculum builds a pupil's character and instils the dignity of labour. By educating Filipinos early on, officials hoped to provide "due regard and respect for the dignity of labour" (Philippine Commission, 1903: 697). Kliebard (1999: 13) particularly, argues that such a programme is intended for those who "require remedial treatment for one reason or another". Additionally, during the early twentieth century, the US was said to have valued manual work more than other colonisers (Francisco, 2015: 38).

As an initial consequence of the emphasis to institute a manual labour-based curriculum, the number of hours allocated to the subject of industrial work was given twice as much time as the more academic counterparts (e.g. reading, writing, arithmetic) (Sobritchea, 1990: 77).

However, getting locals to accept agricultural and blue-collar-centred education had proven to be challenging. That was because US officials felt the attitude of

Filipinos toward manual work "left much to be desired" (Leocadio, in Calata, 2002: 95). Additionally, US officials operating in the islands thought the Spaniards did not help Filipinos appreciate the value of honest work thus leading to the latter's view of manual labour (Lande, 1965: 326; Calata, 2002: 95).

Again, to demonstrate how this idea of blue-collar work relates to security interests, one would need to consider it in light of the security situation officials felt. Officials believed that training for blue-collar-based education and work had a reformative aspect to it. Given that there was a notion among officials that Filipinos acted in a way that officials considered "uncivilised", one could argue that the idea behind blue-collar education reflected the fact that officials wanted security especially against perceived threats from Filipinos. Also, the prevailing institutions in the Philippines helped give credence to the idea that Americans should institute a blue-collar-based education in the colony.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN EDUCATION

Officials have expressed obvious economic *interests* in establishing an educational system. As mentioned in the previous section, officials such as Secretary Root wanted a primary education system that would prepare inhabitants for what he called the "ordinary activities of a civilised community". These so-called "ordinary activities" would also imply that the rationale for instituting educational policies also consisted of practical considerations.

Given that the coffers were also limited when it came to what aspects of which curricular programmes to prioritise, it also meant that officials needed to be wise as to what would extract the best value for the limited funds. During the early twentieth century, the focus of instruction changed slightly depending on who the head of the education bureau was. For the most part, officials also had an *idea* that manual labour was an essential part of the colonial economy they wanted to grow and that Filipinos were more suited to this. Although early colonial educational policy focused initially on establishing primary level schooling, changes were made to it to account for the changing needs of society. In addition to the subjects the Commission mandated to be taught (e.g. arithmetic, reading, and writing in English), the primary education curriculum included a subject that would teach pupils the skills needed to carry out manual labour. That was also the case for pupils in the first grade (Alzona, 1932; Acierto, 1980: 66).

The economic interests in education were also not surprising given the economic position colonisers wanted the Philippines to assume in the first place when the US acquired the islands. As mentioned in chapter 4, one of the hopes was for the Philippines to facilitate trade between the US and the Far East. Moreover, officials felt that given that the colonial economy was underdeveloped, there was a need for extra manpower to take on the economic demands.

Taft, in an interview with the National Geographic Magazine, indicated the importance of educating Filipinos with the English language as it was important for business, science, and politics (cf. Burns, 2010: 58). More practically, he indicated that the educational system would use the English language to remove the memories of Spanish rule from Filipinos (ibid). One other difference between the US and Spanish colonial eras was that the latter did not promote the use of their language early on. Also, by introducing English as a medium of instruction, locals were able to avail themselves of more opportunities both in academia and

professional work. One example of such was the *pensionados*, who were Filipino scholars sent to the US for further study (Calata, 2002: 91-92, 95).

Although there had been a slight shift in the early 1900s between emphasising academic (liberal arts) and vocational subjects, by the latter part of the 1900s, the emphasis had been firmly more toward the latter end of the education spectrum. Such was indicated in the 1907 *Statement of Organization and Aims* of the Bureau of Education, which states that third and fourth-graders would receive manual labour-based training. The curriculum was continuously refined, and from an initial three-year curriculum, elementary education (consisting of primary and intermediate grades) branched out to six years. In 1909, those who continued studying at intermediate grade levels had a choice of course in agriculture, housekeeping, household industries, trade, as well as business in the hopes of preparing pupils for a vocation (Acierto, 1980: 66, 69-70). By 1911, the *Statement of Organization and Aims* of the Bureau of Education specifically stated that the programmes it had were in place to prepare pupils in a "practical way for the industrial, commercial, and domestic activities in which they are later to have a part". The operative words here are *practical* and *industrial*, as it meant that administrators would de-emphasise the more academic-leaning parts of the curriculum and instead focus more on utilitarian functions of giving Filipinos what officials believed were the physical skills needed for the workplace.

As the 1900s progressed, crafts made by Filipino pupils were exported and displayed at various trade fairs. One of them was the 1904 World's Fair in St Louis Missouri, whereby the head of the Filipino exhibit had remarked that they were an "accomplish[ment]" of state-run schools (Philippine Islands, 1904: 35). The blue-collar-based curriculum fed into the export-based orientation that colonial officials hoped to achieve out of the colony (Coloma, 2009: 516).

To highlight the interaction between interests and ideas here, it is worth considering two issues. First, in the US, the idea of work and free enterprise prevailed. It has been a discursive tool in the mainland without which, businessmen operating in the colony who otherwise demanded education would not think about it. That would also give them the notion that they needed human capital of a sort, even if it was blue-collar-based. The second way to articulate this notion is through the idea of Taft's "policy of attraction". The "policy of attraction" was among those initiatives that reminded administrators that there is an economic dimension to what they were supposed to do. It provided officials with guidelines and a statement of principles on what to pursue and the reasons to pursue them. The "policy of attraction" identified the goal of profitability for firms operating in the colony and surplus for the US economy, and that education would facilitate this objective. Thus, the ideas behind the "policy of attraction" provided officials with a guide on how to achieve the US' broader economic goals through education. Likewise, the educational ideas contained in Taft's Policy of attraction reflected the economic interests the US had in the Philippines.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

When the US assumed sovereignty over the Philippines, opportunities for education in the colony were limited, and the state of education was in flux. Chapter 4 has given broader socio-institutional structures the Spaniards had left the Americans with. However, it is sufficient to say that irrespective of the motivations, US officials made improvements over what the Spaniards had offered

(Karnow, 1989). Although former Spanish colonial government initially decreed compulsory education for the islands in 1863, a lot of its provisions were not properly enforced due to opposition from Church officials and budget constraints (Lande, 1965; Sobritchea, 1990: 71). Spaniards were also not keen to provide the islands with widespread access to higher education for fear that it may produce a so-called "revolutionary class" among them (Ninkovich, 2001: 71). Moreover, there were only a few higher education institutions such as the University of Santo Tomas and these were geared towards the selected few Filipinos who were part of *illustrado* or enlightened class, and a lot of them would go on to Europe to continue their studies and become professionals (Constantino, 1975; Coloma, 2009).

When US officials started to formally invest in their educational programme, there was only one teacher for every 4,179 inhabitants when US colonisers started (United States. Philippine Commission, 1900: 31).

Moreover, there were social institutions that some officials would later worry about. It would then prompt a temporary and slight shift in emphasis of the educational curriculum. In particular, the Philippines had institutions that on first sight contradicted the ideas of liberty (to the extent that it was permitted) Americans wanted to incorporate there. One such example of this was *caciquism*[22] or boss rule. The worry was that such a system was holding Filipinos back from further developments and that a lack of academic-based education would make Filipinos vulnerable.

Once again, one of the bases for educational initiatives was the idea that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs. In this case, that was exacerbated or given credence by the institutional set-up the Philippines had. As institutions limit or facilitate how practical ideas are, the chaotic state of institutions made the notion that Filipinos were unable to manage their affairs more credible. Hence, it helped build the notion that more investments in education were necessary. The idea of Filipinos unable to govern themselves had to have a basis somewhere, and institutions provided such a basis.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE EDUCATION-RELATED Is

As mentioned several times, institutions provide the platform to help sustain interests and ideas. Specifically, institutions can facilitate or limit the salience of such. One can argue that given the institutional set-up the Spaniards had left in the Philippines, it provided a challenge for US officials in the sense that the shortage in quality educational institutions helped determine how much they needed to do to satisfy their interests of growing the Philippine economy. From this account, the institution did not define the interest *per se* but rather the means the US would have to take to get there. It does raise a caveat that institutions may not necessarily change the interests, but affect how the interests could be satisfied.

Given as well that the educational institutions left by the Spaniards were not to the standards the Americans desired, it could imply that this helped feed into the idea that Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves. Given that the officials

[22] *Caciquism* is a term that is used in Spain and former Spanish colonies that emphasises the rule by local or village chieftains. Anderson (1988) has an extensive review of this.

had educational programmes in place to address the ideas that officials harboured about Filipinos, it also implied that the previous institutions left by the Spaniards did not do a job that Americans hoped it would do.

Although economic interests were a factor, there are questions about whether economic interests itself was sufficient to warrant educational initiatives. As mentioned previously, the fact that economic interests existed implies that officials subscribed to an idea of an economic system that promotes economic growth. In this case, it was the free enterprise system and the necessary elements for it. Those necessary elements included a productive workforce, which officials hoped the education system would solve. A productive workforce would help contribute profits. As such, the ideas associated with free enterprise helped officials make sense of the fact that it was in their interests to educate Filipinos.

Moreover, one could argue that although education programmes meant to attain economic interests, economic interests, in turn, may not be an end goal. As mentioned, the "policy of attraction" featured political and economic liberalisations, but officials instituted these with the view that Filipinos would have fewer incentives to rebel. Hence, the economic interest could be subservient to the interest of keeping the Philippines secure from rebellions. As such, the idea of attracting Filipinos directly and indirectly informed educational initiatives.

Furthermore, the fact that the educational system centred on training pupils to become productive blue-collar workers. As discussed in a previous section, officials considered blue-collar-based training to have a "reformative" value in addition to an economic value. Officials used this notion of blue-collar work as a basis to consider their security interests. On the other hand, officials considered white-collar-based education riskier. There was a belief that academic (intellectually-based) subjects would increase the risks for rebellion, given that they encourage the learners to think critically. Thus, the idea that blue-collar-based education encouraged discipline and security as well as the notion that white-collar-based education for Filipinos undermined security reflect the security interests that agents had.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter has demonstrated that amidst all the material benefits Filipinos would enjoy under an enhanced educational system compared to the Spanish era, it was not merely a product of altruistic wishes officials had for the Philippines. While the US had shown a marked departure from its colonial counterparts in terms of implementing mass-scale schooling across the Philippines, it was evidence officials had something to gain, and that the ideas-based reasons reflected these. To some degree, it was not a question of whether to educate Filipinos but *what programmes* to educate them with.

Specifically, for the 3Is framework, this chapter has shown that the reasons for education stemmed from ideas that officials harboured about the Philippines. However, these ideas reflected the security and economic interests that officials possessed. Moreover, ideas of free enterprise also provided a basis for officials to consider that it was in their interests to educate the colony. The institutional environment Americans found contributed in that it helped reinforced the ideas of Filipinos colonial officials had about them. On those counts, ideas and institutions are, thus, interlinked.

Specifically, on the aspect of interests, colonial officials also saw the need to improve the locals' economic situation. They recognised that increasing the levels of literacy through educating the populace was an important step to achieve this. Although some education superintendents focused slightly more on improving the islands' intellectual/academic aptitude, most of the superintendents had placed a lot of emphasis on handicrafts and manual labour. Moreover, the basis for the prevailing education system needs to be considered in light of the ideas officials had for the sort of programme they thought most Filipinos were suited for. In relation to the emphasis on blue-collar education to provide for the needs of the economy, the officials followed the programme in place for educating African Americans. That curriculum placed a huge emphasis on blue-collar work. There was a belief by some key officials that Filipinos were by and large not suited for widescale university/academic-based scholastic programmes.

Based on the foregoing, education, as something that had the potential to liberalise aspects of Philippine society had strategic imperatives during the pre-1916 period. On the level of interests, US officials needed to secure their position as the ones who had the right to exercise sovereignty over their recently-acquired territory. To secure such an interest, they needed to devise something to change the mindsets of the islands' inhabitants whereby they avoid rebelling against the occupying powers. Thus, officials considered education an important means to achieve this.

As for the broader institutional background that was around, it sparked a difference in opinion among the officials as to whether to prioritise blue- or white-collar-based education more slightly.

Thus, what started as a political measure also produced an economic legacy across the islands. Despite the initial problems officials experienced and some confusion as to what the thrust of the education system should look like, the labour market in the colony became more attractive to prospective employers. That was manifested in the increase in the number of goods produced in the colony. Given that the Philippines was acquired partly for economic opportunities, the political and economic dimensions of education could not be easily separated.

More importantly, the establishment of a colonial education curriculum has shown how inseparable some of the interests, institutions and ideas are. That was because some ideas stem from the premises behind such interests. The idea of US officials thinking Filipinos were unable to manage the government, as well as the idea that they were savages, were rooted in and strengthened by the interest of US officials trying to secure the colony, especially after a long-fought war. The idea behind the "policy of attraction", to which the educational programmes were a core element of, was also borne out of the security interests of the US to hope ordinary Filipinos would not want to break free of US colonisation. Furthermore, the introduction of a blue-collar-based curriculum was based on the idea that it possessed a redemptive quality to it. The also reflected the security and economic interests officials had.

Moving forward, some scholars have explained how the educational system also reinforced social structures. In practice, wealthy Filipinos continued to be sent to

university and read academic degrees whereas the masses in the population had to bear with a curriculum based on improving blue-collar skills and know-how (Coloma, 2009). That said, opportunities with social mobility grew especially with the introduction of the University of the Philippines during the late 1900s. That was also true for Filipinos who had a modest means of earning an income, as they managed to accept middle- and higher positions in the colonial government. Although education itself was not the only factor for joining the circle of elite politicians, more Filipinos nonetheless took advantage of the increased educational opportunities according to better position themselves to join the ranks of those able to govern the colony (Casambre, 1982: 7). UP was popular with Filipino elites as they sent their children to UP.

Furthermore, as the number of Filipino university graduates increased, more of them began to seek a greater share of available colonial government places (Ninkovich, 2001: 71-2). As at the final Philippine Commission Report available (1915), more than 525 thousand pupils enrolled in school as at September 1913. That represented an increase of 2,934 pupils from the same period in 1912. It also represented an increase of approximately 375 thousand pupils from 1902. Moreover, as at August 1914, the attendance rate at state-run schools was at 89 per cent (United States. War Department. Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1904: 59; United States. Philippine Commission, 1915: 261).

Based on the foregoing, achieving the goal of educating the Filipinos then set the stage for other liberal reforms in the colony. The education system introduced by the US prepared the islands for later rapid industrial growth by helping to produce a well-trained labour force (Landé, 1965: 325).

CHAPTER VIII: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) II: EFFORTS AT LAND REDISTRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter has discussed the motivations that US officials had for putting forward educational reforms in their Filipino colony. As mentioned previously, one such motivation was to aid the colony in improving its economic situation. In doing so, officials also hoped to satisfy their economic goals as well as that of their business allies. Another consequence of the end of the Philippine-American war was continued resistance to US rule. That prompted the Commission to create a "postwar" order to help keep the resistance under control (Kramer, 2006: 170-171).

Moreover, the Philippine-American war left the colonial economy in ruins. As the Philippines was still primarily an agricultural-based economy, its major products were sugar and tobacco amongst others. Agricultural land was largely vacated, but establishments allied with the Spaniards and Catholic Church still owned the most valuable parcels of land. Officials both in Washington and Manila made suggestions on how to deal with the situation they faced, particularly improving economic conditions. In the process, there were constraints and other interests that officials had to deal with as they tried to execute various reforms.

Before proceeding further, this chapter begins the main discussion by explaining the rationale for land redistribution. It will look at it in political and economic terms. The rationale is to show that its goal is to facilitate political and economic improvements in the Philippines. This way, some context on the institutions that constrained land efforts to pull land redistribution will be highlighted.

From here, this chapter will show that the notion that growing the economy is a "civilising" act and Taft's Policy of Attraction were important *ideas* that led officials to try their luck at introducing land redistribution policies. These ideas will highlight the point that land redistribution was not done for its own sake but to satisfy ulterior motives. The chapter then considers the interests that were based on these policies and interests that hindered further attempts at land redistribution. Among the latter are security considerations, the view of America's standing and the need to mobilise the Catholic vote. Finally, given the scholars have suggested efforts at land redistribution have fallen short, this chapter discusses the role of institutions. They include adherence of the US to property rights and the Treaty of Paris, the Catholic Church, and pre-existing social structures in the Philippines that resisted forms of land redistribution. Based on those, institutions were an important constraining factor in realising land redistribution. These pertinent subsections will highlight the essential features of US officials' land redistribution efforts. These subsections demonstrate the prevailing ideas, interests, and institutions and what their consequences were. In the process, these will identify the frustrations officials had to deal with.

Along the process, this chapter will also show that some of the ideas, institutions, and interests would provide the springboard for each other to develop in this realm of facilitating land redistribution. This chapter will explore the interactions between the ideas, institutions, and interests involved. Some of the underlying

ideas behind instituting land redistribution need examination vis-a-vis interests and institutions to understand the decisions that officials took.

The chapter will conclude by reiterating the interactions between ideas, interests, and institutions, and looking and reflecting on their implications and importance.

RATIONALE FOR LAND REDISTRIBUTION

Initiatives for land redistribution and broader land reform are done to improve the political and socio-economic positions of those working in the lands.

Land redistribution and land reform are associated with broader moves for democratisation. Politically, successful land reform programmes have the potential to weaken feudal institutions. In the process, it also opens the door for free enterprise to grow. However, it is bound to run into problems in jurisdictions with prevailing forms of servitude. Hence, much of the results depend on the implementation of such programmes in specific settings (Barlowe, 1953: 181). Democratisation does not happen overnight or automatically as social relationships need dramatic alteration. However, it provides the former peasant classes with an opportunity to participate in the political process. It also facilitates the transformation of such relationships, given that certain anti-democratic practices have been gradually done away with (Senior, 1958).

Economically, numerous scholars (eg. de Janvry, 1981; Roxborough, 1979; Wolford, 2007) have established land redistribution's contribution to economic development in states and their territories. It is, thus, an essential element that facilitates the growth and development of modern economies. The American hegemony was partly premised on economic growth and based on the logic of what previous scholars have said, land reform should have made attempts to contribute to that. Officials believed this would facilitate such efforts.

Herring (1983: 262) has further underscored the political importance of land reform. Although he had questions over the effect of land reform and redistribution was on productivity, his study had indicated that underutilisation arises from large parcels of land that were owned by relatively a few numbers of people. The fact that this persisted nonetheless still gives rise to the suggestion that ownership of large tracts of land distributed amongst a broader segment of the population would increase the chances of such productive use.

IDEAS

Economic Growth as a Civilising Measure

The previous section argued that land redistribution is premised partly on facilitating economic growth. Economic growth was, in turn, something Taft, as Governor-General wanted to promote in the colony. However, it is important to note that Taft and his allies had particularly characterised Filipinos as "uncivilised". As the previous chapters suggest, the "uncivilised" notion had a connotation that a Filipino way of life was inferior in the eyes of the colonisers. In other words, officials had still viewed Filipinos as unfit to manage their affairs.

Hence, one way that Taft hoped to try to "civilise" the Philippines and demonstrate what Americans could do was to try to impart economic advancement. Specifically, Taft wrote to Lodge that "nothing will civilise them [Filipino people]

so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital here" (Taft, 17/10/1900: 3). Thus, Taft thought that developing the Philippine economy was a core part of how they would put forward their colonial agenda and how they would spread American ideas.

The idea of economic growth as a way to "civilising" the Philippines, as feasible as it is, should have had a foundation in other interests and/or institutions. For instance, given how administrators found the institutions, they gave credence to the notion that ideas associated with "civilising" the Philippines had to be given put forward. As discussed in previous chapters, ideas like these also helped reflect interests such as helping increase security in the Philippines and minimising insurrections.

Policy of Attraction

As discussed previously, William Taft's so-called policy of attraction refers to the overarching series of measures that Taft administration rolled out discourage Filipinos from thinking about breaking away from American rule. The measures may seem associated with introducing liberal institutions, but the paradox was that if the US kept introducing such both political and economic liberal reforms, Filipinos would feel encouraged to stay under US sovereignty. In the process, there would be a "lasting imperial bond" between the Philippines and the US (Burns, 2011).

As previous chapters have discussed, the idea of the policy of attraction needs consideration not for its own merits or sake but in conjunction with security interests. Taft needed to find innovative ways of minimising incentives to rebel or create insurrections in the Philippines. The incentives found in this idea reflected security interests. Hence, one should consider any moves proposing or opposing land redistribution in the context of this policy and the security interests officials thought it would satisfy.

INTERESTS

Colonial Security

As the previous section shows, Taft felt determined not to let the Philippines be independent of the US. As such, the colonial government felt the need to secure the colony. Under the underlying ideas associated with the "policy of attraction", Taft felt the need to deal with the colonial elites. Administrators solicited their help to facilitate the suppression of nationalist sentiments in the islands (Burns, 2010: 69). Crucially, however, these elites possessed large parcels of land. Some of them belonged to the Chinese mestizo and would go on to serve in the Philippine Assembly. They included future presidents Sergio Osmena, Jose Laurel and Elpidio Quirino (e.g. see Tan, 1986; Simbulan, 2005).

Furthermore, on the realm of security, Taft feared insurrections as a result of misdeeds carried over from the Spanish era. Taft as much as possible did not want Spanish-based friars back in the lands they were forced to vacate when the US claimed sovereignty over the islands. Based on the narrative above, Taft's goal was to not ignite the resentment of locals against the Spanish friars once who occupied those lands and were technically still owners. He understood that locals viewed friars as their abusers. As demonstrated previously, Taft had also viewed the Filipinos as "uncivilised". Furthermore, based on such views on locals and

friars, given that they were in the early stages of American colonisation, Taft thought the resentment could increase the risk of unrest up to the point that the colonial government would find itself on the receiving end of such resentment (Taft to Roosevelt, 13/9/1902: 4-5).

Propping Up America's Reputation as a Rising Power

As alluded to in previous chapters, the US was an emerging power. Officials such as Taft were hoping to make a good impression in front of the world. Officials alluded to that when they expressed concerns about the repercussions of selling the friar lands outright without further negotiations with the friars. There was a fear of possible damage to the US' reputation abroad if officials acting on behalf of the US would disregard the rights friars believe they had (Iyer and Mauer, 2009: 11).

In this context, one has to examine the interest of improving the US' reputation vis-a-vis with several institutions. It how institution facilitates and constrains how interests become salient. One could argue that that relationship is manifested with the institutionalisation of the Catholic Church and Friar Lands. In as much as the US wanted to improve its image by whatever possible means, it felt constrained by the two aforementioned institutions. That is given that the US felt it needed to work with the institutions to attain their interests. In other words, the options available US bureaucrats and politicians to pursue the interest of improving the US' reputation resulted from the institutions.

Electoral Politics: The Catholic Vote

Electoral politics were a factor for efforts to redistribute land. That was manifested in how officials treated the Catholic vote. If Taft were to decide the Commission should seize the friar lands outright without compensation, the US would be facing threats to its diplomatic, legal, and political credibility. Diplomatically, the US would be seen as less trusted by other nations when it would conduct such deals. Legally, given the property rights issue that the US had long upheld, the government could open itself to litigation. Politically, there was a serious chance that Catholic voters which Taft's party appeared to have counted on for electoral support. Taft did not want the US and his party to suffer such consequences. He, for instance, wrote to Roosevelt about their party's losses in Gubernatorial elections in Maine which they thought was a consequence a backlash in the Catholic vote. Moving further down the line, Taft additionally thought that the issue of the friar lands would stir up agitators in the Philippines who think a change of party would mean a change of policy toward the islands. Even if Taft wanted the friars out to resolve the situation once and for all, he feared the consequences of Aguinaldo's camp dealing with the Friars, something that he thought would become likely if the opposition party took over (Taft to Roosevelt, 14/9/1904: 4-5).

The fact that the Catholic vote was an interest, however, implies that it had some importance. In coming elections, officials, in their capacity as politicians, needed to get as many votes as possible. However, the Catholic Church acts as a constraining institution here in the sense that its presence and power requires satisfying the demands of the Church. Hence, the fact that officials felt the need to negotiate with the Catholic Church to sort out the issues surrounding the Friar Lands suggested the institution added challenges to officials.

Limiting the Power of Some Interest Groups

Although Taft wanted to promote business interests in the colony, he too wanted to impose some limits on what these activities should involve. Thus, in relation to land redistribution issues, there was also a fear in Washington that domestic groups who would lobby for retaining the Philippines as a colony would emerge and exploit the colony's potential too much. As a result, the US government placed limits on how much land US-based corporations could own in the islands. Additionally, the prevailing US national banking system did not cover the islands, and the colonial government may not grant mining permits. That was a deviation from other colonies, where other domestic-based firms may own and exploit as much land as they wish (Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 9).

On paper, this would exhibit that the US appeared serious about regulating business interests, but the fact remains that US-based businessmen continued to operate in the islands. Other colonial governments addressed business requests to maintain security in the colony. However, it also does not appear to square with previously established reasons for colonising the Philippines. Such reasons include economic considerations, given that American businesses continued to operate in the Philippines. Moreover, in 1916 and 1935, when politicians passed legislation which provided more autonomy to the Philippines, a contingent of business groups both US- and Philippine-based continued to oppose such measures.

Though there were attempts at land redistribution early on, as at the time the US took possession of the Philippines, the US did not feel the need to engage in serious land reform since officials did not encounter a similar problem back in the mainland (Salamanca, 1984).

As for the pertinent interactions, this interest in regulating businesses was not the sole reason to justify land redistribution techniques. Although there are no explicit references to the other ideas and institutions, one may suggest that this move should be considered in terms of prevailing ideas, particularly the policy of attraction. In particular, land redistribution issues were a reason for why coloniser-colony relationships became difficult to manage, and the idea behind the policy of attraction is to be innovative in disincentivising Filipinos to clamour for independence from the US.

However, as the reality has shown limited follow through as exhibited by the fact that businesses were still relatively unregulated implies how much of a force they were. Although trying to satisfy business interests is indeed an interest in its own right, that interest would need to assume several other forces. First, those business forces are institutionalised not only in the colony but also in the mainland. These would be a testament to the notion that the strength of such forces made it difficult for colonial officials to follow through on the interests of reigning in special groups if these officials were even serious about reigning them in, to begin with. Second, there were ideas associated with free enterprise here. Under such an idea, regulation should be limited. To varying degrees, officials have expressed their commitment to such. It also manifests itself in the policy of attraction. Hence, this idea of free enterprise is an important way to inform the interests of officials to favour business interests.

Economic Growth
In concert with the "civilising mission", growing the colonial economy was one tent officials such as Taft hoped land reform-related policies would pave the way for. Agriculture was considered a priority sector by officials. In his report to the US Senate, Taft (in United States Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1908: 58) mentioned that although he thought mining was an industry that had the potential to develop in the Philippines, the future of the islands would improve through the agricultural resources found therein. Abaca (or hemp) was the Philippines' main agricultural product. Dried coconuts, sugar, and tobacco were also important products for the islands' economy.

Governor-General William Cameron Forbes, who also served as the Commissioner for Commerce in the Islands from 1904 to 1909, had a different view of land restrictions that the 1902 Organic Act placed. Forbes specifically thought that the restrictions on sugar inhibited the development of the local industries and suspected that representatives of the beet sugar industry in the mainland lobbied such restrictions (Forbes to Stimson, 16/10/1911).

As far as the systems to be proposed were concerned, the aims of the US were not so much about promoting social justice as they were about efficient large-scale commercial agriculture (Lande, 2001: 529). The former was a derivate benefit of the latter. In relation, the assessment was that agrarian-related policies were "designed for farmers rather than peasants", the latter of which, comprised the majority of the islands' population (Adas, 1998: 59).

Once again, the interest in promoting economic growth worked hand-in-hand with the idea of the "civilising mission". Economic growth interest concerning the colony, thus, did not develop in a vacuum. As the "civilising mission" was an idea, it had the role of helping officials make sense of their interest in pursuing economic growth to benefit the US.

INSTITUTIONS
Any efforts at land redistribution by Americans were subject to institutions both inside and outside the Philippines. These institutions included pre-existing practices, as well as adherence to norms. In as much as Taft wanted to introduce such reforms, he admitted the challenge to them.

Also, given the interest in promoting economic growth and securing property rights, there was a need to account for who owned what land. As such, the rest of this section also shows the consequences of these institutions.

Respect for Property Rights
Among the most important considerations were the *institutions* of protecting property rights and the established treaties, most notably the Treaty of Paris. In the US, it was of paramount importance that parties to an agreement should demonstrate credibility when it came to their ability to respect the property rights. Some scholars such as Lamoreaux (2014) have suggested that property rights protection worked hand-in-hand as a consequence of suffrage (of white men), which was part of the idea of "American exceptionalism". The Treaty of Paris, on the other hand, also stated specifically that property rights of Spanish entities

would continue to be respected long after the Philippines were to be ceded to the US.

Respecting property rights has also been central to economic growth that Taft hoped to achieve in the Philippines. Scholars such as Coase (1960) and Besley and Ghatak (2010) have argued that insecure property rights have undermined prospects for economic growth. This institution of property rights thus had implications for efforts to advance forms of land reform or redistribution.

The Treaty of Paris, as Putzel points out, also provides credence to the notion that private property rights would generally be an area that US officials felt should not be interfered. On the surface, this suggests a geopolitical motive which Beveridge hinted at in his speech on the Senate Floor. The fact that one of the motives that Beveridge cited was to shore up the export crop market and supply the world's economic needs and that any mention of assisting tenants of disputed lands on the islands was limited, would indeed point to where the priorities of Washington-based politicians were at the time. Even if on paper McKinley wanted to resolve disputes on large tracts of land, the fact that he also wrote in his instructions to respect private property also suggests that disputes should be weighed against such factors. McKinley also reminded Philippine-based officials that as such processes were also widespread in the US, they should make a similar effort in the islands (in Putzel, 1992: 52).

Early attempts at land redistribution were in a state of flux. They have been at odds with the institutionalisation in the US of property rights. In his testimony to the US Senate, War Secretary Elihu Root (US Senate, 23/1/1902: 49) indicated that their predecessors did not encourage private ownership of lands which to him and the US formed the basis of private enterprise. Taft further corroborated that testimony in a hearing on 4 March 1902, where he said that land titles were mostly in a state of "uncertainty" (in Compton, 1902).

The commitment of the officials to property rights was also on display when trying to figure out what to do with tracts of untitled land that they hoped to sell for development. Officials were disturbed or taken at awe by that prospect.

When US officials stepped foot in the Philippines, they found approximately more than 68 million acres of public lands (i.e. those effectively under US possession at the time the US the islands from Spain) and more than 4.9 million acres owned by individuals. Taft thought it was up to Congress to resolve issues that involved public lands. He also recommended the imposition of restrictions on the amount of land individuals and entities were permitted to own so that in principle, no single individual or entity would have a large concentration of land but only after considering the circumstances, especially when it came to cultivating lands with sugar (United States. Philippine Commission, 1905: 49-50). An estimated 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos were squatters for many years on lands they did not own and that the Spanish colonial government imposed a poll tax. It was here where Secretary Root initially proposed to give squatters a chance to acquire land titles to the lands they were squatting on (United States Congress. Senate, 1902: 49).

Upon passage of the Public Lands Act by the Philippine Commission as authorised by the 1902 Philippine Organic Act, individuals were permitted to purchase up to

16 hectares or 40 acres of land while corporations were restricted to purchase up to 1,024 hectares or approximately 2,560 acres. However, the law also stated individuals could rent as much land from the government as they wanted per Public Lands Law. Taft also stated that corporations are also restricted to lease as much as they could own because allowing them to lease more effectively meant authorising them to engage in agricultural activities and control more than 1,024 hectares of land. Taft, however, thought the Commission should permit individuals and corporations to own or rent more than what was allowed then to stimulate investment, especially in the sugar industry (Taft, 15/10/1903: 8-9). What was on Taft's mind in his conversation to Root was his thoughts on how land ownership and lease policies his Commission had passed could have better enticed more investments in the islands.

Taft also communicated to Root that the situation surrounding land title registration in the islands was problematic (ibid: 13). Thus, the problems inherited from the previous era had forced the Commission to allow landowners to obtain complete confirmation to their land title by simply proving they have been in "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of public agricultural lands under a *bona fide* claim of ownership" in most cases. By doing such, these landowners would be presumed to possess land through a grant from the Spanish government. The Commission believed that the public benefit that settling land titles would provide would outweigh the risk of fraudulent claims to titles. For instance, it would become easier for landowners to secure loans from banks and construct improvements to their land (ibid: 18-19). Taft wanted to end the uncertainties and attempt to try to stimulate economic activities and sorting out issues involving land registration would facilitate this.

The fact that property rights is being discussed here implies that it works in partnership with other ideas and interests. One relationship of institutions to interests is that the institutions reflect agents' interests. The institution of property rights also acts a way to express the commitment of officials towards of taking care of free enterprise interest groups, as most notions of free enterprise suggest that an important aspect of it is securing property rights. It is in this way that trust could develop and a sense of a serious commitment to free enterprise is shown. Officials operated based on respecting such institutions. Hence, these institutions were essential considerations in understanding the reasons for introducing the associated legislation.

Catholic Church and Friar Lands

In the context of attempting to enact land redistribution, the respect for the institution of property rights is related to the fears that politicians had with the institution of the Catholic Church. In fact, there were attempts to resolve the Friar Lands to fulfil the US' commitment to respecting property rights. That was especially in light of the vacated Friar lands. In particular, one of the first things that the Second Philippine Commission of 1900 had to resolve was the question of whether friars should resume occupancy of the lands they occupied before the Philippine revolution. The quest to resolve such a dispute was based on the institutionalised thinking of respecting property rights.

The Friar lands, as they were called, were lands that various orders of Spanish priests (e.g. Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, Recolletos) occupied previously. In 1890, the Spanish government conceded that the Catholic Church

and associated entities "to dispose of the holdings and possessions which they have in these [Philippine] provinces in accordance with the canon law and the legislation of the Indies". It came on the heels of the central government in Madrid allowing them to do what they pleased in the lands (Cunningham: 1916: 479-480). These religious orders were driven from their parishes during the Filipino insurrection against Spain but remained the legal owners of the lands they owned in Spain's former colony. Thus, when the Spanish-American War ended, these orders sought to regain possession of the lands they vacated. Tenants, on the other hand, did not want to surrender possession and/or did not want to pay rent. US officials found that the prevalence of multiple interests around these lands would make the law-and-order situation challenging in the Philippines. In Luzon alone, the Philippine Commission found more than 403 thousand acres of land that belonged to the different friars (1904: 43). Such resentment was manifested in the so-called Constitutional Convention convened by General Emilio Aguinaldo where it nationalised the friar lands and placed them under the name of the "Republic of the Philippines". When the US colonisers implement a court system in the Philippines, the friars were entitled to initiate litigation and recover rents from their tenants that have been due since 1896, as well as to evict delinquent tenants (in United States Congress. Senate, 1908: 20).

A 1901 report by the Taft Philippine Commission (United States. War Department, 1901: 24-25) emphasised that this disputed Friar issue needed a resolution, especially in provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, Bulacan, and Bataan. That was especially as the Philippines was no longer under military governance at the time. Officials suggested the possibility of negotiating with various religious at that stage. Furthermore, the transactions could be executed without incurring financial losses. However, the Commission also recommended to their superiors in Washington that they should get the authority to issue bonds to help finance the purchase of such land with the proceeds from the Commission's sale to third parties used to repay the bonds. The report also indicated that if Courts continue to rule in favour of the land's real owners, unrest would break out.

Leasing such lands also became an issue. Taft made an issue about the tenor available to corporations to lease lands. He preferred to reduce the power of corporations over such lands by reducing the amount of time they were legally permitted to lease them on the go rather than restricting the amount of it (or area) that they could hold. (in Committee on Insular Affairs, 4/3/1902: 118).

On the one hand, Taft continued to describe the issue of letting the Friars come back as a "burning political question" in the islands (in United States. War Department, 1901: 24). The Friar lands constituted "thousands of hectares of the best land in the archipelago" (Cunningham, 1916: 465). Taft felt convinced that doing so would undermine peace and order and locals would blame the US government for the rage that he thought should otherwise be directed towards the friars (Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 10-11). Taft also wrote to remind other US officials that Filipinos that sympathised with US' presence in the islands also had grievances against these friars and that they were highly anxious about the next course of action on the matter. At the same time, Taft also acknowledged "a considerable number of Filipino priests" that could show some hostility to US presence because of "fear that the Catholic Church will deem it necessary on the restoration of complete peace to bring back the friars". Ultimately though, Taft concluded that addressing the "enmity among the people" against the US

government was a much larger consideration than the advantages that came with securing the allegiances of priests who thought that they were still under allegiance to the Spanish crown (United States. War Department, 1901: 31). Even when native Filipinos did not question claims to certain lands, the fact that land titles were under the names of Friars made Taft worried about its impact on the peace and order situation in the colony. For instance, he cited agricultural lands owned by three religious orders which were given to various persons and entities to manage (ibid: 32).

On the other hand, even with such initial thoughts about trying to not agitate Filipinos into uprisings, Taft still recognised the Catholic Church's leverage and eventually made decisions based on such recognition. The institutionalised Catholic Church and property rights had been among those that hamstrung efforts to initiate swift reforms and redistribution. Given the provisions in the Treaty of Paris which particularly pertained to property rights, (Iyer and Mauer, 2009: 11) argued that the US violating it in order to solve the Friar lands dispute would lead to problems such as harm to its international reputation, exposure to domestic litigation, and backlash among Catholic voters back in the mainland. The last reason stated was quite similar to the dilemmas faced by the central Spanish government when it tried to reign in abuses by the Friars (cf. Cunningham, 1916). Furthermore, in a letter to Governor-General Luke Wright, Taft said he saw the recommendation of his Commission to exclude all friars as "too radical" and that he believed more could be accomplished by not looking bad in front of them, though Taft still hoped to keep the "four objectionable orders" out of the parishes (Taft, 22/6/1902: 2). Furthermore, given the interest that the US developing into an emerging power, officials also felt that resolving the property rights-related issues associated with the Friar Lands was imperative.

In other words, the issues surrounding Friar lands had potential serious diplomatic, legal, and political consequences for the US government if it did not resolve them carefully. Whether US officials would be able to promote their interests in the colony and sprout their ideas and institute liberal land redistribution in the Philippines depended on how they threaded the institutional constraints and became mindful of their *interests* back home. Similar to the Spanish era, attempts to dispense with land reform was constrained by factors outside the Philippine territory. Even within the Commission, members were mindful of the political atmosphere back in the mainland.

As a result, Taft recommended in the report to offer to the Friars for *hacenderos* (plantation owners) to purchase such from the Friars (in United States. War Department, 1901: 32). He went to the Vatican to commence negotiations to purchase such Friar Lands. Negotiations became contentious as some religious orders demanded compensation for the improvements these orders made.

That situation led Congress to establish a provision for the US Colonial Government in the Philippines to purchase such lands, and if necessary, to issue bonds for that purpose. Moreover, occupants would get priority on who gets the first right to purchase the property (in United States Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1911: vii). The colonial government paid $7,239,000 to the Vatican for about 165,000 hectares of friar lands that would be transferred to the former's name. Such land was later sold to tenants, but a majority of those who purchased the land happened to be estate

owners. Formal withdrawal of the religious orders did not take place all at once to avoid offending the Spanish Crown (Sodusta, 1981: 258; Seekins, 1991).

Ultimately after a prolonged legal dispute, the US Supreme Court ordered the US government to compensate the religious orders $6.9 million for the improvements (Iyer and Maurer, 2009: 11-12).

Although the average value in Luzon was $114 per hectare (1 hectare = 2.5 acres), the government would charge tenants $131 for the same because of the amount the government paid to the Friars. The government offered loans to tenants that had a six-per cent interest for the land itself and a 12-per cent loan for the equipment and other improvements (ibid: 16). Nonetheless, the friar lands were effectively still unaffordable for *kasama* sharecroppers. The *inquilinos* tenants, those who belonged to the landed oligarchy, along with one US-based sugar firm, were the ones to purchase most of the friar lands (Putzel, 1992: 53).

As was mentioned several times throughout this chapter, the fact that officials such as Taft were wary about the institution of the Catholic Church while trying to secure Friar lands for the former's use suggests that this institution had a direct connection with the electoral interests of officials. In the process of securing deals, Taft received a warning about the political consequences for undermining this institution. Hence on this count, the institution constrained Taft's ability to use Friar Lands for other interests which Taft acknowledged. More importantly, however, the institutional strength of the Catholic Church propelled the interests of Catholic voters to the extent that officials such as Taft had to be sensitive to the latter in his dealings.

Property rights revisited: Friar Lands Inquiry

In the process of implementing the reforms of redistributing Friar Lands, politicians suspected corruption. In particular, then-Congressman Martin of Colorado raised such suspected irregularities in the administration of the sale and issuance of leases of Friar Lands in the Philippines.

The issue of alleged friar lands irregularities the is relevant to the broader issue of land redistribution. On the one hand, land reform is about equitable distribution of public lands so that those in the lower classes could get a decent share of the land. On the other hand, it also raises issues of what gets counted as private property, and it also highlights the reality that private property should be respected. Furthermore, it also demonstrates a commitment by some officials to abide by the institution of respecting property rights. One demonstrates such by litigating how to properly account for such rights. In other words, the issue of land reform also evokes a balancing act and an apparent paradox of respecting private property and distributing land among those who earn less, thus demonstrating the tension between this *institution* and the goal of liberal reforms. It also is was one area about the Philippines where Congress was intensively concerned with.

One of the questions of the inquiry was whether the Friar Lands indeed qualified as public lands for which it would be subject to further regulation under the 1902 Organic Law. Even Secretary Root himself did not originally consider friar lands as public lands (US Senate, 1902: 51). The House has concluded that the Organic Law only covered lands considered public at the time of the acquisition and that

laws concerning private property ownership would remain in effect. Crucially, the report stated that the complainant was not able to show which sections of the law established Friar Lands as part of public domain (United States Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1911: xvii). It was also confirmed in the Organic Act itself which states that Friar lands are not ‘‘public lands’ in the sense in which those words are used in the Public Land Act…, and cannot be acquired or leased under the provisions thereof.” (Friar Lands Act, 1904) The complainant, therefore, had no case in this regard.

In general, both the majority and minority reports agreed that there were no irregularities in the transaction involved (New York Tribune, 1911: 9). In particular, Representative Martin’s colleagues on the committee disagreed as they said that such friar lands were not subject to the individual or corporate limit earlier set out. The majority report concluded that the sale to E L Poole was not "injurious to the best interests of the [Philippine] islands". However, the report also recommended enacting pertinent legislation to clearly state whether US citizens may purchase parcels of public agricultural land in the Philippines that are in the name of the United States. The Sugar Trust did not buy the disputed San Jose lands as Horace Havemeyer purchased them on behalf of the American Sugar Refining Company.

One issue that has arisen from this is that the laws themselves permitted the parties to get away with buying large tracts of lands given. As mentioned earlier, the inquiry concluded that the transaction was legally executed.

Based on the given account, enterprising individuals and entities tried to exhaust legal remedies to reduce the amount of land available to less wealthy Filipinos. Despite the unsuccessful attempts to reveal irregularities in the sale, this episode of the American colonial era also uncovers how larger-sized firms or wealthy individuals continued to be at an advantage in terms of ability to own more parcels of land on offer, and how less wealthy Filipinos remained deprived of the same. If the colonial government and Congress were serious in implementing some meaningful land reform, then they would have reminded themselves of the reasons for purchasing these lands in the first place. As mentioned, they wanted to maintain colonial security, and keeping the status of the unoccupied Friar lands would, in their mind, undermine such efforts. Also evident here is a preference to continue protecting private property rights. However, the problem was that most protected properties belonged to those who would otherwise lose out when bold land reform measures would otherwise be implemented.

Pre-American-era Social Relationships and Agricultural Structures

Although there were attempts to liberalise the land situation, officials ultimately ended up working with the elites, which included members of the landed class (Putzel, 1992: 51).

Taft realised the social realities on the ground when he decided how much of his agenda he would pursue. Although he had this idea that could have a consequence of improving conditions for Filipinos, such became subject to social constraints. Thus, he also acknowledged that as much as he wanted to change the social structures dramatically, such would be "impossible" to attain. Thus, he felt resigned to working with the existing social structures (in Burns, 2011).

An example of one such institution was the *kasama* or sharecropping system. Under this institution, the landlord provided the seeds and cash, while the sharecropping tenant had to provide the tools including the work animals. Each party shared half of the profits, although the landlord deducted the expenses incurred from the tenant's share. Similar to what was in existence during the Spanish era, the tenants under the sharecropping system racked up massive debts and created debt peons which their offspring inherited if unpaid before the original tenant's death. There were no written contracts, and the landlords could manipulate the terms to their advantage and the tenants' detriment. Over time, the tenant-cultivators' positions deteriorated due to a rising population and prevalent impersonal relationships between the tenant and landlord where the latter became less concerned for the former's welfare (Seekins, 1991). In other words, tenant-sharecroppers continued to experience adverse conditions, as was the case before the US colonial government attempted to intervene.

The social practice ran deep that officials even admitted frustration in trying to implement their own alternatives. For instance, the colonial government attempted to put up homesteads that resembled those found in the western part of the US. According to Root, he expected that providing for homestead would cover a "very large number of cases" which were small. Initially, Root quoted the proposed Philippine Organic bill which provided a fixed 100 acres per person worth of homestead land with the impression that each person occupying such lands would cultivate and improve such lands. Root also believed that some tenants would have the "intelligence" to cultivate up to 100 acres while others would not (United States Congress. Senate, 1902: 50). It was most prevalent in Central Luzon and the Visayas, especially in areas known for growing rice. However, it ultimately did not significantly change the patterns of landholdings already prevalent (Seekins, 1991). Additionally, the per cent of tenant farmers doubled during the American occupation of the Philippines (Ninkovich, 2001: 65).

Furthermore, the issue of property rights was also associated with another constraining institution in the colony – landed property class. Thus, the attempts to make land redistribution possible involved a tension between two institutions: weakening the institution of the landed classes and upholding the institution of property rights. Although there were advancements, the former institution has constrained officials and held back what could have been.

Salamanca (1984) argued that as much as US officials in the Philippines wanted to dismantle *cacquism*, these officials did not have the know-how to do it as the situation they found in the colony bore no resemblance to what their experiences were back home. Karnow (1989: 198) even went on to say that US officials "coddled" landed oligarchs while neglecting the plight of the peasantry.

Putzel (1992: 51) posits that American officials were aware of the problems of concentration of the land, but decided to ally themselves with the landed elite anyway. In allying themselves with the institutionalised landed elite in the colony, interests have been a paramount consideration. He invoked Senator Alfred Beveridge's speech on the floor of the US Senate where according to Beveridge, the Philippines was acquired partly because of the value of the valleys in Luzon island and well as his view that forests in the Philippines could supply furniture for the rest of the world for about a century. Despite knowledge of the problems, Beveridge thought that promoting the export industry along with propping the

Philippines as a gateway to China was a priority and in order to facilitate that, existing property rights would need to be upheld. The 1898 Treaty of Paris clearly stated that the US would continue to honour existing property rights, including those who owned a large amount of land (ibid: 52).

Given the foregoing, at the heart of the issue of land redistribution is balancing the need for less wealthy individuals to have a secure space to make the parcels of land they are working on as productive as they see fit with that of respecting property rights to those who rightfully own questionable properties. That was especially true in the case of attempts of the US officials reiterating the need to respect property rights. On some level, this may suggest some contradiction since awarding the rights to less wealthy but enterprising tenants does not always involve keeping existing property rights in-tact. It would also mean that in several cases, those who own large tracts of land would have to give up what was perceived by others to be relatively unproductive uses of the same. By protecting property rights of those who already owned land, it comes with a chance that such owners would feel empowered to continue the oppressive measures that they have been doing since they acquired the property in question.

FURTHER INSIGHTS FROM LAND REDISTRIBUTION

US officials have thought of the Philippines partly as a producer of crops the mainland could benefit from. Yet, they were under the notion that to avoid upsetting their prospects at such, they would have to strike an alliance with landowning elites even if on paper, the colonial government would have an obligation to oversee and help resolve challenges brought about by tenants of the lands owned by these local elites. And given that the paper says to try to safeguard peace and order in the colony, one had to see it in the context of the operations of American businesses.

One issue worth considering is whether McKinley would even consider or codify helping the Filipino tenants resolve their disputes if American firms did not operate in the islands. McKinley had a proclamation that would on the surface suggest uplifting the living standards of Filipino people as he thought. He also requested that the islands should be governed not merely for the US' satisfaction but also the Filipinos'. However, it was also apparent to him and his political and business allies that the opportunity to gain economic dividends in the colony existed in some form. Even if McKinley was sincere about his pledge to deliver a government that would satisfy Filipinos and less so the Americans, not all Filipinos had the same standing. Such was exemplified by the situation of land ownership in the colony, which feature a huge concentration of land among a small number of wealthy owners. Through invoking the clause to respect existing private property rights, McKinley, and by extension, the US government, tried in his instructions to not upset the opportunities before him.

Broadly, land redistribution attempts by the US only strengthened the hand of the figures that it was supposed to weaken, and their influence in business matters only grew. For one, as mentioned by Seekins (1991), the majority of those who purchased friar lands from the colonial government were estate owners. For example, sugar *hacenderos* worked with the US-based Sugar Trust to lobby against other US-based sugar growers who wanted the US government to impose a quota on imports of primary commodities originating from the Philippines. The *hacenderos* continued to prosper and help lobby to defeat tariff restrictions. US-

based cattle ranchers were later permitted to exceed public land limitations in the province of Bukidnon for so long as they continued to be in good favour with the province's governor. Agricultural tenancy effectively increased from 16 per cent in 1903 to 54 per cent before the Second World War began. Leasehold tenancy that featured fixed cash rents faced rapid decline, and cash tenants paid extremely high rents to the point that they had to recourse to sharecropping. By 1939, debt peonage, which was a feature of Spanish colonisation, continued through to the American era as interest rates of up to a hundred per cent were offered. Finally, landlords were able to consolidate political power (Putzel, 1992: 54-55). Land ownership also became the basis for political power as one of the criteria for being included in the initial voter franchise was to have one's property valued at P500 or higher and only less than two per cent of the population was able to vote in the 1907 Assembly elections (ibid: 55-6).

The US was at the time a rising hegemon, but the issue of bringing friar lands to the core of land reform in their colony threatened to undermine its status. In addition to diplomatic and geopolitical constraints, the other factor that had somehow stalled further progress on the Friar lands was the potential backlash from Catholic voters back home. That manifests an instance where the US ambitions for the Philippines, even if it politically provides some sense of law-and-order back in the islands, would come at the expense of political rewards in the wider world and back home.

As one could see, there were ambivalent signs toward land reform. As Putzel (1992) reiterates, the large landowners that the laws were supposed to curb were only emboldened.

One observation was that colonial policy actually strengthened the hand of the previous landholding class. Because of tariff policies, native sugar producers competed with their resource-backed US counterparts. It fostered a more exploitative attitude on the milling class towards their wage workers (Guzman, 2015).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter has shown that the interaction of ideas, institutions, and interests have made prospects for land redistribution in the Philippines challenging for colonial officials to approach. The issue of land redistribution highlights especially how institutions make certain interests salient.

When politicians formulated the Organic Act of 1902, Taft continued his call that American investments were necessary for the islands to develop, particularly in the agricultural sector. Part of doing this would have to run through the road of developing the agricultural industry and hence, imply a form of agricultural reform and land redistribution. At the same time, Taft was aware so as not to give control of land, especially agricultural land, in the colony to just a handful of individuals (in Alfonso, 1968: 246). As alluded to earlier, the colonial government had an economic stake in ensuring that officials appropriately carry out some form of land redistribution. Based on Taft's statements, one of the Commission's priorities was to develop the islands' agricultural potential. There was a fear that had parcels of land ended up in the wrong hands, they would not be used productively, and the future of their potential use would be uncertain. Colonial officials were under the impression that providing an alternative for peasants to purchase land would allow

them to utilise the lands purchased as productively as possible. Evidence had historically suggested that larger tracts of lands concentrated in fewer owners tended to have more unutilised spots (e.g. Herring, 1983).

However, land redistribution, even though one argues that it had the objective of taming the institutions that necessitated it and hence provided an alternative to achieve economic liberalisation, it was not done merely for the sake of such. Like other initiatives discussed thus far, there were underlying motives to enact it. It was only a priority to the extent that it aided the broader goal of developing the colony's agricultural sector. In addition to the "civilising" mission which connoted and impressed that Filipino civilisation, as colonial officials saw it was substandard, there were security considerations behind some specific measures. For one, officials were hoping not to agitate the pro-independence crowds. That was something that would be performed if Friar Lands were not for redistribution at some point.

The security interest also cut against effective land redistribution when one considers it with the institution of the landed elites. The government needed the support of pro-US landed elites and incentivised them to help minimise the risk of uncontrollable insurrections. In relation to that, there were property rights considerations, which the US has demonstrated it tried to uphold and work with. That institution also constrained officials from just disregarding the landed elites' roll.

However, the commitment to upholding the practice of the institution of property rights was something officials needed to consider. One should consider it together with the fact that the Treaty of Paris also constrained what the US could do. The Catholic Church was also an institution that administrations in the US and the Philippines did not want to undermine, lest they suffer electorally. It was also seen in light of the interests to prevent an electoral setback with the Catholic vote, which Taft believed was instrumental in the loss of a gubernatorial race in 1904.

When it came to the interactions between ideas, institutions, and interests, based on the foregoing, one could argue that institutions helped keep interests alive. This was seen, for instance, in the interaction between the Catholic Church, property rights, and the Catholic vote. The fact that politicians worried about the Catholic vote implied that the Catholic Church was a powerful institution.

Furthermore, Poteete (2003) also posits that institutions structure interests. It implies that institutions would help dictate what interests to prioritise. The landed elite was an institution that was mentioned several times in this chapter. Although officials claimed that they wanted to grow the economy through land redistribution, the fact was they had to work with the elite. Colonial administrators also tried to secure the Philippines from further insurrections and rebellions. Given such a security objective, they had to work with the institutions already present (i.e. landed elites) and aiming for full land redistribution was to the mind of officials something that would undermine this security objective.

CHAPTER IX: AMERICAN EFFORTS FOR IMPROVING MATERIAL CONDITIONS (1898-1916) III: THE EVOLUTION OF TARIFF POLICIES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter continues looking at the motivations to improve material conditions in the colony. In particular, this chapter analyses how ideas, interests, and institutions can explain the evolution of tariff policies involving the Philippines.

By discussing the politics of trade, this chapter examines the US domestic political situation. This chapter will also gain some insight into selected members of Congress since it was such members who would control the agenda. This chapter argues that although officials and politicians had varying interests in advancing or hindering tariff reform in the colony, one could understand these interests in light of the ideas these officials believed in and the institutions that they had to operate under. Such policies are deeply rooted in desires to improve material conditions in the colony.

Some of the key reforms included the gradual reduction of tobacco and sugar tariffs. It took nearly a decade to remove tariffs on all raw materials from the Philippines bound for the US. As this chapter shows, tobacco and sugar were the last goods politicians granted tariff-free access.

Throughout the chapter, the ideas discussed are the "civilising mission" of the US, in particular, the idea that developing a sense of entrepreneurship is a way to manifest a more civilising society. There will also be an analysis alongside the policy of attraction. This chapter will show that the interests that were involved had to do with economic reconstruction, especially given a difficult Philippine-American war. Another interest that would be involved in Taft's desire to develop the Philippine agricultural sector and secure the colony. The chapter also argues that electoral politics was a key consideration, especially since some parties were campaigning to reduce tariffs for the domestic market. In other words, the third group of interests that this chapter will discuss are the political realities.

Given the electoral situation, the preceding paragraph identified, the chapter argues by extension that the decision by Congress to reduce tariffs was not made merely because of what was necessary to improve conditions in the Philippines. It was a consequence of other interests rooted in certain ideas.

The chapter will proceed as follows. The second section will briefly explain the key ideas, institutions, and interests involved such as the ideas behind the policy of attraction, the civilising mission, and the interests such as the need for economic growth and the electoral realities that changed over the years. After this brief enumeration of ideas, institutions, and interests, a discussion of both the initial economic backdrop that precipitated calls for tariff reduction and the debates behind the gradual abolition of tariffs will follow. It shows how the ideas, interests, and institutions are manifested and places them against a broader context. There will also be questions and challenges posed as to whether the ideas, institutions, and interests could have been free-standing in their ability to serve reasons for the introduction of the relevant policies.

Given that legislation behind tariff policies has evolved and faced opposition for years before receiving approval, and that reasons colonial officials had throughout the process, this chapter feels that a chronological account will best highlight the ideas, institutions, and interests, especially the electoral/party politics involved.

IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE STRUGGLE FOR REDUCING TARIFFS

The reduction of tariffs was rooted in ideas such as Taft's Policy of Attraction and his notion that Economic growth was a civilising measure. Opponents of tariff reduction also invoked their racial beliefs to justify their position.

IDEA: Taft's Policy of attraction

As chapters 6 and 7 have discussed, William Taft's so-called policy of attraction refers to the overarching series of measures that his administration rolled out to discourage Filipinos from breaking away from US' rule. Free trade was thus seen by colonial officials to encourage the Philippines to remain dependent on the US economy, thus quelling calls for outright independence of the islands and further show the "genius of the American System". The measures may seem associated with introducing liberal institutions. However, the paradox was that if the US kept introducing both political and economic liberal establishments, Filipinos would have more incentives to not demand independence. In the process, there would be a "lasting imperial bond" between the Philippines and the US. Trade links were considered an important tenet of this whereby Taft characterised it as "crucial" to forging such bonds. In a speech given to the Harvard College Alumni Association, Taft believed free trade would Filipinos would "understand the benefit that they derive from such association with the US and will prefer to maintain some sort of bond so that they may be within the tariff wall and enjoy the markets, rather than separate themselves and become independent and lose the valuable business" (Moore, 2017: 120-122). Specifically, Taft himself believed that there was a lot to gain by reducing tariffs. On this count, one way to look at this is that by promoting trade, the US would be able to maintain its hold on the Philippines more smoothly (Burns, 2011).

Certain Filipino officials such as Resident Commissioner Manuel Quezon would later raise such a worry about prospects for independence (Ninkovich, 2001).

As has been discussed in previous chapters, one should consider this idea vis-a-vis the security interests that officials had. On the one hand, given the institutionalised racist views that some officials held against non-whites in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have alluded to, one would suggest that officials had limited interest in seeing Filipinos compete against Americans in a capitalist setting. On the other hand, Taft believed that by liberalising economic policies in the colony and promoting free enterprise for Filipinos to acquire jobs, the colony would secure itself better against insurrections. Thus, one could argue that economic principles contained in the idea of the Policy of Attraction reflected the security interests of colonial officials.

IDEA: Economic Growth as a Civilising Measure

As alluded to in the previous chapter and related to the policy of attraction, Taft was adamant about what the US was supposed to do in the Philippines – make

them civilised to the standards that US officials hoped for. It was based on the notions that officials had that Filipinos were to the minds of officials "uncivilised". Economic policies were a way to do this. To Taft's mind, "nothing will civilise them [Filipino people] so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital here" (Taft, 17/10/1900: 3). An important part of this is trade.

Just as with the previous idea discussed, the "civilising" measures should also be considered alongside security interests. When officials thought Filipinos were "uncivilised", it also added worries that Filipinos might undermine colonial security. Hence, officials believed the notion of providing economic opportunities would redirect Filipinos to use their abilities into what these officials considered as more productive means. It suggests that officials also believed that a lack of economic opportunities would cause unrest in the colonies.

Furthermore, this notion of being "uncivilised" also has to be seen in light of the institutions in the Philippines. As mentioned in previous chapters, especially in Chapter 4, there was a basis for officials to pass negative appraisals – the institutions left behind by the Spaniards made it difficult for them to work with. It would also include the state of the colonial economy, and hence the pronouncement by officials that they have to equip Filipinos for employment. Furthermore, to open more opportunities to provide such employment, colonial officials thus lobbied for relevant policies such as the tariff law. Therefore, the institutionalised set-up colonial officials uncovered in the Philippines facilitated the salience of the idea that Filipinos.

Thus, officials opening up trade would improve the colonial economy, which would facilitate the "civilising mission" Taft intended for the Philippines.

IDEA: Racial concerns
In the ensuing tariff debates, there were direct references to racial elements and in particular, white supremacy. More specifically, it consisted of a notion that by letting foreign goods, particular from Asia into the US mainland, it would come with the risk of "degrading white civilisation" (Merleaux, 2012: 30). As chapter 2 has alluded to, ideas are about people putting forward and acting based on their belief systems. Given that Merleaux suggests that people thought at the time that white American culture was at risk of being "degraded", it implied a belief that such a "white" culture is of superior quality and that anything not from a similar region risked undermining this thought. On this basis, there was a desire to not bring Philippine goods into the US market (cf. 44 Congressional Record 2373, 1902).

These racist ideas against non-whites have also been institutionalised in the US for generations.

Such ideas were reflected in the interests of southern legislators who were keen on defeating the bill. These legislators felt that keeping non-white forces in an inferior position when it comes to trade.

INTEREST: Economic Growth in the Colony
As this chapter and previous chapters mentioned several times, colonial officials wanted to promote economic growth, and Taft mentioned that this was to fulfil

the civilising mission and an integral part of his policy of attraction. Furthermore, he alluded to the fact that by liberalising trade policies, this desire by Taft would be gradually satisfied. Taft's allies, such as President Roosevelt would later echo those principles (Moore, 2017).

Some goods were of key interest. Officials posited that the Philippines enjoyed "unique advantages" in producing hemp and "special advantage" in tobacco and "possibly" sugar, the Commission had the opinion that they could withstand a so-called licence tax or low export duty to favour the treasury (United States. Philippine Commission, 1900: 117).

This interest in economic growth in the colony that officials posited is based on ideas such as the glut thesis and common notions of free enterprise that were dominant in the US. Moreover, officials who lobbied for tariff reduction thought economic growth would also benefit their business allies. These officials have subscribed to these ideas and have invoked it in acquiring the Philippines, to begin with. In this way, it is a manifestation that notions of free enterprise (idea) help make sense of officials' desire for economic growth in the colony (interest).

INTEREST: Fiscal Concerns in the Colony

Most of the concerns about free trade within the colony had to do with tariffs as the main source of revenue for the colonial government. Before the US colonised the Philippines, Spanish officials raised revenues by various means internally such as internal taxation, lottery, and other indulgences. However, after the Spaniards' departure, tariffs consisted of up to seven-eights of colonial income (Plehn, 1902: 507). Hence, not all officials in the colony would welcome outright free trade. The talk of reducing tariffs was usually directed at Filipino goods entering the mainland and not the other way around. Given the perception of the Philippines as a weak party in negotiations, nobody was willing to discuss reducing tariffs for Philippine goods entering the US without considering US goods entering the Philippines without tariffs. Other treaties also meant that certain countries (e.g. Spain) would have to grant similar rights as the US to have their goods enter the Philippines. Consequently, it meant that if the US received tariff concessions on certain goods entering the Philippines, the same premise would have to be extended to countries party to the pertinent agreements. This implied tariff reductions could deny the Philippines of a crucial source of revenue (cf. Abelarde, 1947).

In this case, there seems to be more of an interaction between institutions and interests. The institutional norm here was that officials used tariffs to operate the colony. Furthermore, considering the social and economic condition left by the Spaniards over the years, there was a long way to recovery and funds were needed for this. Therefore, as much as there was the idea of free trade, the other side of it was that officials had to assume a governing responsibility. It is in this way where institutions (i.e. previous condition left from Spanish colonisation and the requirements for recovery) constrain the interests of officials to promote free trade. The same institutions likewise made salient the interest to want to raise money.

One can also identify a similar relationship between the said interests and the standing legal agreements such as the Treaty of Paris. Given that the latter contains agreements of extending the same tariff concessions the US would enjoy

to Spain, the colony's fiscal situation may worsen. Thus, these rules (i.e. treaties) constrained colonial officials to focus on the fiscal concerns of the colony.

INTEREST: Colonial Security
Officials did not merely pursue relaxed trade restrictions for the Philippine goods to improve Filipino economic conditions. Based on the previous section which discussed the policy of attraction, as well as previous chapters, Taft identified a security motive, and it stemmed from the idea that promoting business in the islands would ward off calls for independence as well as insurrections (Burns, 2011). On a more practical matter, trade was one way to ensure a sufficient supply of daily goods. Given that the Philippines was ripe ground for insurrections and law-and-order concerns, economic issues previously caused some of them. Hence, officials had a security stake in promoting the economic wellbeing of the colony. (e.g. Constantino, 1975).

As mentioned previously in the first two ideas, this security interests behind a trading regime were reflected in the policy of attraction. The policy of attraction, which contained provisions for improving the colonial economy through trade was a product of security interests.

INTEREST: Electoral and Party Politics
Given that politicians, especially Congressional lawmakers, controlled the decisions on tariffs, one cannot avoid probing whether electoral considerations were at stake. On the one hand, politicians had to appeal to their constituents and lobbyists. Some of those constituents expressed concern with the potential entry of goods from outside their homes. There was a fear of competition both from outside the US and intra-US colonial competition (Abelarde, 1947; Mearleaux, 2012). On the other hand, parties would later capitalise on other economic circumstances to win votes. There was a consumer base of voters that politicians needed appeal to (Democratic Party, 1912). Furthermore, there would be a change in political parties in charge of the US. With that, questions about policy changes in the colony and broader legislation also changed. In other words, as the upcoming sections show, the electoral and party politics were a major interest.

Business and Economic Interests in the US and Economic Ideas
Related to the interest of electoral politics was the interest of business lobbyists. One could find these interests on both sides of the tariff debate. On the one hand, the profitability of some US firms such as the Sugar Trust depended on importing goods from outside the colony (Merleaux, 2012). As such, such firms believed that tariff relief would be useful for their operations.

On the other hand, some groups claimed that the importation of goods was detrimental to their business and would hence cost jobs. It was prevalent among domestic sugar manufacturers and politicians allied with them. In this case, there was the idea of economic protectionism that opponents subscribed to. The coming sections will highlight more specific examples of those who believed their economic position would be undermined, especially when it came to the ability to generate jobs. Given that ideas are understood to be belief or belief systems that actors possess, the interest of protecting jobs was informed and given sense by the idea of protectionism, more specifically that opening up the US economy to foreign (i.e. including those of US colonies) products endangered existing players.

The economic downturns made notions of protectionism more salient (Nivola, 1986; Fordham, 2017).

These would be recurring themes during the congressional hearings and debates. Officials and politicians were hence keen on referring to economic interests in their positions. However, how they characterised what benefitted their interests depended on whether they subscribed to protectionist or free-market ideas.

Institutions of Laws and Interests Governing the Philippine Status
One of the things that precipitated the talk of trying to reduce tariffs in the first place was a Supreme Court ruling that US possessions outside the mainland were not completely part of the US for the trading purposes. That ruling initially constrained the ability of traders based in the Philippines to export their goods as they please. It also constrained the desire of colonial officials. However, there was an option to rectify the issue by changing existing laws (Abelarde, 1947). It was due to this that officials needed to work with Congress to change the law.

The institution here is the Supreme Court's ability to interpret laws. The Court acted to constrain players' options when it came to trading. Given that according to the Court the Philippines was not a part of the US for purposes of implementing international trading rules, officials and their mainland-based business allies could not just export free to the Philippines as much as they wished without appropriate legislation. It meant fewer opportunities for firms to export their goods to profit from opportunities. Thus in light of the Supreme Court's powers, officials felt prompted to resolve the issue of trading barriers through the legislative process if they wanted to satisfy their business allies.

Established Procedures from the Treaty of Paris
As institutions are defined as the rules of the game (North, 1995), institutions that influenced a few opinions, particularly on opposition inside the colony, were the provisions established by the Treaty of Paris. In particular, it was the rules that governed Spain's access to incentives in the Philippines. The treaty protected Spain's right to continue importing goods into the Philippines (Abelarde, 1947). As the colony depended on tariffs to keep it as fiscally sound as possible, officials there faced an additional consideration. As such, it formed the basis of why some officials felt concerned about the interest of improving the colony's fiscal position. In this regard, institutions associated with the Treaty of Paris, whilst constraining, also helped facilitate the drive of colonial officials to find other ways to increase revenues for the colonial budget.

INITIAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES TO WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF TARIFF BILLS

It took nearly a decade to open up the US to raw materials from the Philippines. The aftermath of the Philippine-American war was among the things that prompted William Taft to call for Congress to gradually reduce the tariff burden on goods entering the US from the colony.

Taft's superior, President Theodore Roosevelt, was keen after his re-election to promote a 1905 tariff bill which would also allow the islands to be open for investments. That was consistent with what Roosevelt said in his first address to Congress, which he thought it was in the country's interest to entice businessmen

to enter the Philippines (Roosevelt, 1901). Roosevelt believed tariff reduction would achieve such. Roosevelt thought that the islands needed capital and that one could secure it by amending tariff arrangements or removing other restrictions on investments by US-based individuals or entities. At the same time, it would result in profits for his business allies. One should stress here that Roosevelt wanted to move away from "The Philippines for the Filipinos"-based policy. A proposed Payne bill would allow for up to corporations to acquire 10,000 acres of land in most parts of the islands, and up to 30,000 acres in Mindoro or Mindanao (New York Times, 1905b: 14).

However, the wishes of the Roosevelt administration faced significant opposition along the way, even from some members of Roosevelt's party. Other interests were afraid that liberalising the Philippines may undermine competition with their counterparts in the mainland US and its other possessions.

Philippine Sugar Industry

Sugar was one of the most important commodities the Philippines traded during American times. As at 1902, sugar was grown in large tracts. However, some sugar was also grown in small farms found in Negros island. The "important" aspects of the sugar industry, according to Taft, were also carried out by those who owned large parcels of hacienda land in Negros (United States Congress. House. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 114, 118).

Moreover, from 1899 to 1902, there was no noticeable increase in sugar production across the islands. The local sugar industry had not experienced growth. It was primarily a result of the great depression of 1897, occasional competition by beet sugar in great consumption centres, and years of rebellion against Spain and the US (Abelarde, 1947: 48).

INITIAL STATE OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO PRINCIPLE OF TARIFF REDUCTION

Before initial Roosevelt and Taft called on Congress to reduce tariffs, Congressional support toward the maintenance of the American empire was rather limited. The political imperative to do so was not domestically persistent given the limited number of voters, a hostile or indifferent public back in the mainland, and no patronage positions to give away. As a result, the colonial government had to rely on its measures to help raise needed revenues to maintain the colony. For instance, to lure investments into the Philippines, it permitted US-produced mining and agricultural equipment to enter without paying tariffs while maintaining tariffs for European equipment. There was a concern that the reason for annexing the Philippines could be significantly undermined if capital was short. It would then bolster arguments of Western European colonial powers that the US possessed weak government mechanisms to become part of the Great Powers club. Moreover, free trade was also seen by colonial officials to encourage the Philippines to remain dependent on the US economy, thus quelling calls for outright independence of the islands and further show the "genius of the American System". In a speech given to the Harvard College Alumni Association, Taft thought that with free trade, the islands would be able to "understand the benefit that they derive from such association with the US and will prefer to maintain some sort of bond so that they may be within the tariff wall and enjoy the markets,

rather than separate themselves and become independent and lose the valuable business" (in Moore, 2017: 120-2).

Based on these accounts, Taft may have thought that reducing tariffs due to the US by Philippine-based sugar producers would, in theory, keep money in the islands. First, profit figures of firms doing business would show something more favourable because of money did not go to the US treasury to pay for such tariffs. It would mean a higher base from which to collect taxes to fund colonial expenditures. In other words, Taft believed that free trade would be a rouse to help the Philippines remain under US influence given what he had viewed as free trade's benefits. As mentioned, colonial officials were almost entirely responsible for raising revenues for the islands and received only limited financial aid from the mainland government.

In 1904, Taft said that although he was "willing an anxious to give it [independence] to them" if he let the islands go on their own at that point, it would violate the trust placed in him and the Commission (New York Times, 1904: 6). It also means that Taft believed that giving free trade to the Philippines would be a way to divert Filipinos' attention from what he thought were the harmful effects of premature independence or even self-governance itself. As was previously established, was an ardent believer that the Philippines was not yet fit to be an independent state and continued to harbour that idea. Thus, to some officials, free trade in the form of lower tariffs had an internal political as well as a practical dimension. More importantly, it had an ideational objective to make the Filipinos want to stay under the influence of the US.

The economic idea of Taft also came with a hope that Filipinos would be in a position to one day purchase US goods (Alfonso, 1968: 243). Taft further said in a 1903 speech that his policy on "the Philippines for the Filipinos" was about the "investment of American capital" that would do most for the "elevation and civilisation" of Filipinos (Taft, 17/12/1903: 3-4, 7). By developing Filipino welfare, Taft hoped to nurture a market for US goods. Thus, based on these statements, any economic measure proposed for the Philippines had this as the end goal.

Trade and Tariff Debates before 1913

As alluded to by officials previously, trade was one important way to facilitate the development of the Philippine economy. Congress set tariff legislation that governed trade between the Philippine Islands and the US. In particular, officials hoped that goods from the islands would be able to enter the mainland without incurring tariffs.

Given for instance that as of 1900 the Philippines enjoyed "unique advantages" in producing hemp and "special advantage" in tobacco and "possibly" sugar, the Commission had the opinion that they could withstand a so-called licence tax or low export duty to favour the treasury (United States. Philippine Commission, 1900: 117).

Taft had continuously reiterated his call for a reduction of the tariffs by 75 per cent of the prevailing Dingley rates, the standard set of tariff rates set for trade between the US and most other countries in the early twentieth century. Taft believed reducing tariffs would serve his interests as governor-general. For him, such a reduction would help the provide the islands with more opportunities for

generating internal revenue, and that it would comprise what Senator Culberson would consider as a "level rate" between tariffs imposed on goods originating from the US and the tariff imposed against Filipino goods. Furthermore, a 75-per cent reduction would enable Philippine-based tobacco manufacturers to place their products in US markets and import Connecticut-based wrappers. When asked what a 50-per cent reduction would do, Taft thought it would "probably increase" trade but that it would not "create a revolution in the trade" straight away. He was confident a dump of sugar and tobacco that domestic interests (e.g. lobbyists) feared would not take place once tariffs on Philippine goods entering the mainland decrease. Taft even told the Committee that a sugar manufacturer based in the US who contacted was "willing" to trade at the 50-per cent level and thought that it would not affect his business. Taft further reiterated that as of 1902, the amount of sugar produced in the Philippines amounted to no more than 200 thousand tonnes, which was less than ten per cent of American consumption of sugar back then. He also described that Philippine sugar did "not seem to be regarded as favourable as sugar from other ports" (United States Congress. House. Committee on Insular Affairs, 1902: 111-2; Abelarde, 1947: 45). The last statement had an implication for sugar producers based in the US who feared that they were unable to compete with the quality of sugar imported from the islands. It was Taft who was reassuring Congress and these interest groups that they had nothing much to worry about in terms of quality. Taft further testified that most Philippine-produced raw sugar gets exported to China, India, and Europe to some degree (ibid: 112). To be sure, Taft also used to acknowledge that tariffs imposed by the colonial government may be beneficial for as it was a source of revenue for the colony. Ultimately though, Taft thought sided more with the net benefits of free trade relations, more particularly that it would bring more opportunities for investments in the colony (in Merlaux, 2012: 33).

Based on such circumstances, Congress initially allowed for a reduction in several 1902 bills which put forward.

In support of Taft throughout this series of tariff reduction bills was his party mate, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge said that amendments to the original trade bill would provide Filipino producers with a "very substantial benefit". Specifically, tariffs would fall by approximately 35 per cent of standard rates. It would allow for more money to be made available for public expenditures in the islands (New York Times, 1902c: 2). He and Representative Payne agreed as to the urgent need for legislation after the US Supreme Court ruled that the Dingley Law that governed tariffs did not apply to Philippine goods entering the US. They thought that introducing legislation would fix these issues as well as issues related to applying shipping laws for commerce between the islands and the mainland (Abelarde, 1947: 42).

Senator Edward Carmack partly voiced opposition to tariff bills. In the same way that interests played a role in *promoting* the bill, some interests lobbied *against* its passage. Such interests stressed the perceived consequences to the supply chain back in the mainland. Although the bill provided tariff reductions, Carmack thought the bill was written in such a way to frame the islands as a "deadly menace to our own trade" and also argued that the bill would only benefit those looking to exploit. Senator Albert Beveridge, a staunch supporter of acquiring and retaining the Philippines, rebuked that notion. Beveridge thought Carmack deliberately wanted to portray an image where the Philippine Commission did not carefully

think about the tariff rates. Beveridge further added that the tariff rates were set after "months of consideration and after consulting every interest in the Philippines" (New York Times, 1902b: 3).

Among the sugar groups that lobbied for lower tariffs was the Sugar Trust. Their business depended on importing large quantities of raw sugar from outside the US (Merleaux, 2012: 35).

Some officials believed outright free trade between the Philippines and the US was initially not advisable. In addition to obvious opposition from domestic sugar manufacturing representatives, the Philippines was used to raising most of its internal revenue through tariffs. Then there was also a consideration that trade between the US and the Philippines meant that the same privileges ought to be extended to trade between Spain and the islands based on the Treaty of Paris' Article IV. By extending trading privileges to Spain, the islands may experience a further decrease in revenues since similar goods from Spain would need to enter the Philippines tariff-free. A uniform tariff between the mainland and islands was deemed impractical because of the differences in each party's economic and social conditions trade (Abelarde, 1947: 41-2).

As mentioned previously, there was opposition to the bill based on ideas on what some politicians thought was the place the Philippines, i.e. in terms of race. Southern Senators were worried about racial issues the opening up of trade would spark. For instance, Senator and sugar planter Murphy Foster of Louisiana was worried that importing free sugar from colonies had "precipitated" a conflict between the Anglo-Saxon race in the mainland and the "cooly labour of the Orient and the cheap labour of the tropics" (in Congressional Record, v44, 1909: 2373). Foster and Sen Newlands thought that the sugar tariff and white supremacy as "bases of democracy". Because of that, both of them were able to convince Congress to retain prevailing tariff regimes as provided for in in the Payne-Aldrich Act (Merleaux, 2012: 38).

Opposition to the bill received opposition from members of the president's own party. Some of them advocated a "careful, general reduction" of tariffs while others wanted reciprocity and adjustment but not the abandonment of the prevailing protective system. If the party failed on its mandate to do these, the latter group warned that the opposition would seize on this potential failure (Blum, 1951: 1334-1335). For instance, Senator Patterson of Colorado thought that sugar-related industries in the likes of Colorado, Louisiana, and Michigan would be "wiped out on account of the immense area of the Philippine territory that may be used for the cultivation of sugar" (in Moore, 2017: 123). Thus, the existing opposition to the colonial government's tariff proposals was somewhat bipartisan. Initial attempts to get a tariff bill through to the US Senate died when the 57th session expired (ibid: 123). Also worth noting was that free trade was granted to Puerto Rico and mainland-based agricultural lobbyists became more determined not to grant the Philippines with the same privileges (ibid: 124). That account suggested that there was a first-hand account of what the negative consequences of free trade.

Another attempt at a tariff bill was introduced in Congress in late 1902. The backdrop of this is further economic problems the islands had faced to the point that reducing tariffs was necessary. The islands were also reeling from nearly six

years of warfare, which threatened local industries. The colony also experienced losses of up to ninety per cent of its carabaos and seventy-five per cent of its rice crops and locusts. Based on opinions of the House Ways and Means Chairman and the Philippine Commission, a reduction of tariffs to 25 per cent of the so-called Dingley rates would not affect the US commodity market. The proposal would additionally increase the amount of sugar and tobacco imported into the islands, which would also mean increased revenues for the insular treasury (Abelarde, 1947: 52-3). Even President Roosevelt pushed for further reductions not just as "wise governmental policy" but also as a "measure of humanity". The president also reiterated the US' mandate to help the islands become more prosperous than in the past (ibid: 57). In 1903, a second amendment to the law called for just a fifty, instead of a seventy-five, per cent reduction off the Dingley law for sugar and tobacco imports into the mainland, but the free entry for other products. Lodge indicated that this was a compromise he would take in exchange for not losing the bill altogether. Lodge was also aware of the significance of the sugar industry to his home state, but he continued to push for passage of the tariff act anyway. He reasoned out that amidst the help he was giving farms, he thought that "the greatest charity, the largest humanity, that we can show them is to open the channels for reviving business" (in ibid: 58-9).

When it came to further initiatives to lower tariffs, Senators were facing pressure from corporate *interests*. Corporate influences on Senators in 1905 made prospects for tariff bill passage less promising (Alfonso, 1970: 136).

Representative Sereno Payne noticed a deficit in cotton imports from the mainland and the islands. For instance, imports from the Philippines reached a value of more than $6.3 million at the end of the fiscal year 1905. However, imports from the US was under $765 thousand at the end of the same period. To correct the issues associated with this deficit, Payne introduced another tariff bill. Mr Payne revealed that US cotton manufacturers were excluded from Philippine trade which was primarily caused by European manufacturers using a special loom of twice the width of desired textiles. It was deemed as more economical than what was prevailing in the US, but a "complete loss of the present capital invested in textile machinery" prevented complete adoption among US manufacturers (ibid: 64-6).

Later in 1905, a minority report from the House of Representatives emerged. In it, the minority took issue with how the Philippines was seen as part of US soil for certain purposes but not for others. It wanted an unambiguous and consistent status for the Philippines for all the purposes. Furthermore, it also "welcome[d] the dissatisfaction of the hitherto legislatively-favoured classes, growing out of the competition of the products of Philippine labour with our products." President Roosevelt's Congressional allies were, unfortunately, unable to derail the bill by getting opposition Democrats on their side to shut down debates (Washington Post, 1905: 4).

It was also partly motivated by a desire by Americans to defeat British and foreign exporters in Manila from getting their hands on what they see is a valuable Filipino commodity called hemp (Storey and Lichauco, 1926: 218). Officials requested further reductions in later years, and there were hearings to settle such matters. Proposals to reduce rates faced opposition from members of Congress who represented tobacco- and sugar-growing states such as Michigan then (cf. Ofreneo, 1980). Reyes (1923) argues that members of Congress felt that despite

potential competition producers in their home states would face (which some have argued is minimal given the relatively small appetite among American consumers for Philippine-based commodities), it was morally imperative to rebuild the Philippine economy. American politicians were also concerned about propping up the Philippine sugar industry due to their perception that the Philippine growers were propped up by what they perceived as slavery (Elliott, 1968: 356).

A report by the United States Department of Commerce and Labor (1907: 9) showed that in 1905, the Philippines exported a total of over $33.4 million worth of goods, slightly larger than an import of just over $30 million. This export value was much larger than what the Philippines experienced in the previous fiscal year. Hemp and sugar led Philippine exports at almost $21.76 million and $5.1 million respectively. Hemp has experienced the most rapid growth in of all commodities exported. Before the 1900s, when the US had not yet colonised the Philippines, the export of hemp never exceeded $10 million whereas, in 1900, it exceeded $13 million. However, sugar exports were on a decline as it exported as much as almost $14 million in 1873 (ibid).

In 1905, Taft once again reiterated his call for Congress to reduce the tariff to nothing on all goods produced in the Philippine islands except for sugar and tobacco, which he wished would stay pegged at 25 per cent (New York Times, 1905a: 6). Philippine Governor-General Wright made similar calls in an earlier Philippine Commission report. Specifically, Wright said that Congress should pass legislation that gives the Philippine Commission authority to set tariff rates independently (in United States. Philippine Commission, 1905: 31). Based on that, there were strong sentiments within the islands to clamour to the US to support reducing tariffs since colonial officials were responsible for developing the islands.

Concern for reduction of tariffs started brewing early on just before the 1905 tariff hearings began. For instance, the New England Tobacco Growers' Association wanted their Senator, John Spooner to "bear in mind the interests of the tobacco growers of New England and of other leaf producing districts in the United States" (Hallady, 30/12/1904: 1). The Michigan Sugar Manufacturers' Association also said in its resolution that

> any aid or assistance given to the Philippine Islands by the United States Government or through congressional legislation should provide that the burden imposed thereby should be borne equally by all the industries of this country, and that it is not just or honest to compel any one or two industries to bear the whole burden of the civilisation, education, enlightenment and development of the Philippine Archipelago, for the purpose of fitting its inhabitants for self-government. (Hathaway, 31/12/1904: 3).

Other associations, such as the Merchants' Association of New York, adopted resolutions that favoured the removal of duties of Philippine products entering the US (Mead, 6/1/1905: 1). Although there was no outright opposition from everybody, there was a concern about ensuring that the burden to help the islands was shared commensurately.

During the Congressional inquiry into Philippine Tariffs in 1905, Mr F R Hathaway, a beets sugar producer opposed to tariff bills granting more concessions to Philippine products entering the mainland, testified before the House of

Representatives. Hathaway said as of 1905, the sugar industry in the Philippines entailed a system of "semiservile labour", that nominal wages paid back then stayed fixed at 15 cents per day (worth approximately US$4 in 2018 money), and that the produce in the islands would yield only about a quarter of what would otherwise be produced using the US or European methods already in place in Cuba, Hawaii, or Java. Additionally, the cost to raise and deliver that sugar at tidewater in the Philippines was approximately three-quarters of a cent but with high interest rates. Furthermore, Hathaway indicated that given that the Philippines was not an "integral territory" of the US, that it should not be treated as such for taxation purposes. Doing so would have implications for whether tariffs should be implemented (United States Congress. House. Committee On Ways and Means.: 41).

When Congressman McLeary of Minnesota asked Hathaway about the impact of the bill to lower tariffs on Philippine goods to the US would be, he indicated that it was going to be the "most serious blow you could give us" because of the "ultimate possibilities over there" if one could find ways out of this Brussels convention proposition. He also mentioned that due to low wages, a vast opportunity of improvements in agriculture and milling lay ahead (ibid: 52).

Mr F M Hatch, counsel for the Hawaii Sugar Planters' Association who was also against the tariff bill, also told the House that the amidst the benefits the bill has for the Philippines, would "very seriously impair our industry" and said to the inquiry that "Hawaii is a part of this country, in a sense in which the Philippine Islands never can be." (ibid: 55).

In a testimony to the House, Major Aaron Gove, coming out against the tariff bill, said that the Philippines would be "the greatest menace there was ever held over us" but that it was possible to develop them without contract labour. He indicated based on a report by the Department of Agriculture that 8 million acres of land comprised sugar lands (ibid: 70).

Opposition to the 1905 iteration of the tariff bill was also felt in among members of the American Beet Sugar Association. Its secretary, Truman Palmer, explained the difference in labour costs as a detrimental factor. He maintained that a Filipino labourer received approximately 30 US cents per day, while his/her US counterpart was paid anywhere between $1.50 and $2.50 per day for the same kind of work. Instead, Truman thought Filipinos would be wiser to "devote more time" to producing hemp, coffee, or rubber as he thought that it would benefit them more to do so over the long run (House of Representatives, 1905, in Abelardo, 1970: 79). Palmer here seemed to point out that the low prices of Filipino beat sugar products were attractive to buyers in the mainland. Mr A Bijur, a member of the National Cigar Leaf Tobacco Association, made a similar argument regarding tobacco. According to Mr A Bijur, a large difference existed in tobacco and cigar labour costs between the mainland and the Philippines. Specifically, such labour cost $1.50 per day in the mainland, while only 25 US cents per day in the Philippines (ibid: 81).

Those who made a case for the islands, such as Clarence Edwards of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, thought that between 1895 and 1904, sugar imports from the islands had not "materially increased" and that domestic consumption still far exceeded the ability of Filipino producers to produce (ibid: 83).

Taft reassured representative of the beet sugar industry Charles Warren that his first allegiance was to the US and that he would not push for tariff bills that would ultimately injure US sugar and tobacco industries. However, Taft was adamant that the reduction of tariffs on the said products was not going to do that based on the conditions of the US-based industries back then. Nonetheless, on 18 January 1908, Taft was willing to compromise by limiting the quantity of such products and pushing for a limited tariff reduction than originally sought (in Alfonso, 1970: 140). Taft appeared mindful of the worries of domestic industries. The fact Taft was willing to compromise with the quantity of controversial goods that could be permitted to enter the US without duty was an indication of political pressure his original efforts faced.

Resistance to free trade was also ripe among Filipinos. Manuel Quezon, a resident Philippine commissioner, publicly thought that granting free trade privileges would encourage US interests to seek protection from the US, something that would make prospects for independence "less likely" (Ninkovich, 2001: 65).

1912 Election Campaign and Push for 1913 Underwood Bill

As hopeless as the prospect to reduce the remaining tariffs remained, an electoral interest in reforming tariffs sprouted again in the 1910s. From 1912-1913, the country just experienced a presidential campaign in which the Progressive Party, a party in which then-former President Roosevelt stood as a Presidential candidate in 1912, influenced the ensuing policy. One of the manifesto items put forward included the rising costs of living as a result of tariffs (Progressive Party, 1912). The official opposition Democratic Party also campaigned on a manifesto to reduce tariffs as a way of addressing the rising cost of living back home. In particular, they pointed to tariffs as the "principal cause of the unequal distribution of wealth" (Democratic Party, 1912). It was notably different from what Democrats in Congress previously believed. Despite Taft being one of those who campaigned to liberalise tariffs for US-bound Filipino goods permanently, his party had lost that election, especially as Democrats accused him of policies that were vetoed. With a change in the president's party and electoral promises, there was a change in the policies that administrators pursued.

In 1913, as part of a broader bill to reform tariffs and taxes across the US, Congress proposed a law to allow for more unlimited raw materials from the Philippines to be exported to the US (the provision did not apply to manufactured goods with over 20% worth of raw materials). Reyes (1923) argued that US lawmakers thought this would be sensible for business interests in the mainland to allow Philippine goods with fewer restrictions. Tariffs were ultimately abolished in 1913 with limited opposition (ibid: 114-115).

In the ensuing debates leading to the bill's passage, opposition to tariff reduction came from the tobacco industry lobbyists. For instance, in a letter to Congressman Frank Willis, the Cigar Makers' International Union cited that more than 11,000 workers worked in the tobacco industry and that they feared European and American tobacco trusts would relocate factories in the Philippines. Underwood rebutted that the tobacco industry in the Philippines was "no new industry" (50 Cong. Rec. 1328-1329, 1913). Although lobbyists did not explicitly say it, there was a worry for the over 11,000 jobs that may be lost. When asked by colleagues for why seek a higher quota limit when the islands did not even use

up their allotment completely, Underwood replied that he did not want the US to be the power that forced the other to open their goods to the former's products but to form a market for the latter's products while keeping it closed to such (ibid).

The Underwood Bill was broad-based law, not just something particular to the Philippines. As a consequence, given that it took nearly a decade to remove tariffs, the Philippines appeared to be a derivative beneficiary of such moves. The removal of tariffs on the key goods of sugar and tobacco was due to the broader appetite of politicians (especially Democrats and Progressive Party candidates) to satisfy the electorate by at least claiming to want to bring down the cost of living. The bill's passage was, hence, a move to fulfil a campaign promise.

The successful passage of tariff laws by a new Democratic Congress and its support by a new Democratic President reflect how ideas help agents make sense of their interests. The interest here Democrats' desire to win an election and show its voters that it was fulfilling campaign promises. The idea involved was proposing tariff reductions between the US and Philippines to alleviate the economic troubles in the 1910s. Hence, tariff reduction provided a way for Democratic politicians to realise their interests of winning an election and keeping their promise afterwards.

CONCLUSION: TARIFF STRUGGLE AND THE INTERACTION OF 3Is

One of the important lessons this chapter wishes to convey is that the factors to promote and oppose trade liberalisation are connected. Although there were multiple interests involved in it, ideas became helpful in informing the interests of the key players. Those who proposed tariff reduction felt that the idea of free enterprise would best serve their interests. For example, Taft strongly promoted the idea of introducing enterprise into the colony, and it was compatible with his business interests, which he persistently sought to operate in the Philippines. Meanwhile, those who opposed it felt their interests might be undermined subscribed to more protectionist ideas.

Another way in which tariff reform proposals highlighted the relationships between ideas and interests is Taft's interests in discouraging Filipinos from seeking independence and maintaining order to allow businesses to conduct their affairs. It was a paradox since being self-sufficient with enterprise skills was something associated with steps towards being independent. Nonetheless, Taft hoped that such ideas would make the Filipinos want to stay part of the US to the extent that they did.

The third way that ideas and interests interacted was in electoral politics. The Democrats needed to win an election, and they felt winning and fulfilling campaign promises meant providing economic relief to voters suffering an economic crisis. This included tariff relief.

There were also interactions between institutions and the commonly-cited ideas and interests behind the tariff battle, even though the interactions are indirect. However, to identify the institutions, one will need to consider the laws and rules involved as North (1995) describes institutions to be the "rules of the game". For instance, one such rule deals with the legal system whereby the Supreme Court ruled the Philippines was not a part of the US for international trading purposes. These rules acted as a limit for how officials and their business allies could pursue

their agenda. Similarly, there were legal treaties that governed existing tariff arrangements. Such treaties acted to constrain colonial administrators against pursuing tariff reduction, as the treaties had provisions for reciprocal arrangements, which meant fewer sources of revenue. There were also institutions such as the separation of power. They acted as venues for politicians to get their points across. One could observe this in the Congressional hearings whereby members of Congress would invite allies in the private sector to support their statements.

In this backdrop, the economy would develop much more than in 1902 as far as officials were concerned. Despite the hopes that it would discourage moves towards independence, there was slow but steady evidence that material conditions were headed towards a level that officials could not even consider the thought of keeping the Philippines with the same grip as they have for nearly 15 years (cf. Philippine Commission Reports).

PART IV – LATER POLITICAL LIBERALISATION

CHAPTER X: 3Is AND THE ROAD TO THE 1916 PHILIPPINE AUTONOMY BILL

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the background that informed the process of passing the 1916 Philippine Autonomy Act (the "Jones Law")[23] and some of its key features. This law was known for codifying the commitment of the US to grant the Philippines independence at some point in the future. The Jones Law was a product of the Wilson administration's thinking about what ought to happen in the Islands. Under, Wilson's presidency, moves to prepare the Philippines for eventual independence were underway. He set an ultimate goal of promoting freedom and self-government "for every people" even as he supported whatever system he thought would provide benefits to inhabitants of the Philippines at the time. However, he was not going to promote outright independence as quickly as some members of his party would. Nonetheless, he promised that "every step will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands" (in Clements, 1992: 107).

As will be explained later, this law would amend key provisions of the 1902 Philippine Organic Act, the prevailing law that had made provisions for governing the Philippines, particularly granting more opportunities for Filipinos to get represented in the colonial government. It was effectively tantamount to providing the Philippines with a new constitution that would ultimately last for nearly two decades; the period of which is already beyond the focus on this thesis. However, the language of the law suggested wiggle room for politicians to invoke it to further delay it and not set an absolute fixed date. Passage of such a bill from its earlier iteration took years and faced opposition. The question this chapter is interested in is how Hall's three Is (interests, ideas, and institutions) can be used to explain the evolution of the Jones Law, and in particular, the Wilson administration's role in shaping what it looked like. This chapter will also use such ideas, institutions, and interests to trace opposition to such motives with a view that the bill was not going to have a smooth ride. This chapter tries to look at the interplay within these elements. As it does so, it will outline key elements of the bill that could conceivably be a consequence of such ideas, interests, and institutions.

In order to proceed, this chapter will begin by considering the ideas involved. Among the ideas discussed would be the recurring notion that Filipinos could still not be trusted to manage their affairs and were uncivilised. It would be discussed with a view that significant opposition to outright independence existed on the one hand, and some officials acknowledged improvements in the Philippines, on the other hand. A related idea discussed is whether officials considered Filipinos as "civilised" enough. It would be viewed by discussing the extent of how material conditions have improved in the islands. Furthermore, on the notion of ideas, the

[23] The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 was informally referred to as the Jones Bill or later the Jones Law. The Jones here refers to the author of the bill, Representative William Jones, an fellow party-mate of then-President Wilson.

chapter will look at how officials saw the Philippine mission vis-à-vis upholding the ideals set forth by McKinley and American values in general. It will look at how politicians used race as a basis for including some provisions in the bill, including provisions on citizenship.

When it comes to interests, the section will discuss the threat of Japan and how both proponents and opponents of the Jones bill used it to promote their arguments. The chapter will include how some Filipinos felt the need to justify their side by using the Japanese situation. The chapter also discusses how the prospect of the First World War reopened considerations for the certain economic provisions to be in the bill. Third, the section discusses the electoral considerations that warrant consideration. The section then turns finally to other economic interests that have informed the debate.

The section of institutions will primarily discuss whether the political institutions introduced by the Wilson administration's Republican predecessors still served their original purpose. As will be seen in that section, there were questions officials had about whether the existing structures perpetuated the behaviour they sought to avoid.

IDEAS

Democratic Party's Anti-Imperialist Manifesto

Momentum for the Jones Law coincided with a change in party control in Washington. Wilson was the first Democratic President since the US acquired the Philippines. It also marked the first time the Democratic Party had controlled both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government at the same time since the US acquired the Philippines. Changes to certain policy areas accompanied this change in who the party-in-charge of different branches of government were. Although Wilson himself held ambivalent positions over the years about the Philippines, he was nonetheless representing a party that had been against colonisation. Just as with the 1908 manifesto, the party's 1912 manifesto specifically stated it was "against a policy of imperialism and colonial exploitation in the Philippines or elsewhere". Moreover, the party favoured "an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognise the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established" (Democratic Party, 1912).

Prominent pro-independence Filipinos shared such a perception of the new administration. For instance, in a letter to incoming Secretary of State and former Democratic Party Standard Bearer William Jennings Bryan dated 15 November 1912, Emilio Aguinaldo regarded Wilson's Democratic Party as the "standard bearer of justice, equality, and liberty" as he hoped for the move for independence to enjoy widespread support among that party (in Link, 1978a: 10). Bryan replied on 2 January 1913 by assuring Aguinaldo that his party preferred "democratic methods" of governing (ibid).

To be clear, not all of this was a product of moral or altruistic considerations. Some members of Wilson's parties had other considerations for why the Philippines must be given its independence or even not be part of the US in the first place. Some of this was even rooted in the party's 1900 manifesto whereby

it condemned the war the Republican-led administration waged in their then-newly-acquired territory. It also stated that "Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilisation; they cannot be subjects without imperilling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilisation nor to convert the Republic into an empire" (Democratic Party, 1900). That provoked the image among some in Democratic Party circles that Filipinos were undesirable as citizens. Brands (1992: vi) also argues that the Democrats were opposed to colonisation mainly because it "contradicted American ideals and prevented the natural development of Filipino society". Nonetheless, it was a sign that some members of Wilson's party were not looking forward to considering Filipinos to have the same rights as Americans.

Filipinos still cannot be trusted to run their affairs?

One of the most commonly cited reasons that the Filipinos became subject to US rule in the first place was the notion that they still could not be trusted to govern themselves. As at the 1910s, this view was held consistently by the likes of Taft, the first Governor-General and later War Secretary and US President. It was also a publicly-held view, as demonstrated by the editorial board of certain newspapers that politicians read.

Just like other officials and politicians, Wilson previously had a notion of Filipinos before becoming president. The fact that he previously used language such as "order and self-control" implied that before he assumed the presidency, he subscribed to the idea that Filipinos lacked these characteristics. It had driven his policy prescriptions (in his capacity as an academic) toward the Philippines. This idea of instilling such order and self-control also explains Wilson not initially fixated on forming a democratic government in the islands despite him invoking the US being a "democratic country". Despite the language used in the US Constitution, the idea of their "civilising mission" continued to prevail as seen by the drive of some US officials who wanted to hold off giving the Islands more devolved powers. They were left with the idea that Filipino officials had a greater tendency to preside over corrupt governments. Officials were still under the impression that a government under Filipino hands tantamounted to chaos, and such a prospect scared those who profited from the occupation. This impression is consistent with former War Secretary Elihu Root's characterisation of Filipinos in which the absence of "self-restraint" and "self-control" with corruption and personality-based politics. Under Root's standards of what passes for a desirable government, popular self-government implied and assumed "organised self-control" (Go, 2008: 43). Hence one of the things running through the minds of the politicians in deciding the fate and future make-up of the Islands was their idea of Filipinos acting more like the West. If they were to codify more self-governance, it implied that they reached a point that they became convinced Filipinos were capable of behaving in the manner officials desired. Notwithstanding the presence of corruption back at home, officials associated the so-called corruption and other acts of political malpractice they saw in Filipinos as a disqualifying for prospects of self-governance.

Henry Jones Ford was sent by President Wilson to the Philippines to assess the condition of the Islands vis-à-vis self-governance. As of 28 August 1913, Ford

wrote that based on his findings, Americans who lived in the Islands remained convinced of the Filipinos' incapacity of being able to govern themselves. Some reasons for such was that they did not have a single common language and that there was prevailing rivalry among different tribes. They also expressed concern over the prevalence of what they thought of as caciquism. Ford downplayed the problem of *caciquism*, saying that these are common in most other predominant agricultural societies. He believed that *caciquism* was "not incompatible with constitutional government" and that it did not serve as a hindrance towards democratic forms of governance. In terms of economics and commerce, Ford observed a strong sense of commercial spirit in the Philippines' inhabitants, which he then thought would bolster public order in the Islands (Link, 1978b: 243-244). Ford downplayed what others thought of as the peculiarities of the Philippine system of *caciquism* by saying that it was normal elsewhere to have relationships based on such a system emerge.

As such, those who advocated against devolving more power to Filipinos were afraid that the progress made with Americans who had sincere intentions in the islands could be gone. Opposition Congressmen like Clarence Miller and Charles Elliott believed that in devolving more power to Filipinos meant that "inefficient and even dishonest native politicians" would take over (Kramer, 2006: 358-9). That was just one account that shows sentiments of distrust among some US politicians that Filipino politicians running their affairs would undermine the US' stake in the islands still loomed as measures to devolve power from the former to the latter were ongoing.

The experience during the Spanish colonial era of Filipinos occupying positions of power and facilitating the hardship of their people have added credibility to this impression some politicians had. In retrospect, observers have argued that not much has changed in terms of the inner workings of how Filipinos have practised political power (e.g. Karnow, 1989: 228). The political peculiarities that officials observed from Filipinos since the occupation began remained for much of their rule. The fact that thresholds for literacy were part of the independence conversation implied that US officials thought that a lack of education was one of the things that caused Filipinos to behave in a way that US officials thought was undesirable and undermining of US interests. In the first place, politicians were adamant about sticking to the so-called civilising mission and that abandoning it would be seen as a major failure.

In relation to the drive by the new administration to promote further home rule, former colonial officials belonging to the opposition party such as Taft had criticisms for Woodrow Wilson's appointments to the Philippines. Taft called the "wholesale removal of important, able, and experienced" US officials in the colony by then Governor-General Harrison "so distressing". Taft also thought that the eventual passage of the Jones bill would 'make the work of deterioration complete'. He was adamant that Filipinos were not yet ready for self-government of the level sought by his Democratic counterparts and that it would take "two generations" (New York Times, 1915: 4).

Even as Taft publicly approached the issue of Filipino self-governance cautiously, Garrison cited before the Senate what Taft said about the aims of Americans in

the Islands. Specifically, that Americans "endeavour to secure for Filipinos economic independence and to fit them for complete self-government, with the power to decide eventually, according to their own largest good, whether such self-government shall be accompanied by independence" (In United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 639). In any case, Taft testified in the Senate that he was against self-governance per se, but the problem he thought was that Filipinos were not in a position to determine what was appropriate for them. He also admitted that notions of superiority factored into his thought process (ibid: 388). Taft further warned that further moves for self-governance back then was that it would unleash bloody forms of politics early on. Taft cited the situation in Mexico where the losing politician "gives his head for a forfeit" and that the same was bound to take place in the Islands especially with what he knew about Aguinaldo. Taft feared that feuds among political groups would break out in the Islands (ibid: 372-3).

Some rationalised the perception of Filipinos not being ready with why McKinley came to conquer the Philippines in the first place. The New York Times (1916a: 10) editorial board was also wary of granting the Filipinos more powers. It felt that based on its reports, the locals were not yet ready to govern themselves "in four years or in six" and perhaps needed "another half century" of development. The Times wrote further that Congress would be "advertising to stronger nations" that the islands would be "ready for occupancy" by some other power "within a specified period". One should also keep this in light of President McKinley's original options for the islands, one of which was to turn the Philippines over to a dominant European power back then, but that McKinley declined it to not revive the advantages such European powers once had.

Among the outstanding contentious issues was that of the Moro rebels in the Southern Philippines. Republican Senators struggled to extract from Garrison what his plan was for this group which insular officials found troublesome so that they could be represented and receive the same treatment as the Christian-based population. For instance, when asked by Senator Crawford if there should be a clause to leave out Moros from provisions of self-government reserved for the rest of the population, Garrison said that it was done in the past, but that the outcome was deemed "embarrassing" that he did not want Congress to make the same mistake (In United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 650-655).

The question on the idea of whether Filipinos could govern themselves was manifested in the issue of expanding the voting franchise. In addition to logistical concerns brought up by officials, a more important reason to not expand it further was the notion that they were afraid Filipinos would not be smart enough to choose the appropriate leaders. The Chairman of the Committee also stated that one of the bill's aims or intentions should be to broaden the educational qualifications to join the voting franchise. Based on actual figures from the 1912 Assembly elections, 81,916 voters qualified through education alone while less than 61 thousand qualified through property alone (ibid: 185-187). Dean Worcester, a Philippine Commissioner, testified that out of the approximately 250,000 voters, many of them did "not exercise much intelligence" in voting. He was answering

this in the context that elections would no longer occur should the Philippines be set free. The Senate Committee on the Philippines asked General McIntyre about language requirements of voting. McIntyre replied that the requirement to communicate in English and Spanish were retained because eligible male voters did not "have the advantages of our schools", acknowledging that they were not yet fully-educated in US institutions enough to know the English language (ibid: 61-3). Senators also asked the Secretary to the Philippines, Sam Ferguson, about the voting franchise in the context of whether the people in the islands were governed only by the approximately 250 thousand people who exercised their right to vote in the 1912 Assembly elections. Ferguson replied that it would be a "government by the leaders to a greater extent than we have in the United States", or "the educated class". Ferguson, when further asked about by Senator Lippitt (who wanted the franchise expanded) who would exercise power if governance was to be turned over to the Philippines, replied that the Filipino Legislature would "extend the provision of this bill to those who could read or write in a dialect". The Chairman of the Committee also stated that one of the bill's aims or intentions should be to broaden the educational qualifications to join the voting franchise (ibid: 309). It was then a feature of the final version of the Jones Law.

However, there were signs of progress in terms of the ability of Filipinos to manage their affairs. In a further cable relayed by Secretary Garrison to Tumulty, Wilson's private secretary (dated 19 October 1915), then Governor-General Harrison was convinced that Filipinos have proven that they manifested self-control and patience in promises the US administration had given them (in Link, 1978c: 86). Furthermore, in a letter to Manuel Quezon dated 12 March 1915, Wilson expressed his admiration "for the self-respecting behaviour of the people of the Philippines" (Wilson, 12/3/1915). In this light, there was a prevailing view that as far as Wilson's appointees were concerned, Filipinos were ready. Such was a contrast to the previous administration's views.

To be sure, Harrison's moves of Filipinisation did not initially produce the results that officials had hoped for. For one, Filipiniastion oversaw the hiring of Filipinos who had abilities that were deemed as corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and dishonest. Harrison was unable to sufficiently control the problems Filipino officials caused (Onorato, 1967: 99-103). On this count, Filipinos have not sufficiently proven wrong and have, based on this account, added credence to the basis of the ideas of sceptical Americans who wanted to withhold more self-governance to the Philippines. Such actions have helped convinced opponents of independence that their material interests faced a greater threat if the Filipinos headed more government agencies.

Furthermore, according to Harrison, in a letter to Tumulty "Filipinisation" ultimately made government more efficient as he felt convinced he was able to better secure the ability of the local people and officials to cooperate and administer such laws promulgated there (Harrison to Tumulty, 31/8/1915: 37855).

Mostly Improved Material conditions: "Civilised Standards?"
Another one of the reasons that US officials have cited for why they took on the Philippines, to begin with, was that they thought it was not civilised enough to their standards. It meant that material conditions in the islands were not of a "civilised" standard when they first took possession of the islands. As far as these officials were concerned, being civilised also included the notion that it was not ready for business and not educated enough.

However, in the 1910s, officials have often cited that material conditions in the islands have improved to warrant consideration for further devolution in the Philippines. The fact that lawmakers sponsored devolution-related bills in 1914 may indicate the progress that Filipinos have exhibited. It then prompted questions such as how that progress looked like and if the Philippines' existing constitution (Organic Act) was going to inhibit the ultimate plans that US officials had for the islands. This rest of this subsection compares conditions in 1902, the time when the first organic act was adopted and 1914, which was the year in which measures to provide governance was put forward in Congress.

In 1913, the total value of taxable business activity in the islands amounted to ₱671,685,704. By comparison, this just amounted to just over ₱380 million in 1909 (Philippines. Governor, 1914: 8). There are no comparable statistics available in 1902. Nonetheless, the Philippine Commission report has pointed to a steady increase in such activity over the years.

When it came to customs (tariff) collections, the primary source of income for the islands, collections totalled total of $8,246,025 (approximately ₱16.4 million) was collected as of 1913. That, however, marked a slight decrease from $8,525,216.48 (approximately ₱17 million) collected in 1902. It is important to note that within this period, tariff bills were passed in the US to allow free entry of goods from the US to the Philippines. In the fiscal year ending 1913, the colonial government collected a combined subtotal of more than ₱25 million from internal revenues, customs duties, taxes and fees from the City of Manila, and miscellaneous fees alone; this was higher compared to the end of the 1902 fiscal year - $10,516,751.44 (approximately ₱21 million) (United States. War Department: 762, 831; Philippines. Governor, 1914: 222, 231).

Exports from the islands reached $53,683,326 (approximately ₱107 million) in 1913. By comparison, the value of exports was $20,509,404 (approximately ₱41 million) in 1902. Specifically, the total trade between the US and Philippines was valued at ₱91,235,034 in 1913 compared to approximately ₱18 million in 1902. Exports from the Philippines to the US were valued at just over ₱10 million in 1902, but it rose to almost ₱40 million in 1913 (United States. War Department: 849-850 Philippines. Governor, 1914: 8, 228-230).

As for education, an average of almost 288,000 pupils had attended school as of 1913. Notwithstanding the decrease from the previous year, this was still up from when the US took over the colony. Administrators have reported 'steady and encouraging' educational progress other than the fact that a slight decrease in pupil enrolment was reported. For instance, 1,032 standard school sites were

built, of which 592 were classified as "permanent" (Philippines. Governor, 1914: 24-5, 243).

So that officials in Washington can get a first-hand view of conditions on the ground, President Wilson sent Henry Jones Ford (1914) was sent by President Wilson to the Philippines to assess its conditions. However, amidst these improvements, Ford still found some issues when it came to education. In particular, he identified difficulties when it came to improving the literacy level of most inhabitants from their local dialects into more national vernaculars of English or Spanish. Ford nonetheless thought that it was an unnecessary burden that the islands' inhabitants learn English in order to be deemed literate. As such, he recommended that the voting franchise be extended to men literate in any local dialect.

Avid imperialists such as Taft even conceded such material improvements. In front of the US Senate on 2 January 1915, Taft conceded that that economic conditions in the Philippines made prospects for self-government there brighter than in Cuba. Specifically, he thought that the insular economy was riper than Cuba for allowing what he thought of as an "intelligent" middle-class to flourish (United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Philippines, 2015: 385). Part of the aims of the US was to enhance the Islands' economic fortunes. Taft had seen that more industries that depended on a so-called "intelligent middle class" were thriving. Taft was, however, not enthusiastic about enshrining in law a commitment that Filipinos be permitted to more provisions of self-government than what already existed at the time. However, Taft had a parallel thought that faintly resembled Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) regarding the role of a growing middle-class on self-determination, especially given that their counterparts in the Philippines had become more educated than before the US assumed sovereignty.

If one were to believe US officials at face value, the law's authors desired to balance what politicians claimed was the goal of governance of Philippine self-rule and the maintenance of their sovereign rights over the Islands. A concrete manifestation of more powers given to Filipinos was the election of a fully-elected bicameral legislature. Under the previous constitution, only the lower house, or Philippine Assembly, was guaranteed to become an all-Filipino chamber. Eligibility to vote also extended to men who could "read and write either Spanish, English, or a native language" (1916 Philippine Autonomy Act, Section 15(b)). Previously, when it came to who qualified for the voting franchise through literacy qualifications, it was only extended to those who could read and write in either Spanish or English. The fact that this was included serves as a recognition that US officials were growing more confident of the abilities of Filipino men to become literate enough to vote. The fact that this franchise was extended was also a signal that politicians in the US, which decided the Philippines' constitutional structure, were giving more Filipinos a greater voice on how to govern their territory. The Islands' legislature had more powers compared to its previous iteration when it came to raising funds and allocating them to internal priorities.

Based on these developments, notwithstanding isolated statistics, there were considerable material improvements for more than a decade. Nonetheless, there were areas in which much work remained.

Upholding American Ideals

Wilson's thoughts about retaining the Philippines has gone back and forth throughout his public career. Nonetheless, he viewed the Philippines vis-a-vis the US' broader mission in the Western Pacific. In it, he indicated a need to be "opened and transformed" and be aligned with the West's way of living. Wilson, just like McKinley and Roosevelt, was convinced that the democratic nature of the US made it suited to take up the task of aligning the East's standards with the West. In the Spanish-American War, he observed that there was a lack of progress when it came to Filipinos getting a democratic form of government. As such, Wilson felt it was incumbent for his country to aid the political education of Filipinos in the same manner that England had done so to its colonies in the Americas. As Wilson observed that Filipinos revolted, he felt that they needed to cure what he thought of was ignorance on their part before the Philippines could be given a democratic form of government (Ambrosius, 1987: 10). He used terms such as teaching Filipinos "order and self-control". It did not necessarily mean that Wilson had initially been in favour of instituting democratic government for Filipinos but rather a government based on what he thought was "justice and enlightenment" where certain guarantees deemed effective vary on a case-by-case basis (Wilson, 1901). As for his views on American imperialism, he further justified it by arguing that when domestic frontiers for trade have been closed-off, an international frontier had to be created (Mulder, 1978: 231).

During the 1912 presidential election campaign, Wilson (1912: 31) pronounced that it was Americans' duty, as trustees, to institute a governing arrangement that was "most serviceable to' the inhabitants' 'freedom and development'". That was in line with his party's long-standing manifesto first promoted by its former Presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan whereby the party renounced imperialism and exploitation in the Islands (Curry, 1957: 67).

For some officials, *legitimacy* was key to discharging their duties. It meant that such officials believed they needed to promote the values they claim to stand for to the degree that they could. Thus, Americans needed to devolve power to the Filipinos to the degree they had to increase such. By not passing further moves to devolve governance to Filipinos for 19 years, there is an implication that whatever the US did to appear as a more legitimate force to Filipinos have worked better while at the same time, allowing officials to continue their work in the Islands and allow political interests to cash in on.

Racial animus

Given the ideas among some that Filipinos were not fit to manage their affairs, some politicians used it to support moves towards independence. Politicians introduced a racial element into the campaign to eventually allow Filipinos to govern themselves (Kramer, 2006: 355). Kramer thought the bill would facilitate the creation of a policy that would "exclude" what Sen Clarke of Arkansas called the "Asiatics". Clarke introduced an amendment (hereto referred to as the Clarke Amendment) to recognise the Philippines as an independent state and for the US to withdraw within two years of the bill's passage. Clarke also took into consideration the possible racial animus that would brew among Asian nations, particularly Japan if the US would not withdraw from the islands (in Curry, 1954:

446). In other words, by making the Philippines an independent state, it would contribute to US officials crafting a coherent policy that would keep what they saw as Asians out of US soil. That implies that American officials found it difficult to justify excluding Japanese from their country but not Filipinos, who based on their accounts, were closer in terms of race to the Japanese than to the US. Additionally, if ever the Japanese were to invade, officials also found it made better sense for them (Japanese) to keep the Philippines once captured than the US take possession of it (ibid). Some lawmakers contended that eventual retention was tantamount to the US becoming involved in what was called "the dangerous maelstrom of Oriental politics" (in Congressional Record 51, 1914: 15834).

INTERESTS

Material interests were also present in pressuring US leaders who wanted to manifest the independence promised to Filipinos. It did not necessarily contradict accounts of US officials treating the Philippines with understanding. They needed to appease its inhabitants to the extent that they did as a practical means to facilitate their interests. A complaint at the beginning that businessmen had was that the Islands lacked law-and-order, which created uncertainty.

Threat of Japan

Those who favoured and opposed further devolution of powers to the insular government cited the threat of Japan as a reason for their position.

Given that the Philippines was a territory for the US, there was a fear among officials favouring more devolution that the Philippines could act as a backdoor for Japan to undermine US power. As a later section describes, defence systems of the Philippines were seen as weak, and if Japan were to exploit this, it would be tantamount to entering the US and attacking them therein.

The serious possibility of granting the Philippines independence had considerable roots in the middle of the Roosevelt presidency where Roosevelt was also worried about Japan's rising power in the region. The field commanders assessed that the Islands were an "extremely desirable possession" for the Japanese, which can use it as an outlet for the rising power's surplus population. In addition, the assessment also cited that Japan had some use for the Philippines as a strategic point for which to be able to "command the coast of China" (in Daniels, 1963: 55).

As deliberations for the bills loomed, the Japanese factor was still a significant consideration for some politicians. Democratic politicians felt that although Filipinos would ultimately become capable, the looming threat of a Japanese invasion was an import factor. They believed that the US was not in a position to defend the Philippines in such an event. Even a Republican lawmaker, Albert Fall, characterised the Philippines as a "weak point in the line of our defence" (in Kramer, 2006: 122). This notion was backed up by military officials such as Bradley Fiske, who said that the US was only in a position to send its fleet to Japan and sever trade links but not to a full extent with the northwest trade links still able to continue. Fiske also warned not to underestimate the Japanese people's ability to live frugally to ward off whatever trade sanctions the US could impose whereas the US would be at higher risk for costly sea-related perils (in Daniels,

1963: 56). On 16 May 1913, Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels conceded that US forces "could not prevent" Japan's navy from acquiring the Philippines if it wanted to (ibid: 65).

The situation in Japan also generated significant initial opposition to the Jones Bill and outright independence at that point. Just as those who supported the bill were worried that the US was at that point not in a position to defend the Philippines against Japanese invasion, those who opposed it thought that by providing Japan with an opportunity to seize the Philippines would undermine the US' ability to take command of the western Pacific (Curry, 1954: 443). As officials thought the US acquired the Philippines for its value to the US-China trade, the Philippines was nonetheless vulnerable to falling to Japanese rule (Ford, 1914).

Such sentiments were shared by those who planned to vote against the bill. Congressman Fees felt as if the proponents of more self-rule were trying to pull a fast one as he characterised the assessment of war as an "expedient" manner or an excuse to merely pass the Jones Bill (Curry, 1957: 84). Some of the president's allies also thought that Japan would be happy to seize the Philippines from the US if both nations were to become enemies. Furthermore, Senator John Williams of Mississippi charged that Japan would better perform guardianship over the islands. He also said that both Japanese and Filipinos would understand each other than the Americans do of the Philippines. Therefore, given these stakes, he thought that the burdens of defending the Philippines outweighed the benefits (New York Times, 1916b: 2). Based on these accounts, it seemed to be a given that an invasion from a third power would be inevitable if the Philippines was allowed to govern itself, but a disagreement emerged about whether it was a desirable outcome to see what could be the US' Asian possession end up in someone else's purview. In summary, proponents thought that attacking the Philippines under US rule was the gateway to undermining US military prowess whereas opponents thought the same would be likelier to occur if the Islands were no longer part of the US.

Reasons involving the Japanese threat were also cited by key Filipino officials when they lobbied measures short of independence. Although Quezon was publicly advocating for Philippine independence, he was privately very wary of granting independence outright. For the same reason that US officials thought that Japanese forces were waiting in the wings for the US to withdraw, Quezon expressed concerns about independence by citing the Japanese situation. He was worried about what Japanese power could do to influence the islands. Quezon also confided to Frank McIntyre that Americans expressed concern to him of their interests getting undermined with early independence. Quezon said this is as most Filipinos thought that being given independence would hinder Japan's hopes and dreams. He instead wanted the bill to dictate the relationships between the mainland and the islands for a period covering at least 25 years. However, Quezon was nonetheless in favour of the elected Senate and a veto threshold in that chamber (Curry, 1957: 79).

Quezon also worried about how to face the lower classes himself without US support (Ninkovich, 2001: 76). It is also noteworthy to consider these things in perspective where the US was an emerging imperial power. Given that in 1898,

McKinley did not want to give an upper hand to its European imperial rivals, allowing another power to take over the Philippines would have undermined what McKinley sought to avoid. Nonetheless, one key debate was whether keeping the Philippines or letting it go free was consistent with what they hoped to achieve in the islands.

Ford also expressed his concern that the existing set-up of governance was ill-suited for the Philippines in that it would perpetuate the bad habits associated with factionalism rather than facilitate good governance. Ford proposed to repeal the Organic Act, and the Philippines be instead placed directly under the control of the White House who could decide to establish a legislature controlled by the Islands' native inhabitants. Ford believed instead that his proposed set-up could discourage Filipinos from rebelling since he thought they would have what they need and thus become more militarily self-sufficient to defend themselves against the Japanese threat (ibid).

First World War and need for a More Devolved Legislature

In addition to the Japanese threat, the First World War was seen as a geopolitical factor in introducing the Jones bill in Congress. In particular, the bill's provisions on giving the Philippines more autonomous trade policies was looming large on the minds of its promoters. As previously mentioned, the previous insular constitution did not permit the insular government to set the Islands' own trade policy and that in the event of any disruption, Congress would have to grant relief (Curry, 1957: 84). Representative Jones, together with Quezon, argued that passage of the bill warranted consideration since that war was said to disrupt trade involving the Islands. Trade disruption would mean that Congress would need to intervene often to give the Islands an aid package to help recovery. The US' involvement in wars similar to the one described meant that their economic interests in the Philippines were under threat. The fact that Congress was setting laws also implied that the economic interests of the federal government were more likely to be undermined if they would stick to the existing legal arrangement for the Islands since the Islands could not move to alter its trade strategies without Congressional authorisation. It would thus impose unnecessary and onerous costs to the US mainland.

Given the practicalities that can be stymied as a consequence of war, it implied that it was necessary to have a more devolved legislature than the one that prevailing laws provide. The would-be Jones law would contain changes towards what the Philippine legislative structure would look like. Before the Jones Law was approved, the Philippine Assembly was the only elected all-Filipino chamber in the Insular government. However, Garrison in a letter to President Wilson dated 13 June 1913 alluded to the suggestion by Episcopal Bishop Brent that the Philippines be given a Senate. It was in contrast to what Garrison hoped to do, which was to simply give Filipinos a majority in the already existing Philippine Commission (Link, 1978a: 516). In the floor of the US Senate, Senator Hitchcock (one of Wilson's party-mates) agreed with instituting a Colonial Senate by saying that the bill's section that discusses the legislature in the Philippine was there to give them a "very natural but a very moderate" legislative independence. Hitchcock also characterised the addition of the Senate as the "most important change" the bill

gives the existing colonial constitution (53 Cong. Rec. 609-610, 1916). Another main feature of the bill was that Filipinos had the authority to pass laws that had to do with setting tariffs, coinage, mining amongst others, something that was heavily restricted under the Organic Act (Curry, 1957: 82).

Electoral politics
Given the Wilson's party's manifesto pronouncements, the pressure was mounting for Wilson and his party to deliver on their campaign promises. They had won control of the executive and legislative branches of government.

As mentioned previously, Harrison blamed the failure of previous iterations of the Jones Bill on threats by the opposition Republicans to filibuster or stymie it. Harrison was also well aware that the fate of the president's party depended on the successful passage of the said bill. Harrison believed that the opposition's game plan was to pin issues of further self-rule on whether such moves would undermine the efficiency of government in the colony. This way, the opposition would hope that it would undercut the president's party's narrative.

There were, however, also electoral-religious interests at play, particularly within Wilson's party. Harrison found that the president's party-mates who voted against the bill were mainly Catholics and that their attitude was due to the intervention by and influence of Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore, purportedly in relation to the investigation of Church authorities in the islands. Furthermore, a pro-independence newspaper reported that the Catholic Church had interests that were controlled by an "old revolutionary element" and that they were afraid that independence would risk the Philippines to fall under Japan hands, which to the Church meant a step closer to paganism (Beadles, 1968: 438). Again, this demonstrates that the Catholics were still an influential driver of colonial policy and electoral fortunes. As discussed previously, it was difficult to get around the Catholic Church, especially as they were an important group for members of Wilson's party, especially in the northern part of the country.

Other economic interests
There was a mixed view of whether the Philippines was still commercially viable for the US.

On the one hand, Taft mentioned that while powers such as England and their colonial territories were enriched through trade, the US was a country "large enough" without any trade and that he did not think that it should be a basis to retain the Islands. Nonetheless, Taft cited figures showing how US sovereignty over the Philippines improved trade and commerce in the islands: from approximately $4 million in 1899 to $50 million within 15 years (United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Philippines, 1915: 398-9). One of Wilson's Senate ally, Senator Shafroth thought nonetheless it was a matter of who were being ruled rather than the rulers themselves (ibid).

On the other hand, Wilson would hardly be alone among presidents to cast doubt on the economic value of the Philippines to the US at some point in his presidency. Even Roosevelt conceded in 1913 that the US no longer had "any special beneficial interest" in retaining the islands (in Ninkovich, 2001: 75). On some level, his open-mindedness about the Philippines was hinted in the previous decade when

he said that the US should be open to setting the islands free in the future, although back then he still expressed a preference for retaining the islands.

INSTITUTIONS

Structures built for purpose?

However, even as concerns about Filipinos being able to govern themselves festered, some officials in the Wilson administration believed that the current system actually made it difficult for the US to achieve its stated objectives in the Philippines. Thus, newer management would think it needs to try something different.

Ford also inspected the conditions of self-governance in the islands. Upon his arrival there, his initial impression of the overall situation was "very grave" and due for "radical treatment". Ford opined that the problem did not lie in the men running the policies as with the policies themselves (Ford, 30/4/1913: 52497). In his report, Ford had concluded that "American administration has been attended by greater success in organising the Philippines and fitting the country for self-government than I had supposed before visiting the Islands". Moreover, he also said that the Wilson administration adhered to the view that the insular government should conform not to the Americans' so-called "theoretical views", rather the context found in the Islands. Finally, Ford thought that the existing insular government accomplished what it set out to do and that by delaying the further devolution of self-government would be a breach in the pledges the US made to the Islands. He identified difficulties, however, such as when it came to improving the literacy level of most inhabitants from their local dialects into more national vernaculars of English or Spanish. Ford nonetheless thought that it was an unnecessary burden that islanders learn English in order to be deemed literate. As such, Ford recommended that the voting franchise be extended to males literate in local dialects. He then further called on the Wilson administration to focus less on hiring local staff for the civil service and rather, economic reform. In this light, given the differences he observed in both the Philippine and mainland US economic development, he thought that the Philippines should have its own system of taxation and navigation to facilitate economic independence (in Link, 1978b: 244-245).

The mood to alter some aspects of the existing structure were rooted in desires to account for whether existing structures reinforced undesirable behaviours of Filipinos. Whereas some of the prevailing policies of US on Filipinos were based on the premise that Filipinos were unable to manage to govern their affairs, others feared it was these structures introduced by the US that would make it worse. Ford (1914) also expressed his concern that the existing set-up of governance was ill-suited for the Philippines in that it would perpetuate the bad habits associated with factionalism rather than facilitate good governance. Ford proposed repealing of the Organic Act, and the Philippines be instead placed directly under the control of the White House who could decide to establish a legislature controlled by the Islands' native inhabitants. Ford believe instead that his proposed set-up could discourage Filipinos from rebelling since he thought they would have what they need and thus become more militarily self-sufficient to defend themselves against the Japanese threat (ibid).

There were initiatives to include more Filipinos in the central colonial governance structure even before the 1916 bill was passed. Wilson (in Kramer, 2006: 352) reiterated that as the Philippines was part of the US, he had hoped to "deprive [themselves] of that frontier". He also sent to Quezon a message which said the US regarded itself as "trustees" who acted for the "benefit of the Philippine islands" and that each step taken would point in that direction (ibid). In light of this, his then Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, recommended that the Islands' legislature be comprised mainly of Filipinos in the upper house (Philippine Commission) in addition to the lower house while reserving an executive veto for either the Governor-General, Secretary of War, and US President. Garrison reminded Wilson that the prevailing doctrine was that the Filipinos have more leeway to be able to govern their affairs. Initially and to be consistent with the statements government officials had released to the public as well as tradition, the War Secretary did not call for an immediate change in the structure but wanted Filipinos to have more say under the existing structures. For sure, he explicitly indicated that there need not be elections to executive positions as there were to the Philippine Assembly (Garrison, 24/4/1913: 51960-1). In turn, Wilson's designated Governor-General, Benjamin Harrison instituted a practice known as "Filipinisation", under which Filipinos became part of the provincial and insular bureaucracy. To be consistent with such actions, on 6 October 1913, Harrison promulgated a message from Wilson to the Filipino people which reiterated that the US administration would take every step with a view of "ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence" (in Link, 1978b: 323-4).

As an immediate consequence of Harrison's new policies, more than half of the members of the Philippine Commission consisted of Filipinos. US encouragement of business activities also came to an end under Harrison's stewardship of the islands (Kramer, 2006: 352). It was said there that Wilson had a "hope" to take the Philippines out of US sovereignty.

Moreover, based on the suggestions of Ford in the previous section, he wanted to frame the question of self-government more as an expression that it would better serve Filipinos when it came to being able to chart their own economic destiny. He then cited the discrepancies between the US and Philippine systems. It implied that as much as looking out for the welfare of the Islands' economy, the desire to push for self-government had the hope of also keeping the mainland's economy in-tact. By pegging the Philippines tightly to the US, Ford was suggesting that it would undermine economic stability back home.

Congressional Politics and Priorities

The reality of Congressional politics was something that factored into the bill's progress.

Although the bill's first iteration had its genesis in the 1912-13 session, it was competing with issues on the First world war, conservation, shipping, and an emergency tax bill in 1914 for Congress' attention. Ultimately, the Senate was unable to pass it before the end of the 63rd Congress (in Curry, 1957: 86).

The preamble in the Philippine Bill became a source of contention, especially among the then-opposition party. Garrison wrote to Wilson that his allies in Congress were worried that the insistence of wording the preamble in such a way that suggested a promise of independence would threaten any chances of passage during the current session (Garrison, 26/2/1915: 73234). Before this, the opposition raised objections to the timing of introducing the Jones Bill. Congressman Towner, for instance, claimed that it was "unwise" to introduce and discuss late into the 63rd Congress any issues regarding the Philippines were deemed sensitive. Even a mere suggestion of outright independence at that point would make the Philippines ground zero in a war that would involve many countries who wanted a stake in the Far East such as Germany and Japan (in 53 Cong Record 15802, 1914a). Moreover, as the US was engaged in war in the Far East region, Towner and other members of the opposition thought that it was not prudent to push further self-government in the Islands and instead recommended increasing the debt limit of the Islands to $15 million from $5 million to aid them for the expected tie-up of Pacific shipping (Dougherty, 1914: 12). Elections were coming up in just over a month.

In reply to Towner, Jones cited a previous statement by Towner, whom he purported to say that some form of legislation to provide relief for Filipinos and business operating in the Islands was needed. Additionally, the letters were written by Mr Fairchilds, a businessman whose corporation invested $4 million of its money in the Islands. Jones said that Fairchilds claimed that the course of action proposed by the former's bill was "imperatively demanded". Moreover, Jones even reiterated that Towner even characterised the bill as a "conservative" one (in Congressional Record, 26/9/1914: 15803-4). A few days later, Towner renewed his call to hold off any moves for independence in the Islands, citing the example of Canada and Australia where back then, he claimed that while they enjoyed self-governance, they were not clamouring for outright independence because of their association to the country that exercised sovereignty over them (in Congressional Record, 3/10/1914: 16134).

Even though Wilson's controlled both chambers of Congress and the White House, the party's majority was not large enough to overcome opposition. That was a concern made by officials of Wilson's administration Later in Wilson's first term, Harrison wrote to Tumulty whereby the former blamed the failure of previous iterations of the Jones Bill on threats by opposition Republicans to filibuster or stymie them as they made their way through Congress (Harrison, 31/8/1915: 37854-37855).

INTERACTION OF THE IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS REVISITED

The given reasons appear compelling for officials to pursue a higher degree of autonomy for Filipinos. However, some ideas, interests, and institutions are insufficient in and of themselves to understand the motivations that these officials and politicians had.

Interactions between ideas and institutions

In light of discussing institutions, one way to consider it is that the institutions in the Philippines officials and politicians hoped to work with and rectify with their presence. Institutions are the rules of the game and the constraints that agents faced and can also include social and economic situations. Although there was more work left to be desired, it was difficult to claim that there was no progress in terms of economic progress and education rates back in the colony. It would mean that the notion that Filipinos were unable to govern their affairs became somewhat less salient in the 1910s than when the Americans started to take up the colony. On the other, granted that a lot of work remained, the proposed set-up and the fact that it would take decades before members proposed another major piece of related legislation were testaments to such a reality. It is therefore in this way where institutions constrain ideas: the improvements, however limited they were, limited the salience of the ideas that Filipinos were never going to be ready for being capable of managing their affairs.

In moves to try to devolve more power to the colonial government, there are instances whereby ideas help make sense of the related institutions. As mentioned, the notion that Filipinos were unable to govern themselves prompted officials to reconsider whether existing institutions continued to serve their original purpose. Even though there were material improvements, the fact that officials still invoked some doubts about the ability of Filipinos to defend themselves was manifested in how officials questioned whether the existing institutions were helping them achieve the stated objectives.

In relation to the foregoing, there were American ideals Wilson and his designees in the Philippines felt they needed to uphold. Based on the assessments, the current institutional set-ups were no longer appropriate as far as trying to project American ideals were concerned. Hence, officials deemed that a reconfiguration of the institutional laws was necessary.

Interaction between institutions and interests

The institutionalised set-up of Congressional and electoral politics discussed in the Institutions section provides a manifestation for how such set-ups constrain interests, particularly those who want to pursue their interests as easing colonial control over the Philippines. Given that there were many agenda items that Congress had to pursue, there is a chance that the interests related devolving the system of government in the Philippines may be de-prioritised in favour of other interests.

Still, on the issue of relationships between institutions and interests, the fact that warding off the threat of Japan was an interest that military officials invoked points to questions about the extent of the strength of the US military. As mentioned, officials claimed that since the Philippines was a territory of the US at the time, the Philippines was fair game for Japanese conquest. As such, the then-set-up of the US military in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines was not adequate and would thus undermine their mainland interests.

As was discussed in previous chapters, the Catholic Church was a powerful institution. A notable vote among the Congressional members who expressed initial opposition to independence initiatives were Catholics. Given that there was

the Catholic Church was keen on retaining the Philippines for reasons such as to discourage the growth of paganism that would result if another power would take over. In turn, Catholic Congressional members were wary about what that institution would do if such members would go against it. Hence, there was a constraint for Catholic members against pursuing interests that undermine their electoral prospects because of the power the Catholic institution over the voters these members depended on.

Furthermore, the electoral interests of other officials and politicians in the mainland were reflected in the use of the institutions. Given how legislative voting worked, the Wilson administration, despite having his party control Congress, encountered intra-party challenges in convincing his party-mates to vote for devolution. As mentioned earlier, some of these were related to the fact that most of those who initially opposed to Wilson's party were Catholics. They have manifested their interests through the institutional of levers of Congressional power.

Interaction between ideas and interests

To make sense of the upholding American ideas, it helps to look at it alongside the interest of officials wanting to improve the US' reputation as an emerging global superpower. As the coming First World War had undermined existing European powers, someone needed to take over. The US was in a position to so. However, officials acting on behalf of the US needed to exhibit credibility by at least showing that they are making efforts to conduct themselves consistent with the values they claim to espouse.

Party and electoral politics were also present. For a variety of reasons ranging from the hypocrisy to racist views about the Philippines, Democrats had been usually - though not universally or consistently – against colonisation. The 1912 Democratic manifesto contained such ideas. They were also a guide for such politicians to think that their electoral fortunes hinged partly on how they pursued these interests.

Furthermore, electoral politics, particularly the Democratic Party's manifesto and how some members of the party saw the Philippines from a racial perspective, security-related interests had to be examined in conjunction with each other. Earlier iterations of the manifesto stated that Filipinos "cannot be citizens without endangering our civilisation" (Democratic Party, 1900). Although this was an older manifesto item, the 1912 campaign provided room for those who still harboured such ideas about Filipinos to pursue security-related interests. It is in this way where ideas could reflect security interests.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER ASSESSMENTS

President Wilson signed the Jones bill into law on 29 August 1916. He said that upon signing it that the bill "excites peculiar feelings' in him because 'there have been times when the people of the Philippine Islands doubted [US] intentions to be liberally just to them". Wilson hoped that the bill reassures the locals of the US' intentions for them (Link, 1964: 355).

Given that pressure from lobbies wanting to keep the Philippines as a US possession was present, the Jones Law was considered a way to satisfy such

colonial interests by nominally instituting a looser grip on the Islands' internal affairs short of outright independence. That law was the last primary law passed in Congress that concerned devolving internal Island matters to its inhabitants before the Tydings-McDuffie law 19 years later. Why it took that long to push for another law to further give the Philippines even more independence is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the fact that it took a long time for politicians to propose further devolution (as compared to the time that the Organic Act was in effect) implied that the Jones Law successfully addressed something that inflamed the passions of those seeking more self-determination in the islands. It also implied that US officials had interests that they could achieve more successfully with the reforms set in the 1916 constitution than with the Organic Act. It would come in the form of more Filipinos being in the legislature while at the same time, the US would dictate some of the issues Filipino officials should not advocate.

Just as with the previous administration, the situation with Japan, especially that the US back then was not completely capable of protecting the Islands from an attack by those forces, was a factor that prompted officials to reconsider their position and give urgency to whatever actions they needed to do to the Islands.

In discussing interests, ideas, and institutions, this chapter has again demonstrated the difficulty of discussing some of them *per se*. For one, the notion of whether Filipinos were fit enough to govern themselves is relevant for the discussion on the existing institutions that the Americans set forth for the Filipinos. The officials that Wilson appointed assessed whether the US governance structures were fit for purpose and a shared notion was that Filipinos were not in a position to manage their affairs effectively. Thus, the basis for officials deciding on what path the Philippines would need to be on were dependent on whether the existing institutions were perpetuating the social structures their predecessors sought to eliminate, to begin with.

Although it is too simplistic to say that party politics had any direct effect on policy, it was clear that getting into the Philippines was something Wilson's party largely sought to avoid in the first place if they could. Wilson's party maintained a relatively anti-colonialist line that the party tried to tie to its electoral fortunes. It needed the bill to pass were it to be successful in the upcoming 1916 elections. Even though 1914 to 1918 was also a small window in which Wilson's Party held both the executive and legislative, the parliamentary hurdles were something they needed to consider, and the opposition party took advantage of such hurdles.

The passage of the Jones Bill happened to be the last time in almost two decades Congress would pass a law granting a greater degree of self-government to the Filipino people than was previously the case. Given further fears of what Japan may do to the islands, Quezon further requested future US administrations not to hasten any moves towards granting Filipinos more power than what they have. In the ensuing years, the effects of the 1929 Great Depression has made US-based business reconsider their position in the islands, with more of them favouring letting the islands free (Ninkovich, 2001). Although the 1916-1935 era is beyond the focus of this work, one can imply that there were business and geopolitical interests, particularly a change in economic conditions that started to factor in.

PART V – CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XI: CONCLUSION: THE 3Is AND GRADUAL LIBERALISATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

OVERVIEW

After nearly two decades of the United States colonising the Philippines, the US presented both political and material reforms. However, as this thesis has shown, the reforms introduced were not executed merely to improve the lives of Filipinos. Officials had underlying interests to introduce such reforms. However, one has to look at these interests alongside various ideas and institutions to understand how these reasons are related and thus in and of themselves not sufficient to understand such decisions.

This concluding chapter provides a summary of the key ideas, institutions, and interests discussed in the previous chapter that have helped shape US officials' decision-making and how they interact. This chapter aims to reiterate the fact that although there are valid ideas-, institutions-, and interest-based explanations for why officials introduced the relevant reforms, they are connected to a significant degree with each other and hence should be understood in relation to each other.

This chapter will begin by going through the most recurring ideas of Filipinos as "uncivilised" and Taft's Policy of Attraction. The interests of internal, external security, as well as the economic opportunities generated and electoral and partisan politics. Such institutions will be described again with a view that they were constraining factors in decision-making, and interacted with one of the other ideas and interests.

The chapter then reiterates how the ideas, institutions, and interests interact with each other. In particular that a) ideas help agents make sense of interests and institutions, b) ideas also reflect agents' interests, c) institutions limit and facilitate the effectivity and saliency of interests, and d) institutions result from the construction of agents' interests.

The chapter closes by considering the wider lessons from this thesis and the implications from it.

IDEAS

As the earlier sections suggested, ideas are about the knowledge and values that decision-makers hold. Ideas are about what these actors think about the underlying issues that help them to make decisions as well as the values that inform such decisions.

Filipinos as Uncivilised?

One of the most commonly-recurring ideas for whether to give the Philippines such forms of governance was the idea of Filipinos not being civilised enough. In particular, most officials harboured an image of Filipinos unable to govern themselves and manage themselves.

This notion was significant when there were questions about political institutions such as the Philippine Assembly. Senators who were allies of Republican presidents were under the impression that Filipinos were unable to govern

themselves enough to warrant their own insular parliament (May, 1980: 58). There was a fear that these institutions would be used to introduce measures that would counter the interests of the US.

That initial idea of Filipino was also cited when it came to why officials wanted to develop the colonial economy as discussed in part III. For Taft and his colleagues, free enterprise could civilise a society. He stated in a letter to Senate ally Lodge that "nothing will civilise them [Filipino people] so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital here [in the colony]".

This notion of uncivilised Filipinos also formed the basis for educational policies. Taft's conception of education was in line with making people ready to be able to govern themselves even though he had shown no intention of granting them this sense of autonomy anytime in the foreseeable future. That was the case, as he also said that Filipinos should be capable of self-governing before the government that he led could be turned over to them (Brands, 1992: 68). Education policy was thus also used to instil in locals patriotism and unity, as well as a preparation for democratic "self-government" (Sobritchea, 1990: 74-5) even if Taft had no foreseeable plans to grant Filipinos such a privilege. Taft testified that the Filipino race was not yet ready and had a somewhat limited potential relative to their white counterparts to get educated enough to manage their own affairs (in Committee of Insular Affairs, 1/3/1902: 96).

Taft's policy of attraction

A related idea to the notion of civilising Filipinos is Taft's broader notion of trying to attract Filipinos. The attraction of Filipinos came with the idea that by introducing reforms that are associated with American ideas, officials could win Filipinos over (Burns, 2010). In this way, there would be fewer reasons for Filipinos to want to break away from the US.

One of the elements of this was introducing mass-based education. In here, there was an emphasis on reinforcing American values. These values included liberty (to the extent permitted) and enterprise. However, at the same time, officials acknowledged the risks that Filipinos may use them to demand more than what the officials were prepared to or legally permitted to offer. To allay fears of what education could do, officials imposed restrictions on what criticisms locals may express in the colony.

INTERESTS

This thesis has shown there were plenty of interests at stake as officials tried to decide the next move for the Philippines. Based on Hall's definition, these could include security, geopolitical situations, and economic opportunities.

Security against Filipino Insurrections

Security was of paramount interest to those operating in the colony. US officials often used security concerns as a basis for why they felt Filipinos were not able to manage their affairs satisfactorily. As mentioned, officials feared that Filipinos would misuse the institutions and use them to express their disdain for the colonisers, initiate insurrections, declare outright independence prematurely, and cause other forms of chaos that would undermine colonial security. It took several years to capture the key leaders of the Aguinaldo-led insurrection. Thus, there

was a view that resolving the security situation required deep and fundamental measures and not mere brute force.

Chapter 6 has shown that security was a reason for why Taft, an ardent opponent of outright independence or even further measures of devolution, introduced the Philippine Assembly. In particular, Taft proposed this idea as an incentive for Filipinos to cooperate with US officials. That is, even though a consequence of the Assembly was to provide more opportunities for locals to participate in the governance of the Philippines, Taft believed that one of its main functions was to aid in the pacification of Filipinos and prevent insurrections (Stanley, 1974). Taft hoped by providing such reforms, Filipinos would have to rebel against the US.

Chapter 7 also demonstrates that security was another primary reason for instituting mass-based public education in the Philippines in the first place. Taft made promoting primary education a central tenet to his so-called "policy of attraction", which is his policy used to win the hearts and minds of Filipinos (Burns, 2010: 57).

Amidst the security experiences, "Filipinising" Filipinos meant for colonial administrators returning to experiences the administrators would worry about. Thus, education was used as an avenue for the US to impart in Filipino minds the superiority of US values in the hopes that the risks of promoting independence would drop.

External Security

Chapter 10 has argued that two security issues prompted debate about the future of the Philippines in US custody: Japan and the First World War.

Both sides of the debate considered the issue of Japan when deciding the elements of the final form of the Jones Law would comprise. On the one hand, there was a broad concern that given the defence capabilities of the US in the north-western Pacific, Japan could use the Philippines as a backdoor to attack the US.

On the other hand, the vulnerability of the US to Japanese forces was also a reason for some officials to discourage not granting the Philippines further devolution. There was a feeling that if the US let go of the Philippines and Japan would, in turn, seize it, the ability of the US to secure the north Pacific would be undermined.

The First World War was also seen as a geopolitical factor in the introduction of the bill in Congress. In particular, the bill's provisions on giving Philippine bodies more leeway in the area of trade policy was looming large on the minds of its promoters.

Building American Credibility

Compared to European Powers, the US was a relatively young player in foreign policy. Various groups wanted to ensure that the US lived up to its ideals and that the way to do so was to act credibly. One way they would show this was to honour international laws and treaties the US entered into. Hence, how to handle the issue of redistributing friar lands was done partly to improve American credibility globally.

Some critics say that the US may lose credibility by the mere act of entering the Philippines, to begin with. However, by signing the Treaty of Paris with Spain, the US managed to secure its claims to the Philippines.

Economic Opportunities
Chapter 5 discussed some of the economic opportunities that the US was thinking of. One obvious interest that governed what the US wanted to do in the Philippines was the opportunity for China trade. The China trade aspect of this was salient, especially after given that the US was coming off a recession and it needed more markets for its goods. Furthermore, imperialists such as Taft and Roosevelt have found commercial value in acquiring and governing the Philippines as part of a network of naval and coal stations that would form a trade route between the US and China (e.g. McCormick, 1963; Beveridge, 1900; Gould, 1980). These officials believed the Philippines would also facilitate further access to the other trading ports (Vanderbilt in testimony to US Senate, 1900: 561).

Chapter 7 also demonstrated that economic considerations were one of the main considerations for instituting the educational curriculum that was in place. Officials and businesspeople needed graduates who could perform blue-collar work. Thus, officials felt that education needed to have a practical value. Given that one of the hopes was for the Philippines to facilitate trade between the US and the Far East and that the colonial economy was underdeveloped, there was a need for extra manpower to take on the economic demands. The blue-collar-based curriculum fed into the export-based orientation that colonial officials hoped to achieve out of the colony (ibid: 516).

Chapter 9, shows that tariff reform in the Philippines was a long-fought battle. The most important goods for local producers – sugar and tobacco, took years before becoming tariff-free. However, there was an economic situation in the US that prompted politicians to reconsider their position further than previously. During the 1912 election campaign, there was a concern about the high cost of living which the then-opposition Democrats exploited. Public opinion then felt convinced to want to reduce tariffs for relief from high costs.

Electoral and Partisan Politics
Electoral politics had been part of the equation. For instance, McKinley needed to demonstrate credibility on foreign policy given a perception that he lacked such. The acquisition of the Philippines became an opportunity for him to demonstrate it. His handling of the Philippines and more broadly the Spanish-American War was often considered a reason for a rise in his popularity through the 1900 election campaign (Gould, nd).

The Catholic vote (related to the institution of the Catholic Church described in the next section) was also something sought after. The Catholic vote was especially prominent in two instances. The first instance can be seen in Chapter 8 when Taft acknowledged that he had to be careful when it came to the redistribution of friar lands. Scholars have argued that a consequence of not dealing with the Catholic Church carefully would be alienating voters affiliated with the Catholic faith. Chapter 10 has also demonstrated that the Catholic vote was a reason for why some members of Wilson's party had expressed hesitation with how much power to give the Filipinos in the Jones Bill. It was as Democrats in the northern US

accepted the reality that the Catholic church did not want to separate itself from the Philippines, something that the US could do.

When it came to tariffs, as seen in Chapter 9, politicians also tried to appeal to key trade groups in a hope to win their political favours. It helped explained initial objections as these politicians feared political repercussions of crossing such groups.

Electoral politics also played another roll in tariff reduction. The mainland economy suffered problems and Democrats promised to voters that they would solve it. They won on that basis, voted to reduce tariffs to help fulfil their promises.

Moreover, in Chapter 10, in keeping with campaign manifesto promises, members of the new governing party tried to initiate moves towards giving Filipinos more power.

INSTITUTIONS

Pre-American Social Structures in the Philippines

Most of the institutions in the Philippines were discussed in detail, especially in Chapter 4. An important aspect of it was that there were deeply-informed and deeply rooted pre-existing social structures that have been a breathing ground for challenges that US officials would face. Statistics that indicated a lack of progress in the Philippines were also rooted in the issues Chapter 4 has identified. Taft indicated that if he had his way, he would rather not deal with the groups that were products of these institutions. However, Taft was left with limited options for whom he and his colleagues could work with.

Such behaviours witnessed encapsulates a broader finding. Given the situation that the likes of Kerr had witnessed, it was apparent to American officials that the Filipinos could not be trusted to govern themselves and undo the atrocities the Spaniards did to them with without any assistance. This idea has been built up gradually. It was also apparent that officials who wanted to rule the Philippines had a stronger case to do so and portray the Filipino subjects lacking the abilities to operate a government. Based on these, Kerr (1906: 13) thought that to giving the Filipinos gradual liberties associated with liberal democracies was something more feasible than early full autonomy. One can surmise that with what the Spaniards left the Philippines, the US was looking at the Philippines more from a perspective of what the islands can contribute to the former's fortunes.

Property Rights

Among the most important considerations in promulgating economic-related policies were protecting the institutions of protecting property rights. In the US, it was of paramount importance that parties to an agreement demonstrated credibility when it came to their ability to respect such. Some scholars have suggested (e.g. Lamoreaux, 2014) that property rights protection worked hand-in-hand as a consequence of suffrage (of white men), which was part of the idea of 'American exceptionalism'. The approach to land distribution was also a testament to the US trying to institute property rights.

Catholic Church
Taft and his successors as governors-general wanted to institute some form of land redistribution. However, the Catholic Church acted as a constraining factor. It was among the most important institutions that politicians needed to appease, of which whose Spanish arm was also an institution that the Treaty of Paris hoped to protect. That was especially an important consideration given that the largest parcels of land were still legally under the names of the Friars. This one, along with other institutions mentioned earlier meant that officials were resigned to need to the exercise restraint when there were conflicts that arose. The last reason stated was quite similar to the dilemmas faced by the central Spanish government when it tried to reign in abuses by the Friars (see Cunningham, 1916). Furthermore, Taft saw the recommendation of his Commission to exclude all friars as "too radical", and that he believed the US could accomplish more by not looking bad in front of them (Taft to Wright, 22/6/1902; series 3 reel 36: 2).

INTERACTIONS AMONG IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS

The framework has helped explain that the commonly cited reasons for the officials colonising the Philippines and introducing liberal reforms have connections to each other.

Ideas help agents make sense of their interests and institutions.
One could witness how ideas could help agents make sense of institutions through desires of officials to promote economic growth. Given that officials and their business allies were clamouring to support measures that encourage free enterprise, a relevant question to be posed is what ideas feed into such. As discussed in Chapter 5, before the colonial relationship began, there were the ideas of the glut thesis and capitalism in general. Another instance that highlighted the interaction between interests and institutions was security-related interests. As this interest contained an emphasis on insurrection concerns, it implies and presupposes that a prevailing idea had to be that Filipinos were prone to committing insurrections. One could make a similar premise that the idea of Filipinos unable to manage their affairs and the uncivilised notion helped inform the officials' security-related concerns (e.g. insurrections).

One could also identify the interactions between ideas and interests when it came to how to approach voters. For instance, Democrats wanted to win elections, and they saw an economic crisis under the other party's government. Tariff reduction, as a part of economic relief measures, was the idea that Democratic politicians considered. Hence, the latter served as an option to help Democratic politicians make sense of their interests to win votes in the 1912 election, and its passage was a way to show voters the party would keep its promise.

Ideas reflect an agent's interests.
Based on correspondences, concerns about security and the Filipinos inciting insurrections fed into the idea that Filipinos were not capable of being given outright liberties and that they needed further guidance. This thesis has reinforced the notion that the interest of security is inseparable from the ideas Americans had about Filipinos, and thus the ensuing policies. These security issues help form the basis of what Americans think about Filipinos.

As mentioned in Chapter 10, to understand and appreciate what upholding American ideas meant, it helps to look at it alongside the interest of officials

wanting to improve the US' reputation as an emerging global superpower. As the coming First World War had undermined existing European powers, someone needed to take over. The US was in a position to so. However, officials acting on behalf of the US needed to exhibit credibility by at least showing that they are making efforts to conduct themselves consistent with the values they claim to espouse.

Institutions limit or facilitate the effectivity of ideas and saliency of interests. First, when it comes to how institutions inform interests, as demonstrated in the previous section, winning over certain votes cannot be separated from respecting the institution associated with them. One can imply that the institution in this light has sway over the groups that hold the key to whether an actor's interest would be satisfied. The institutions, which are also normal behaviours or "rules of the game" (North, 1995), also provide a springboard and constraint for actors to pursue their interests. If politicians wanted to win votes or the US was to build its reputation respectively, they needed to act without breaching certain constraining institutions.

Another example of institutions informing interests was the norm of adhering to neutrality and building, especially as the Spanish-American War was going on. As mentioned in Chapter 5, given that the US and the host countries were bound by neutrality, the US was forced to find a station somewhere else. US officials wanted to defeat Spain. However, Britain and China's refusal to grant American requests made the Philippines an alternative for establishing a base for US naval operations.

Similarly, respecting the institution of property rights also spoke to the interest of the US to be a credible player in the world stage. As mentioned earlier, the US was trying to build its image and credibility, and it could ill-afford to renege on treaties. It meant that a way to build credibility was to honour its international commitments, something that respecting property rights would demonstrate. As Chapters 5 and 8 have explained, officials feared violating that norm may cause diplomatic, legal, and political consequences for the US reputation. Thus, the need for prolonged negotiations.

This thesis has shown the institutions in the Philippines that came from the pre-American era. These practices and norms were compared to the standards that officials believed were acceptable. In particular, the notion that Filipinos prize reciprocity and indebtedness, social institutions made prevalent back then gave credence to the idea that Filipinos do not prize less corrupt forms of governance and hence are not trustworthy enough to govern themselves. The institutionalised social structures provided the basis that Filipinos in general were - as far as colonials officials were concerned - an uncivilised group. It also caused worries among US officials if the institutions they set up were built for purpose, i.e. effective enough to stem the problem brought about by the ideas US officials had.

The social structures left during the Spanish era were also some reasons for rebellions and calls for independence from all colonisers. Hence, colonial administrators became nervous about securing the colony. As such, this is an instance of where the structures and rules of the game back then help inform agents' security agendas.

Furthermore, institutions are manifested in pertinent laws and norms. The prevailing colonial institutional set-up gave agents even more compelling reasons to come out in favour of relaxing trade restrictions. The 1902 Organic Act did not permit the colonial government to set the colony's trade policy independently (Curry, 1957: 84). Officials felt that passage of the bill warranted consideration since that war was said to disrupt trade involving the Philippines. Trade disruption would mean that Congress would need to intervene and give the Islands an aid package just to recover very often. The involvement of the US in wars similar to the one described meant that economic interests operating in the Philippines were threatened. The fact that Congress set laws also implied that the economic interests of the federal government were more likely to be undermined if they would stick to the existing legal arrangement for the Philippines. That is as the colony could not move to alter its trade strategies without Congressional authorisation. That would thus impose unnecessary and onerous costs and burdens to the US mainland.

Institutions result from the construction of an agent's interests
As Chapter 10 has discussed, the electoral interests of other officials and politicians in the mainland were reflected in the relevant institutions. Given the rules of legislative voting, the Wilson administration encountered intra-party challenges in convincing his party-mates to vote for devolution. These were related to the fact that most of those who initially opposed from Wilson's party were Catholics. They have manifested their interests through the institutional of levers of Congressional power.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

For the reasons discussed in the thesis, the US introduced institutions associated with liberal democracies. However, given there was a security interest in keeping the Philippines from, US officials had to work with actors they felt were the closest to becoming "civilised" even if Taft and his colleagues regarded these Filipinos as corrupt. In that case, it was the established local politicians. It would mean and point to the fact that the ability of ordinary Filipinos to participate depended partly on security interests.

Moreover, as officials underscored the importance of vocational/blue-collar over academic/white-collar subjects in the 1900s, it meant that most Filipinos would be precluded from the prestigious occupations that the *illustrados* would enjoy. Although progress and social mobility existed, the fact is only relatively few Filipinos continued to make it to university and hence be offered well-paying and leadership jobs.

The Philippines would not experience a major wave of political liberalisation initiatives until 1935. Given that there was a nearly two-decade gap between the passage of such initiatives, it implies that the ideas and interests of US officials were satisfied for the time being. Furthermore, the institutions both in the Philippines and US constrained them, and the institutional set-up in the Philippines, as imperfect as it was, became much less of a concern for officials.

BROADER LESSONS

Ultimately, this thesis attempted to contribute to the existing body of literature by providing context to the interests of officials and showing that these interests were in and of themselves not a sufficient reason to propose, pass, and execute the

reforms. This thesis has shown that the possible factors and reasons for why agents decide to act in a certain manner are more connected to each other than most analysts think.

It is inevitable to identify the possible interests that actors who promote pertinent policies possess. However, the previous section and the rest of this thesis emphasises one has to consider the interests in a certain context, and ideas and institutions provide this. When it comes to analysing interests, for instance, this thesis contributes by questioning how actors considered such to be their interests. Scholars should, thus, not assume the interests have an inherent meaning. Likewise, institutions provide the circumstances that help actors consider what interests that are feasible for them to pursue. For instance, one could consider whether difficulties in passing legislation could be traced back to racial ideas about who may benefit from them and whether these racial ideas could have informed any interests legislators had or vice versa.

Given the Orientalist literature presented and reviewed in Chapter 2, the role of ideas also becomes important when considering the policy-making process. The thesis has established that the belief of actors about Filipinos was an important factor to influence other pertinent policies. It could also be instrumental in understanding the ideas-based factors behind why various pieces of legislation could succeed or fail.

The application of the 3Is framework to the Philippine colonial situation also highlights that ideas involved in the policies may be a product of the interests. Some officials put forward policies based on certain ideas. The ideas behind the policies, however, also contain the interests that actors possess.

Based on the Philippine case, institutions have acted as a constraining factor. However, they may have also facilitated change. Based on what the thesis has shown, institution-based factors may contribute to change if agents believe that they are not fit for purpose. Chapter 10 has demonstrated that case when the existing institutional set-up the US had in the Philippines no longer served the original purposes. The fact that the institutional set-up may contribute to change may also indicate that these institutions, when built, reflect the interests and ideas behind why they were established. Additionally, each agent has different agendas. Therefore, they could find support from these institutions if it helps them serve their interests.

As to whether factors involving ideas, institutions, or interests are most important in decision-making, the thesis has shown that the major factors would, to some degree, depend on one or the other. It is thus the hope that this thesis has provided an opportunity to demonstrate how the 3Is framework reveals the connection between some of the most commonly cited reasons. In other words, this thesis has also hoped to establish how a few of them depend on the others.

This thesis has not sought to directly contradict existing literature that casts the US as a positive or negative force. It does not even disregard the atrocities other scholars (e.g. San Juan, 2002) have argued. In fact, this thesis, where appropriate, has shown evidence of some politicians and officials thinking the Filipinos negatively. The thesis has also pointed the environment that would make

such thoughts salient. However, the thesis could not ignore the fact that the US has introduced even a limited form of liberal democratic reforms.

Based on everything mentioned, the thesis has hoped to contribute to a more insightful and integrated manner of understanding the reasons for why actors make certain decisions or oppose their passage.

APPENDIX A: DRAMATIS PERSONAE OF SOME KEY OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS INVOLVED

Emilio Aguinaldo – President of Philippine Revolutionary Government (1898-1899)

Nelson Aldrich – United States Senator from Rhode Island (1881-1911), a supporter of Philippine annexation, and co-author of Payne-Aldrich Act that would allow some provisions for tariff-free trade for goods from the Philippines to the US

Fred Atkinson – American Director of Education in the Philippines (1900-1902)

Jose Basco y Vargas – Philippine Governor-General (under Spanish rule) (1778-1787)

Albert Beveridge (also known as Alfred Beveridge) – United States Senator from Indiana (1899-1911), a supporter of Philippine annexation and tariff reduction for goods coming from the Philippines

Edward Carmack – United States Senator (1901-1907), an opponent of an early iteration of a tariff bill that would reduce goods from the Philippines to the US

Josephus Daniels –Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921)

Bradley Fiske – Rear Admiral in US Navy under Josephus Daniels who commented on US military position vis-à-vis Japan.

William Cameron Forbes – Philippine Commissioner of Commerce (1904-1909); Governor-General of the Philippines (1909-1913)

Lindley Garrison – War Secretary under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1916)

Gilbert Hitchcock – United States Senator from Nebraska (1911-1923) who pushed for reforms in the 1916 Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law.

Francis Burton Harrison – Philippine Governor-General (1913-1921)

George Frisbee Hoar – United States Senator, an opponent of Philippine annexation

Luke Wright – Philippine Governor-General (1904-1906)

William Atkinson Jones – United States Representative from Virginia (1891-1918) and author of Jones Law.

Henry Cabot Lodge – United States Senator, in favour of Philippine annexation

Samuel McEnery – United States Senator from Louisiana (1897-1910), an opponent of granting US citizenship to Filipinos when the Philippines was annexed.

Frank McIntyre – Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs during Taft and Wilson administrations (1912-1929)

William McKinley – United States President (1897-1901) who oversaw the annexation of Philippines

Sereno Payne – United States Representative from New York (1889-1914) and co-author of Payne-Aldrich Act that would allow for some provisions for tariff-free trade for goods from the Philippines to the US.

Manuel Quezon – Member of Philippine Assembly (1907-1916); Resident Commissioner of the Philippines (1909-1916); later first President of Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1944)

Theodore Roosevelt – United States President (1901-1909)

Elihu Root – United States War Secretary from 1899 to 1904 under Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt

Henry Stimson – War Secretary under William Taft (1911-1913)

William Taft – Philippine Governor-General (1901-1904); United States War Secretary under President Theodore Roosevelt (1904-1909); United States President (1909-1913)

John Patrick Tumulty – Private Secretary to President Woodrow Wilson (1911-1921)

Albert Todd – First Education Superintendent of the Philippines during when the colony was placed under military rule

Horace Towner – United States Representative from Iowa (1911-1923) and an opponent of Philippine independence during Wilson administration

Oscar Underwood – United States Representative (1897-1915), House Majority Leader (1911-1915), and author of Underwood Tariff Bill

Woodrow Wilson – United States President (1913-1921), signed 1916 Jones Law

APPENDIX B – LIST OF ARCHIVES AND DATABASES CONSULTED

Manuscripts

- William Forbes Papers [Manuscript: Houghton Library, Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts]
- Bernard Moses Papers, 1875-1915 [Manuscript: The Bancroft Library, University of Berkley California]
- Louisiana Purchase Exposition, Collection 1890-1904 [Manuscript: State Historical Society of Missouri]
- Philippine Bureau of Education Reports (1907, 1911) [Manuscript: Available at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor]
- Theodore Roosevelt Papers [Microfilm: Library of Congress and www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org]
- John Spooner Papers [Manuscript: Library of Congress, Washington DC]
- William McKinley Papers [Microfilm: British Library, London and Library of Congress, Washington DC]
- William H Taft Papers [Microfilm: British Library, London and Library of Congress, Washington DC]
- Woodrow Wilson Papers [Microfilm: Library of Congress, Washington DC]

Government Databases

- Congressional Review [National Archives, Washington DC; also available on Government Printing Office Website]
- Reports of the Philippine Commission (1900-1903, 1904, 1913-1914) [available at hathitrust.org and University of Michigan's *The United States and its Territories* website: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/]
- United States Department of Commerce and Labor Reports (1907) [available at hathitrust.org]
- United States House of Representatives, Committee on Insular Affairs, committee hearings and reports [available through Proquest Congressional at the Library of Congress, Washington DC]
- United States Senate, Committee on the Philippines, committee hearings and reports [available through Proquest Congressional at the Library of Congress, Washington DC]

Newspaper and Periodical Databases

- *Manila Times* [Microfilm: Rizal Library, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila Philippines, and Library of Congress, Washington DC]
- *New York Times* [https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/browser]
- *South China Morning Post* [Microfilm: British Library, London]
- *Washington Post* [Microfilm: British Library, Library of Congress, Washington DC]

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35 Congressional Record 5788-5796 (1902) (Speech of George Frisbee Hoar).

44 Congressional Record 2373 (1909) (Speech of M Foster).

50 Congressional Record 1328-1229 (1913) (letter of A Strasser of Cigar Makers' International Union of America to Hon Frank B Willis).

51 Congressional Record 15803-15804, 15834 (1914) (Speech of Rep W Jones)

51 Congressional Record 15834 (1914) (Speech of Rep W Jones)

53 Congressional Record 609-610 (1916) (Remarks of G Hitchcock, 15 August 1916)

53 Congressional Record 1680-1685 (1916) (Extension of Remarks of Hon Nelson E Matthews of Ohio in the House of Representatives, 15 August 1916)

53 Congressional Record 2107-2108 (1916) (Extension of Remarks of Hon Nelson E Matthews of Ohio in the House of Representatives, 15 August 1916)

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